335 Phil. 507
VITUG, J.:
1) Order, dated 14 March 1994, ruling on Emilio R. Tuason’s “Motion to Remove Guardianship” (Certified True Copy, Rollo, p. 38);In not a single instance, in the foregoing incidents, did private respondent appear to have seriously objected to the jurisdiction of the court.
2) Order, dated 28 November 1994 ruling on Emilio R. Tuason’s Urgent Omnibus Motion (Certified True Copy, Rollo, pp. 39-41);
3) Order, dated 21 December 1994 ruling on Emilio R. Tuason’s Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction (Certified True Copy, Rollo, p. 42);
4) Order, dated 26 December 1994, resetting the case for presentation of evidence anent Emilio R. Tuason’s application for injunction (Certified True Copy, Rollo, p. 43);
5) Order, dated 15 March 1995, denying Emilio R. Tuason’s Motion for Reconsideration (Certified True Copy, Rollo, p. 44); and
6) Order, dated 25 July 1996, setting the hearing for Emilio R. Tuason’s motion for a restraining order or preliminary injunction and granting him twenty (20) days temporary restraining order (Certified True Copy, Rollo, p. 45).
“The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. The decisions promulgated heretofore by this Court would likewise seemingly apply estoppel to bar the defendant from pursuing that defense by alleging in his answer any other issue for dismissing the action.The case of Yangco vs. CFI of Manila,[3] cited by the appellate court, is not really in point. The petitioner therein, Yangco, did not seek any affirmative relief, instantly taking, instead, an exception from the trial court’s jurisdiction over his person. In the case at bench, Rule 15, Section 23, of the Rules of Court -
“A citation of a few of our decisions might be apropos.
“In Wang Laboratories, Inc. vs. Mendoza (156 SCRA 44), this Court has ruled that if the defendant, besides setting up in a motion to dismiss his objection to the jurisdiction of the court, alleges at the same time any other ground for dismissing the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In the process, it has equated the matter to a situation where, such as in Immaculata vs. Judge Navarro, et al. (146 SCRA 5), the defendant invokes an affirmative relief against his opponent.
“x x x x x x x x x
“When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Syllabus, Flores vs. Zurbito, supra, at page 751. That rule was followed in Ocampo vs. Mina and Arejola, 41 Phil. 308).”[2]
“Sec. 23. What is equivalent to service. - The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service.” -is clearly applicable.