349 Phil. 434
ROMERO, J.:
Criminal Case No. 17449In short, Marcos and Dans were separately charged under Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452 for accepting employment in and/or acting as Chairman and Director, respectively, of the PGHFI while the latter had pending business (the lease agreements) with the LRTA, which they both also headed. With regard to the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17453, the accusations against both of them stemmed from the contracts they signed in representation of the LRTA and of the PGHFI which were allegedly entered into “under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.”
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:That on or about September 8, 1982, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into an agreement for the development of the areas adjacent to the LRTA stations and the management and operation of the concession areas therein, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Criminal Case No. 17450
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Criminal Case No. 17451“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS of Violation of Section 3(d) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:Criminal Case No. 17452
That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS, a public officer, being then the Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Chairman of (the) Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise had, at that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in her capacity as Chairman of LRTA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(d) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE P. DANS, JR., a public officer, being then the Vice-Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Director of (the) Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise had, at that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of LRTA.Criminal Case No. 17453
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:That on or about June 18, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.”
“WHEREFORE, judgment is now renderedPetitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the court’s decision on October 8, 1993. The Office of the Solicitor General also filed a motion for partial reconsideration on the same date, seeking civil indemnity for the People of the Philippines. On November 13, 1996, respondent court promulgated two resolutions, one denying the motion of Dans,[9] and another denying that of Marcos and modifying the assailed September 24, 1993, decision with the addition of a sixth paragraph in the dispositive portion which dealt with the civil liability of petitioners, viz.:[10]The Ombudsman is given thirty (30) days from today within which to make a determination of whether or not the other members of the Board of Directors of the Light Rail Transit Authority during the relevant periods with respect to the lease contracts dated June 8, 1984 and June 18, 1984 executed by said Authority with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. may also be prosecuted under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, and to report to this Court at the end of said period whatever determination he has made including the steps intended to be taken hereon towards a new preliminary investigation, if the same is appropriate.
- ACQUITTING the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and the accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. of the charge in Criminal Case No. 17449, there being no manifest and gross disadvantage brought about by the contract dated September 8, 1982;
- ACQUITTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS in Criminal Case No. 17451, it not having been demonstrated that the Information charging her had given her adequate notice of the acts for which she could be held liable under the law;
- ACQUITTING accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17452, it not having been demonstrated that the Information charging him had given him adequate notice of the acts for which he could be held liable under the law;
and considering that the charges against them have been proved beyond reasonable doubt- CONVICTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17450 under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby imposes upon each accused the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and ten (10) days as maximum.
Both accused shall also suffer the additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office as provided in Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3019;- CONVICTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17453 under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby imposes upon each accused the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and ten (10) days as maximum.
Both accused shall also suffer the additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office as provided in Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3019.
The bonds posted for the provisional liberty of accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17449, No. 17451 and No. 17452 are hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.”
“6. Accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily to reimburse the Light Railway Transit Authority for the prejudice that they have caused to said Light Railway Transit Authority through the lease contracts which they executed.Aggrieved, petitioners separately elevated their case to this Court for a review on the following grounds:(a) Under Criminal Case No. 17450, the sum of THIRTY TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,172,000.00);
(b) Under Criminal Case No. 17453, the sum of NINETY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P92,268,840.00).”
“Since per testimony of witness Ramon Cuervo, Jr. (tsn, pp. 20 to 26, August 13, 1992) that considering the nature of the terminal at the Sta. Cruz Station, which would be (the) subject of the lease contract between the Light Rail Transit Authority and the PGH Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit “C”), the rental of the premises in question could go up to P400,000.00 per month if the LRTA would put up the building as against the stipulated rental of P92,437.00 actually entered into between the parties, there would appear cause to believe that the lease contract in question was grossly disadvantageous for (sic) the government.Dans questioned the denial on the ground that the demurrer should have been resolved solely on the basis of the prosecution’s evidence; and even assuming that it could be resolved using the evidence for the defense, the latter must have been previously formally offered.[13]
For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused Jose P. Dans, Jr., dated December 7, 1992, is DENIED for lack of merit.”
“First, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo taken at the instance of Engr. Dans on August 12 and 13, 1992, was already part of the record(s) in these cases when the Demurrer to Evidence was filed by Engr. Dans on December 7, 1992. The testimony was introduced into the record in exactly the same manner as any other testimony would be presented in evidence during trial. x x x.In any event, even if the testimony of Cuervo were to be excluded, there was enough evidence proffered by the prosecution, particularly Exhibits “B” (the lease agreement in favor of the PGHFI) and “D” (the sublease agreement in favor of TNCC) which would have more than justified the denial of the demurrer. In other words, notwithstanding Cuervo’s testimony, these exhibits constitute solid documentary proof of petitioners’ liability under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, as will be shown later in our discussion of Issue No. 5, “Was the evidence properly appreciated by respondent court?”
Being already part of the record in these cases, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo could be taken judicial notice of.
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. . . . ‘(J)udicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As a means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills the objects which the evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence unnecessary.’[16] Consequently, ‘the party desiring to establish a fact is relieved, when judicial notice is taken of the fact, from introducing evidence to prove it.’[17]
Second, having been given in the course of the proceedings in these cases, the testimony of Mr. Cuervo constitutes judicial admission of Engr. Dans who made it part of the record of these cases.As in judicial notice of a fact, ‘admissions made in the course of the judicial proceedings are substitutes for, and dispense with, the actual proof of facts.’[18] The party benefited by the admission is relieved of the duty of presenting evidence of the admitted fact and ‘(t)he court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence, the fact admitted by the parties.’[19]
xxx xxx xxx
Third, since the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo was given in open court and duly recorded, the Court could not just ignore the solemn declarations therein on the technicality that the testimony had not been formally offered in evidence. x x x.”
“That on or about June 8 [18], 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City [Sta. Cruz, Manila], with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.”[21] (Underscoring supplied)As can be readily observed, the informations meet the minimum requirements for them to be upheld in court.
“. . . A bill of particulars while provided for under Section 6 of Rule 116 is not a popular procedure among lawyers for the accused in criminal cases. For one thing, it may invite an amended information which is not only clearer but may also be stronger and more incriminating. However, it would have clarified and corrected at an early stage the kind of doubt which the accused in this particular case alleged to have entertained. Section 6 of Rule 116 provides:In fact, the records reveal that Marcos did file such a motion.[25] After the prosecution had filed its answer thereto, she was given an opportunity to file a reply, but she did not, thereby indicating that she was satisfied with what was already stated in the answer.SEC. 6. Bill of Particulars. -- Defendant may, at any time on or before arraignment, move for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.[24]The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have been an order from the court directing the Fiscal to amend the information because the defect, if there ever was one, was curable by the simplest of amendments or clarifications.” (Underscoring supplied)
“. . . In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act (No.) 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act.”We, therefore, affirm the constitutionality of Section 3(g) of R.A No. 3019, as amended.
“SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:It is clear that for liability to attach under the aforequoted provision, the public officer concerned must have entered into a contract which is “manifestly and grossly disadvantageous” to the Government. The court a quo phrased the focal issue in these petitions in this wise: “(A)re exhibits ‘A,’ ‘B’ and ‘C’, the Lease Agreements executed by the LRTA with the PGH Foundation over the LRT property at the stations in Pasay City and Sta. Cruz (Manila) ‘manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government’?”
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.”
“. . . ., (T)he avowed purpose of both accused in entering into the Lease Agreements was not to earn additional income for the use of the LRTA in its operations, but to give financial assistance to the PGHF in the pursuit of its charitable objectives.While these observations cannot be said to be flawed, they were made only after the trial, in fact, after the assailed decision was promulgated, and these conclusions are the court’s alone. The prosecution never attempted to establish a connection between the two defendants in committing the acts for which they were charged. It is a fundamental rule, however, that a charge of conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal accusation, that is, “independently and beyond reasonable doubt.”[35] In this regard, therefore, this Court’s opinion that the alleged conspiracy between the petitioners was not sufficiently established by the State’s evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
This expressly admitted purpose explains why the rentals stipulated in the Lease Agreements were so low that when compared with the rentals provided in the Sub-Lease Agreements, the latter deceivingly appear, to borrow the words of Mr. Cuervo, to be “extra-ordinarily high.” To have fixed much higher rentals would have been to reduce the income which both the accused would like the PGHF to earn from the lease contracts. And the rentals in the Lease Agreements all the more became very low in light of the fact that the Agreement for the development of the areas adjacent to the LRT stations was without any valuable consideration.”[33]
xxx xxx xxx
“In these cases, Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos had a common objective, namely, to lease in favor of the PGHF the Pasay City and Sta. Cruz properties under such terms and conditions so favorable to the PGHF as to result in manifest and gross disadvantage to the LRTA. This common purpose they pursued together and in concert with each other, being in the position to do so because they were both ranking officials of the LRTA and the PGHF.
Thus, on September 8, 1982, avowedly desirous to extend financial support to the PGHF (not to the PGH), Engr. Dans, representing the LRTA, and Mrs. Marcos, as chairman of the PGHF, executed an agreement wherein without any valuable consideration, the latter was granted (exclusive) authority to develop areas adjacent to the LRT stations and to operate commercial concessions therein.
In furtherance of their common design and pursuant to their intention to financially benefit the PGHF, Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos, acting in their said representative capacities, entered into a Lease Agreement on June 8, 1984, over the Pasay City area for P102,760.00 a month and another Lease Agreement ten days later over the Sta. Cruz Area for P92,437.20 per month. As already demonstrated, the monthly rentals and other stipulations in both contracts placed the LRTA in a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous position.
Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos were, therefore, both co-conspirators for having acted in conspiracy with each other and co-principals by direct participation for having taken direct part in the execution of the acts charged. Engr. Dans could not have committed the offenses without Mrs. Marcos and vice-versa.”[34]
“It was precisely for the reason that Mr. Cuervo was merely asked by Engr. Dans’ lawyer as to the fair and reasonable rentals of the leased premises as without improvements, without the LRT stations being adjacent thereto, and not parts of commercial centers, that the Court, through Presiding Justice Garchitorena, was constrained to propound questions on the fair and reasonable rentals of the leased areas by considering them as not ordinary parcels of land.”[38]The Court notes that while petitioners have been making such an outcry since the promulgation of the questioned judgment regarding the line of questioning followed by respondent court, none of them ever objected to such queries during the trial. Neither did they attempt to salvage the situation by asking questions on re-direct examination if they harbored the impression that the court’s cross-examination seriously prejudiced their case. This observation was likewise made by the court a quo, to wit:
“It is now too late in the day to object to the alleged leading, misleading, and badgering questions of the Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to ask (the court) to expunge the answers thereto from the record. Needless to say, Engr. Dans (and Marcos, for that matter) should have done so when the supposed objectionable nature of the questions and/or answers were propounded or given. (Section 36, Rule 132, 1985 Rules on Evidence). As it happened, he (and she) did not even raise his (and her) objections at the close of the testimony of Mr. Cuervo. He (and she) did not also ask re-direct questions to correct whatever mistakes or misimpressions allegedly crept into Mr. Cuervo’s testimony. Instead, he formally offered the entire testimony without making any exceptions or reservations.”[39]We should stress that in affirming the conviction of petitioner Marcos, this Court relies mainly on the prosecution’s documentary evidence showing the chasmic disparity between the P102,760.00 monthly rental stipulated in Exhibit “B” and the P734,000.00 monthly rental provided in Exhibit “D.” The testimony of Cuervo is, at best, opinion only, but the amounts mentioned in the said two exhibits are facts which cannot be altered by opinion, however “expert.” Regardless of Cuervo’s expert opinion on the probable rental rate of the Pasay lot, the stubborn fact and cold reality is that the PGHFI was able to lease it out for an amount that was seven times more than what it stipulated to pay the government. The sublease (Exhibit “D”) is the best monument to the “gross and manifest disadvantage” suffered by the government due to the willful actions of Marcos. Hence, even if the questions of Justice Garchitorena and the answers thereto of Cuervo were totally ignored by this Court, the prosecution’s evidence would still firmly stand, and would definitely be more than sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
1) the constitutionality of Sec. 3(g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,I concede the correctness of the ponencia’s finding as to the (a) constitutionality of Sec. 3 (g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, (b) sufficiency of the informations, and (c) proper representation of petitioner Marcos by counsel. However, with respect to the constitutionality issue, I hasten to add that contrary to petitioner Marcos’ claim, Sec. 3(g) is not a rider and therefore is not violative of the “one-title-one-subject” provision of the Constitution. There is nothing in the subject of Section 3(g), which reads:
2) the sufficiency of the criminal informations
3) whether petitioner Marcos was properly represented by counsel during the trial,
4) the validity of the decision rendered by the First Division of Sandiganbayan,
5) the denial of petitioner Dan’s demurrer,
6) appreciation/weight of the evidence, and
7) the alleged lack of fair trial.
“(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.”that is not germane to the title of R.A. 3019 which is the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”. This law covers wrongdoings committed by public officers. Section 3(g) does not deal with “negligence/mistake” as erroneously argued by petitioner Marcos. Rather it deals with a public officer’s act of entering into a “dishonest transaction in relation to official acts” per petitioner Marcos’ own definition of “corruption.”[1] Even assuming arguendo, that the act punished under Section 3(g) may be considered as negligent by nature, yet the opening statement of Section 3 clearly defined and classified it as one “constituting a corrupt practice.”[2] It is within the province of the legislative body to define and describe what acts are criminal and to prescribe the penalty therefor. In any case, petitioner Marcos failed to show a clear case of unconstitutionality of Section 3(g) and thus was not able to rebut, even by mere scintilla of evidence or argument, the presumption of constitutionality of the assailed provision.
“Since per testimony of witness Ramon Cuervo, Jr. (tsn., pp. 20 to 26, August 13, 1992) that considering the nature of the terminal at the Sta. Cruz Station, which would be subject of the lease contract between the Light Rail Transit Authority and the PGH Foundation Inc. (Exhibit C), the rental of the premises in question could go up to P400,000.00 per month if the LRTA would put up the building against the stipulated rental of P92,437.00 actually entered into between the parties, there would appear cause to believe that the lease contract in question was grossly disadvantageous for the government.It was highly improper for the Sandiganbayan to have ruled on the demurrer on the basis of the advanced testimony of defense witness Cuervo. A demurrer tests the sufficiency or insufficiency solely of the prosecution evidence and the trial court’s resolution in connection therewith should be strictly limited to that. This is unmistakably deducible from Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that a demurrer is filed and resolved when it is only the prosecution that has rested its case. Thus:
“For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused Jose P. Dans, Jr., dated December 7, 1992 is DENIED for lack of merit.”
“Section 15. Demurrer to evidence – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence; (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.That witness Cuervo’s testimony was taken in advance which the Sandiganbayan took judicial notice of, is no justification at all for the premature consideration of said defense evidence. For otherwise, it is a tantamount to an adjudication on the merits even before the defense takes its turn to present all evidence it deems necessary to its cause.
“If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.”
“Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. – The unanimous votes of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. In the event that the three justices do not reached a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering a judgment.” (emphasis supplied).Verily, by virtue of the creation of the Special Division, it is axiomatic that the First Division is divested of jurisdiction to pass judgment over the case in favor of the Special Division. And there is nothing in the law or rules that allows the original division to “re-render” a decision once a Special Division is already in place. Moreover, it was too speculative for Justice Garchitorena to consider as pointless Justice Amores’ manifestation. Who knows, Justice Amores’ opinion could have swayed the other Justices, and thus a different outcome may have possibly resulted.
“The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of all cases filed with it irrespective of the place where they may have arisen, x x x.”[8]The Quezon City restaurant where the Justices (Garchitorena, Balajadia and Del Rosario) took lunch and where they, as per Justice Garchitorena’s account, “discussed their positions in these cases”[10] is not the principal office or an extension of the Sndiganbayan. Neither was there any prior valid authorization to hold sessions therein. Clearly then, whatever discussion and agreement was made among the above-mentioned Justice present in that restaurant cannot be considered as “official business” and therefore, has no binding effect.
And its Rules of Procedure particularly clarifies that:
“sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or division, shall be held in its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila area where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it x x x.”[9] (Emphasis supplied)
“Offers for sale in the ‘Bulletin Today’FMV of the entire land, computed on P1,500.00/sq. m., is therefore, P11,010,00.00. Multiplied by the higher value of 8%, P880,800.00 then will be the fair rental value of the Pasay property per annum,[18] or P73,400.00 a month.“On January 20, 1984 –The firm of the witness itself had also made the following appraisal jobs:
629 sq. m. located along Taft Avenue Pasay City, offered for sale by Polo Manrique Realty with an asking price of P2,500 per square meter.
On October 16, 1983 –
RGV Realty offered for sale 1,000 sq. m. with improvement thereon along Taft Avenue, Pasay City, at P1.7 million or an average per square meter of P1,688.
On September 4, 1984 –
R.F. Pula, another broker, offered for sale 300 sq. m. of lot located on F.B. Harrison near Libertad St., Pasay City, for P1,500 per square meter.On June 7, 1984 –
Property along EDSA and Vizcarra St. close to Taft Avenue with an area of 823 sq. m. at P2,500 per square meter.
On June 6, 1984 –
25 contiguous lots along Taft Avenue, Maria Lim and Donada Streets near Dela Salle College with a total area of 12,000 sq. m. at P1,120 per square meter, with the area along Taft Avenue corresponding to 2,156 square meters at P1,700 per square meter.
On June 1, 1984 –
6 contiguous lots along Taft Avenue, Buendia and Donada Sts. with an area of 3,772 sq. m. at a total value of P7,964,900 or an average of P2,111.58 per square meter”[17]
“On May 28, 1983 –Fair rental value of this property was pegged at P969,907.68 per annum , or P80,825.64 a month.[20] This is assumed that the FMV per sq. M. is P10,623.76 at the same value of 8%.604 sq. m. lot located along Escolta offered by Uni-Invest Management Corporation at P6,000 per square meter;His company, the Cuervo Appraiser Company, appraised two (2) properties in that year, viz:
On June 13, 1982 –
323 sq. m. lot along Carriedo Street near Plaza Miranda offered for sale by Realtor R.F. Pula at P18,575.00 per square meter;
On April 5, 1982 –
439 sq. m. lot along Echague St. in Quiapo offered for sale by Honoria Development at P12,000 per square meter.On August 1, 1984 –
for purposes of selling, the Odeon Theater at Rizal Avenue cor. Recto Avenue with an area of 1,580 sq. m. appraised at P14,500 per square meter excluding the movie house); and
On March 19, 1984 –
The Philippine Commercial International (sic) Bank’s site at Plaza Sta. Cruz, more less diagonally across Dasmariñas, with an area of 679 sq. m. was appraised at P8, 500 per square meter.”[19]
“So we summarize.The problem with the Sandiganbayan’s findings is that it completely ignored the unchallenged testimony of witness Cuervo and instead supplanted the same with valuations based on unfounded assumptions and/or hypothetical situations. For the Pasay property, for instance, the Sandiganbayan – particularly Justice Garchitorena, proceeded from his insistent assumed premise that the property was with “substantial amount of improvement.” We quote the pertinent sequence of questioning from the transcript of stenographic notes, viz:
Considering the real estate values given by appraiser Cuervo,
(1) compared with the fair rental value of P80,825.65 under normal circumstances for ordinary properties there, the rental value of the Sta. Cruz area of the LRTA property (Exhibit “E”) would go up by 5 times or up to P400,000 ‘if they would use that space available for shops’ (p.23, TSN, August 13, 1992); and
(2) the estimate given by witness Cuervo for the Pasay City Station would still be twice as much as the stipulated rental in the lease agreement. ‘It would be that way, your Honor, if they would put up the shops….’ (p. 25, id)
In sum, according to witness Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., whom accused Dans qualified as a real estate broker and appraiser,
(a) the LRTA property is in Pasay City was leased to the PGH Foundation at ½ of what the property should have been leased out for; and
(b) the Sta. Cruz property was leased to the PGH Foundation for ¼ of what that property should have been leased out for,
Obviously there is a gross disparity here.”[21]
“ATTY. BELO | |
Q | What percent therefore of the fair market value constitute the rental of this property we talking about? |
A | P880,800 per annum, which would be a fair rental. |
Q | On the other hand, the rental stipulated in this contract is what? |
A | P1,233,120.00, sir. |
Q | So the rental stipulated in the contract exceeds what you call fair rental for this property? |
A | Yes, sir. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | That is on the presumption that there are no buildings on the land you are renting? |
WITNESS | |
A | Yes, your Honor. |
Q | However, here we are talking of property with substantial amount of improvement? |
A | I am computing it based on bare land, your Honor.”[22] (Underscoring supplied) |
x x x x x x x x x | |
“PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Now, the Court will ask questions. | |
Q | Mr. Cuervo, when you were talking about real estate both in Pasay and in Sta. Cruz, you were talking about buildings and properties that are either empty or of building in the same vein of no useful construction or else of ordinary construction. |
WITNESS | |
A | In this particular property, the one in Sta. Cruz, the building was demolished. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | We are talking of Pasay. |
WITNESS | |
A | The one in Pasay, I was told some improvements there were not yet existing at that time. |
Q | Obviously from your information the construction were of no significant value? |
A | Right. |
Q | We, of course, know what these properties are. These were the terminals, the important stations of the Light Railway Transport System, and if we did not know then, we know now that these constructions were of heavy designs and because of the nature of the activity there it will be a higher pedestrian traffic area which for retail purposes would be, presumably, a very important valuable piece of property, do you agree with that? |
A | Yes, for retail specially. |
Q | In that light, you are still prepared to tell us that insofar as Pasay is concerned, your appraisal in 1984 would still be rated at the same level that you were rating similar property which were listed among realtors in 1984? |
A | The value that I gave between P1,000 to P1,500? |
Q | Yes. |
A | That is because those improvements were not yet there. I am giving the value of the land as fair (sic, should be bare) not as already a station. |
Q | So that while, as a general statement, you would say for ordinary realtor in the Pasay area, your listing on Exhibit 4 would be valid. In fact, everybody in this courtroom knows that the property we are discussing here was not an ordinary piece of land? |
A | Was never an ordinary piece of property before it was built…. |
Q | Insofar as the subject matter now is concerned which is an LRT terminal? |
A | Yes, sir. |
Q | Will you now be in position to make a statement as to what a fair market value of the property would be, if not for acquisition, ……... what would be the value which would give you a fair rental? |
A | If the land would fair now? |
Q | Considering what it is being used for. |
A | The only thing that could be of value is the potential of what rental it could get by retailing but not the station. |
Q | So, as a retail outlet, or whatever, supposing you are going to lease it so that you could turn around and use it for advertising space, use it for particular stalls, stores, may be jeepney or tricycle terminal or whatever because it is an exchange, would you be in a position to do appraisals for rental value? |
A | Yes, your Honor. |
Q | Supposing the LRT at that time had engaged you and say, “Mr. Cuervo, we want to make money additionally out of this area, can you consult with us”? |
A | We would go on hypothetical. If there were no stores there at this point and time, then we will consider the rental rates of commercial properties of the immediate area, and with the market there we will also go to hypothetical approach to this area. Considering that it is a catchment area where thousands of people would be passing by in front of…….... |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | Have you thought of what values you would put there? |
A | No I did not get to that point. |
Q | Would you be in a position, you would not. But obviously, it would be much more than the values you gavr (sic) us on the basis of your listings? |
A | The value that I gave you in 1983? |
Q | We are talking of 1984. We are talking about whether Mr. Dans was remiss in that property in 1984. What would be the multiples that you would use if you were the consultant of LRTA? |
A | I would go to the prevailing rental rates of CANTIMAR (sic) and all the other stores, and the Baclaran activity, and then… |
Q | Can you given (sic) us the multiples that you would use if this is the latest rental ub (sic) the area, would it be more, the same or less? |
A | Definitely more comparing to Cantimar (sic) and the Baclaran area would probably be 2 to 3 times more. |
Q | Alright, let’s take it at 3. So, your testimony yesterday was what? Do you recall? Your estimate yesterday without inputing the LRT, was what again? |
A | P63,039.00 |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | That was your assumed fair market value for what period? |
A | Then we have P425,885. |
Q | Would be for what period, monthly period? |
A | That is the valuation. |
Q | No, Mr. Cuervo, we are talking this out in testimony and we want to be able to read well. What was your estimates for the fair rental value per square meter of Pasay, the one that you gave us yesterday. |
You gave us a figure yesterday. You were telling us that your land value is ranged from P1,000 to P1,500 in that area. Under this circumstances, what would be your fair rental at that time? | |
You can use your calculator. | |
A | Taking a high figure of P1,500 times .08 would be P120.00 per square meter your Honor. |
Q | Rental? |
A | Yes, your Honor. |
Q | So, for the entire property of 7,340 square meters |
A | P10.00 per square meter. |
Q | P10.00 per square meter would be a fair rental? |
A | Fair rental at that time. |
Q | With an area of 7,340, you were saying that 73,400 would be of the ordinary property then? |
A | Yes, your Honor. |
Q | Now, if we talk of a multiple of 3, then we are talking of P210,000 more or less? |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | Per month, what is the rental agreement under Exhibit 3-c? |
ATTY. BELLO | |
It was worth P102,760 monthly. | |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | So, if we are going to look at your figures, your estimated rental of P210,000 per month would be twice as much as the rental fixed in the Lease Contract of the LRTA with the PGH Foundation? |
A | Yes, your Honor.”[23] (Underscoring supplied). |
“Q | Now with regard to the Sta. Cruz terminal, again the figures you gave us in Exhibit 7 which is the lower half of your listings were again on the basis of the property as based on the environment there, all the way to Escolta and going all the way to North to Recto, and the fair lease rental that you gave us, at that time, would have been what? |
A | We came out with P969,970 against P1,109,246 which was the contract. |
Q | So the contract was ….. |
A | Was a little bit high. |
Q | So the contract was reading at P1.1 million. |
A | That’s right your Honor? |
Q | That was the lease rental of LRTA in favor of PGH Foundation. But we are talking about a general situation. Now, we have this particular station which was not only terminal but a crossroad really because you had people from all sides of Quiapo, Sta. Cruz, Rizal Avenue, which will board presumably all the way to Baclaran and all the way to Caloocan. So, you have a bigger mixture of people coming in. What would be your multiple here? |
WITNESS: | |
A | I would go as high as 5, your Honor. |
Q | Now, you estimated the proper rental value per month for the property to be what? |
A | (Witness making his computation) P80,825.64, your Honor. |
Q | For the total area monthly? |
A | The total area divided by ……… P70.82 per square meter, your Honor. P70.82 per square meter was the multiple for the 1,141 square meters. |
Q | That was your professional opinion? |
A | Yes, your Honor. |
Q | One more time. Your estimated professional opinion at that time, the rental value would be …….. |
A | I came out with the figure P969,970.49 for the year. |
Q | Is this per square meter or for the entire property? |
A | For the entire property divided by 12, we come out with P80,825.64. |
Q | So, this would be our fair rental on the optimum condition? |
A | Yes, sir. |
Q | Now, our Lease Contract there, Exhibit 6, tell us…. |
ATTY. BELO | |
Under the Lease Contract is P92,437.20 a month. | |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | If you say that the fair rental value was P80,000 but because of the construction of the particular nature of the condition of the Sta. Cruz station or the Carriedo Station, you would use a factor of 5, a multiple of 5, then you would be taking something like P400,000 per month rental. So on that basis, the rental of the LRT authority in favor of the PGH was almost ¼ as much as you think the rental should have been? |
ATTY. BELO | |
Objection, your Honor, that is not the conclusion. You see this Honorable Court is inputing the value as station now but the witness testifying on the fair market value at the time. | |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Correct, but we also ask him to input now the character of the railway station. That is why he said the railway station would make it much valuable 5 times more. | |
WITNESS | |
A Yes, if they would use that space available for shops. | |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Yes, of course. We are talking here of all other things being equal except the fact that we have a railroad station, a cross terminal. | |
So, here we are saying that P400,000 a month would be good rental? | |
A | Will they be putting up the building? |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
It does not matter. See, if the LRT put up the building it will ask for a fair return of the property. Whoever put up the building will charge for the rent. | |
WITNESS | |
A | If the tenant will put up the building his capital outlay on his own will be beside the rent. While if the LRT will put up the building, then the rent….... |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
That is correct, we are talking here about cost of money. There is a beautiful phrase for that in finance, how you project the value of the money-etc. | |
So there are our figures now. P400,000 more or less us a good asking price or fair rental price insofar s the LRT authority were concerned. Nonetheless, we are told that the monthly rental for the Sub-Lease in the Sta. Cruz property is how much per month, (sic) for the entire property? | |
A | The Lease Contract is P255,797.50 a month. |
Q | For the entire property? |
A | For the entire property. |
Q | So, based on your estimates it will still be ½ as much as you would charge if you were the LRT on the basis of the input? So, even if sub-leased to Trans-National Construction Corporation was still 50 percent cheaper than what you would have charge if you were going to advice the LRT as to what the rental would be. |
A | It would be that way, your Honor, if they would put up the shop. This is just a land. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | Except that we know now that what was being leased was not land but the facilities which would be available in the LRT terminal. |
WITNESS | |
A | The building was built by the lessee.”[28] |
“Q | As a professional because you are presented here as an expert, do you know of any reason why the consideration in the Sub-Lease Agreement was very much higher that the consideration in the Lease Contract after only 19 days? |
A | I am sorry I cannot give you an answer to that. All I know is that the rental of the sub-lease is extra-ordinary high. There must be some other reasons other than my knowledge.”[34] |
“Should there be a delay in any payment of the rental consideration equivalent to one year, the LESSOR shall have the right to take possession of the premises, the property and improvements thereon, the ownership of all improvements thereby accruing to the lessor.”[38]and then proceeded to say that:
“As if this disadvantage were not enough, in both acts, non payment of rentals by the PGH Foundation was not actionable unless the rentals were in arrears for one year (par. II, 4, Exhibits “B” and “C”). The LRTA could be, therefore, deprived of the enjoyment of the rentals from its two valuable pieces of real estate or of the interest income therefrom for almost one year without any recourse for the LRTA. And if the LRTA needed any money which it could have otherwise gotten from the rentals of the properties, it would have to borrow money from other resources and pay interest for eleven (11) months because the PGH Foundation had to be in arrears for twelve (120 months before the LRTA could take any action.This is a very narrow interpretation of said stipulation. I subscribe to petitioner Dans’ view that the stipulation gives the LRTA as lessor the “additional right” to recover possession of the two (2) leased properties and to acquire ownership of all improvements introduced thereon if and when PGHFI incurs arrears equivalent to one year rental. It certainly does not bar the LRTA from availing of other legal remedies not expressly contained in the contract, for the principle is well settled that an existing law enters into and forms part of a valid contract without need for the parties expressly making reference to it.[40]
“This was not only being over generous; it was gross abandonment of any effort to get decent terms for the LRTA.”[39]
“x x x x x x x x x | |
“Q | So the rental stipulated in the contract exceeds what you call fair rental for this property? |
A | Yes, sir. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | That is on the presumption that there are no buildings on the land you are renting? |
WITNESS | |
A | Yes, your honor. |
Q | However, we are talking of property with substantial amount of improvement? |
A | I am computing it based on bare land, your honor.”[47] |
(Underscoring ours.) | |
“x x x x x x x x x | |
“PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Now, the court will ask questions. | |
Q | Mr. Cuervo, when your talking about real estate both in Pasay and Sta. Cruz, you were talking about buildings and properties that are either empty or of buildings in the same vein of no useful construction or else of ordinary construction. |
WITNESS | |
A | In this particular property, the one in Sta. Cruz, the building was demolished. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | We are talking of Pasay. |
WITNESS | |
A | The one in Pasay, I was told some improvements there were not yet existing at that time. |
Q | Obviously from your information the construction were of no significant value? |
A | Right. |
Q | We, of course, know what these properties are. These were the terminals, the important stations of the Light Railway Transport System, and if we did not know then, we know now that these constructions were of heavy designs and because of the nature of the activity there it will be a higher pedestrian traffic area which for retail purposes would be, presumably, a very important valuable piece of property, do you agree with that? |
A | Yes, for retail especially. |
Q | Inn that light, are you still prepared to tell us that insofar as Pasay is concerned, your appraisal in 1984 would still be rated at the same level that you were rating similar property which were listed among realtors in 1984? |
A | The value that I gave between P1,000 to P1,500? |
Q | Yes. |
A | That is because those improvements were not yet there. I am giving the value of the land as fair not as already a station. |
Q | So that while, as a general statement, you would say for ordinary realtor in the Pasay area, your listing on Exhibit 4 would be valid. In fact, everybody in this courtroom knows that the property we are discussing here was not an ordinary piece of land? |
A | Was never an ordinary piece of property before it was built……. |
Q | Insofar as the subject matter now is concerned which is an LRT terminal? |
A | Yes, sir.”[48] (Underscoring ours) |
(For the Pasay Property) | |
Q | Will you now be in position to make a statement as to what a fair market value of the property would be, if not for acquisition,……… what would be the value which would give you a fair rental? |
A | If that land would fair now? |
Q | Considering what it is being used for. |
A | The only thing that could be of value is the potential of what rental it could get by retailing but not as station. |
Q | So, as a retail outlet, or whatever, supposing you are going to lease it so that you could turn around and use it for advertising space, use it for particular stalls, stores, may be jeepney or tricycle terminal or whatever because it is an exchange, would you be in a position to do appraisal for rental value? |
A | Yes, your honor. |
Q | Supposing the LRT at that time had engaged you and say, “Mr. Cuervo, we want to make money additionally out of this area, can you consult with us? |
A | We would go on hypothetical. If there were no stores there at this point and time, then we will consider the rental rates of commercial properties of the immediate area, and with the market there we will also go to hypothetical approach to this area. Considering that it is a catchment area where thousands of people would be passing by in front of………. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | Have you thought of what values you would put there? |
A | No I did not get to that point. |
Q | Would you be in a position, no you would not. But, obviously, it would be much more than the values you gavr (sic) us on the basis of your listings? |
A | The value that I gave you in 1983? |
Q | We are talking of 1984. We are talking about whether Mr. Dans was remiss in that property in 1984. What would be the multiples that you would us if you were the consultant of the LRTA? |
A | I would go to the prevailing rental rates of CANTIMAR (sic) and all the other stores, and the Baclaran activity, and then… |
Q | Can you give us the multiples that you would use if this is the latest rental ub (sic) the area, would it be more, the same or less? |
A | Definitely more comparing it to Cantimar (sic) and the Baclaran area would probably be 2 to 3 times more. |
Q | Alright, let’s take it at 3. So, your testimony yesterday was what? Do you recall? Your estimate yesterday without inputing the LRT, was what again? |
A | P63,039.00. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | That was your assumed fair market value for what period? |
A | Then we have P425,885. |
Q | Would be for what period, monthly period? |
A | That is the evaluation. |
Q | No, Mr. Cuervo, we are taking this out in testimony and we want to be able to read well. What was your estimates for the fair rental value per square meter of Pasay, the one that you gave us yesterday? |
You gave us a figure yesterday. You were telling us that your land value is ranged from P1,000 to P1,500 in that area. Under this circumstances, what would be your fair rental at that time? | |
You can use your calculator. | |
A | Taking a high figure of P1,500 times .08 would be P120.00 per square meter, your honor. |
Q | Rental? |
A | Yes, your honor. |
Q | So, for the entire property of 7,340 square meters |
A | P10.00 per square meter. |
Q | P10.00 per square meter would be fair rental? |
A | Fair rental at that time. |
Q | With an area or 7,340, you were saying that 73,400 would be of the ordinary property then? |
A | Yes, your honor. |
Q | Now, if we talk of a multiple of 3, then we are talking of P210,000 more or less? |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | Per month, what was the rental agreement under exhibit 3-C? |
ATTY. BELO | |
It was P102,760 monthly. | |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | So, if we are going to look at your figures, your estimated rental of P210,000 per month would twice as much as the rental fixed in the Lease Contract of the LRTA with the PGH Foundation? |
A | Yes, your honor.”[49] |
(For the Sta. Cruz Property) | |
“Q | Now with regard to the Sta. Cruz terminal, again the figures you gave us in exhibit 7 which is the lower half of your listings were again on the basis of the property as based on the environment there, all the way to Escolta and going all the way to North to Recto, and fair lease rental that you gave us, at that time, would have been what? |
A | We came out with P969,970 against the P1,109,246 which was the contract. |
Q | So the contract was…….. |
A | Was a little bit high. |
Q | So the contract was reading at P1.1 million? |
A | That is right, your honor? |
Q | That was the lease rental of LRTA in favor of PGH Foundation. But we are talking about a general situation. Now, we have this particular station which was not only terminal but a crossroad really because you had people from all sides of Quiapo, Sta. Cruz, Rizal Avenue which will board presumably all the way to Baclaran and all the way to Caloocan. So, you have a bigger mixture of people coming in. What would be your multiple here? |
WITNESS | |
A | I would to as high as 5, your Honor. |
Q | Now, you estimated the proper rental value per month for the property to be what? |
A | (Witness making his computation). P80,825.64, your Honor. |
Q | For the total area monthly? |
A | The total area divided by ….. P70.82 per square meter, your Honor. P70.82 per square meter was the multiple for the 1,141 square meters. |
Q | That was your personal opinion? |
A | Yes, your Honor. |
Q | One more time. Your estimated professional opinion at that time, the rented value would be….. |
A | I came out with the figure P969,970.49 for the year. |
Q | Is this per square meter or for the entire property? |
A | For the entire property divided by 12, we come out with P80,825.64. |
Q | So, this would be our fair rental on the optimum condition? |
A | Yes, sir. |
Q | Now, our Lease Contract there, Exhibit 6, tell us…. |
ATTY. BELO | |
Under the Lease Contract is P92,437.20 a month. | |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | If you say the fair rental value was P80,000 but because of the construction of the particular nature of the condition of the Sta. Cruz Station or the Carriedo Station, you would use a factor of 5, a multiple of 5, then you would be talking something like P400,000 per month rental. So on the basis, the rental of the LRT authority in favor of the PGH was almost ¼ as much as you think the rental should have been? |
ATTY. BELO | |
Objection, your Honor, that is not the conclusion. You see this Honorable Court is inputing the value as station now but the witness is testifying on the fair market value at that time. | |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Correct, but we also ask him to input now the character of the railway station. That is why he said the railway station would make it much valuable 5 times more. | |
WITNESS | |
A | Yes, if they would use that space available for shops. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Yes, of course. We are talking here of all other things being equal except the fact that we have a railroad station, a cross terminal. | |
So, here we are saying that P400.000 a month would be a good rental? | |
A | Will they be putting up the building? |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
It does not matter. See, if the LRT put up the building it will ask for a fair return of the property. Whoever put up the building will charge for the rent. | |
WITNESS | |
A | If the tenant will put up the building his capital outlay on his own will be beside the rent. While if the LRT will put up the building, then the rent…. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
That is correct, we are talking here about cost of money. There is a beautiful phrase for that in finance, how you project the value of money-etc. | |
So, these are our figures now, P400,000 more or less is a good asking price or fair rental price insofar as the LRT authority were concerned. Nonetheless, we are told that the monthly rental for the Sub-Lease in the Sta. Cruz property is how much per much, for the entire property? | |
A | The Lease Contract is P255,797.50 a month. |
Q | For the entire property? |
A | For the entire property. |
Q | So, based on your estimates it will still be ½ as much as you would charge if you were the LRT on the basis of the input? So, even if sub-leased to Trans-National Construction Corporation was still 50 per cent cheaper than what you would have charge if you were going to advice the LRT as to what the rental would be. |
A | It would be that way, your Honor, if they would put up the shop. This is just a land. |
PJ GARCHITORENA | |
Q | Except that we know now that what was being leased was not land but the facilities which would be available in the LRT terminal. |
WITNESS | |
A | The building was built by the lessee.”[50] |
“…It is indeed an impressive proportion (referring to the volume of questions of the trial judge), but no such mathematical computation is of itself determinative. However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and vigorous examination of the defendant himself by the judge, x x x, we fear that in its zeal for arriving at the facts the court here conveyed to the jury to strong an impression of the court’s belief in the defendant’s probable guilt to permit the jury freely to perform it own function of independent determination of the facts.”Let it thus be stressed anew at this juncture that convictions are based on the actual commission of crimes, to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always with justice.[54]
x x x x x x x x x
“This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking “clarificatory” questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial.”x x x x x x x x x
“A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression that he is allied with the prosecution”
“We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth of the transaction, but it is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of the crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interest of society.”
“Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses at length. The circumstances may be such in a given case as to justify the court in so doing…This court, however, has more than once said that the examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional which will justify the presiding judge is conducting an extensive examination. It is always embarrassing for counsel to object to what he may deem improper questions by the court. Then, in conducting a lengthy examination, it would be almost impossible for the judge to preserve a judicial attitude. While he is not a mere figurehead or umpire in a trial, and it is his duty to see that justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to conduct such examinations. The extent to which this shall be done must largely be a matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case, but in so doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of an advocate….”
“While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is largely in the discretion of the trial judge, it must be understood that we have not adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial procedure, even at the expense of occasional delays …. The judge is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and while he has the right, and it is often his duty, to question witnesses to the end that justice shall prevail, we can conceive of no other reason, for him to take the trial of the cause out of the hands of counsel.”
“The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and it is believed the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional in a high degree which will justify the presiding judge in entering upon and conducting an extended examination of a witness, and that the exercise of a sound discretion will seldom deem such action necessary or advisable.”
“He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.”
“The impartiality of the judge – his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of either one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of special importance in criminal cases.…”
“Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to dispose of these cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people’s faith in our courts.”
“Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process.”
“x x x. It is now too late in the day to object to the alleged leading, misleading, and badgering questions of the Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to ask to expunge the answers thereto from the record. Needless to say, Engr. Dans should have done so when the supposed objectionable nature of the questions and/or answers were propounded or given. As it happened, he did not even raise his objections at the close of the testimony of Mr. Cuervo. He did not also ask re-direct questions to correct whatever mistakes or misimpressions allegedly crept into Mr. Cuervo’s testimony. Instead, he formally offered the entire testimony without making any exceptions or reservations.”[55]In “Tabuena”, this Court took cognizance of the Sandiganbayan’s active participation in the examination of witnesses even when petitioners did not raise this issue at all either in the trial court or in their appeal before us, justifying the same under the doctrine that “an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.”[56] What more when, as in this case, this objection has been raised while the case is still within the power of review of the trial court.
“That morning of September 21, 1993, several members of this Court (i.e. Justice Regino Hermosisima, Jr., Justice del Rosario, Justice Balajadia and the undersigned) had appeared before a committee hearing of the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives at the Asian Institute of Tourism in Quezon City. They had a late lunch together at a restaurant in Quezon City after the committee hearing and it was there that Justice del Rosario and Balajadia as well as the undersigned discussed their positions in these cases. That was the time when the undersigned and Justice Balajadia agree with Justice del Rosario’s position”[4] Rollo in G.R. No. 126995 pp. 592.
“There and then, the undersigned as Chairman of the Division asked Justice del Rosario if he would mind if, by reason of our going along with his view resulting therefore in concurrence with Justice Atienza’s opinion, the Special Division were to be dissolved because of the lack of need therefor, i.e., there had resulted a unanimity among the regular members of the First Division were to be dissolved because of the lack of need therefor, i.e., there had resulted a unanimity among the regular members of the First Division Justice del Rosario said he did not mind at all so that as soon as the Justices arrived at the Sandiganbayan, the undersigned sent word for Justice Amores to join Justice Balajadia and the undersigned to discuss the agreement with Justice del Rosario. The undersigned then issued A.O. No. 293-93, dissolving the Special Division.
It was on that same day even before the undersigned had come back from lunch with the other Justices that Justice Amores had submitted his “Manifestation” to the undersigned in a sealed envelope asking for fifteen-day extension. The request for extension had, however, become pointless because of the agreement of Justice Balajadia and the undersigned with the conclusion of Justice Atienza.“Justice Amores did not at any time thereafter indicate in any way his opposition to the dissolution of he Special Division.“Justice del Rosario’s conclusion were similar to those of Justice Atienza.
“C. At all events, whatever position Justice Amores had taken would not alter the final decision.
“To Recapitulate :
Justice Balajadia and the undersigned had originally votedJustice Narciso Atienza had voted
- to convict accused Imelda Marcos in Criminal Cases No. 17450, No. 17451 and No. 17453;
- to convict accused Jose P. Dans in Criminal Cases NO. 17450, No. 17452, and No. 17453;
- to acquit both accused in Criminal Case No. 17449.
- to convict accused Marcos and Dans in criminal Cases No. 17450 and No. 17453;
- to acquit accused Marcos in Criminal Case No. 17451;
- to acquit accused Dans in Criminal Case No. 17452;
- to acquit both accused Dans and Marcos in Criminal Case No. 17449.
“If Justice Amores were to have disagreed with the conclusion reached by Justice del Rosario and Atienza (which were subsequently adopted by Justices Balajadia and the undersigned), he would have been outvoted by the other four Justices. On the other hand, if Justice Amores had concurred with the position taken by the four other Justices of the Special Division, it would have altered the decision as promulgated. Such concurrence would only bring about unanimity in the decision – which would be a very odd situation since a Special Division constituted precisely because of the existence of a divided court. If the Special Division had remained, the vote of Justice Amores either way would not have resulted in any change in the result of the decision as promulgated.
“A debate can be held about the correctness of the dissolution of the Special Division when the regular members of the First Division had come to an agreement. Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness thereof, however, it would not prove bias or prejudice In fact, if the Special Division had not been dissolved, the only effect of the extension sought by Justice Amores would have been to defer – and delay the promulgation for over fifteen (15) days. This would have been of no consequence to accused Marcos (nor to accused Dans) since, as above shown, the opinion still to be rendered by Justice Amores would no longer alter the results. (Certainly, accused Marcos does not claim that a deferment of, or a delay in, the promulgation of the decision would benefit either herself or accused Dans, and if she did say that, one would wonder what or how the delay would have benefited her specially after the Supreme Court had refused to act in G.R. Nos. 111784-87 which had precisely sought that deferment.)
“In closing on this point, it might be useful to note that none of the administrative orders which created and dissolved the Special Division, not even the separate opinions rendered by Justice Atienza and Justice del Rosario, were kept hidden; on the contrary, all were made part of the record – and open to inspection by all – as accused hae plainly seen. More than that: when Justice Balajadia and the undersigned had agreed during lunch on September 21, 1993 with Justice del Rosario’s presentation, the agreement was explicit that he written opinions submitted by Justice del Rosario and Justice Atienza, together with the Administrative Orders constituting and later dissolving the Special Division, would form part of the record because they were official acts actually performed by different members of the Court in connection with the cases. Likewise, the Administrative Order itself dissolving the Special Division explicitly stated the reason therefor: that Justice Jose S. Balajadia and the undersigned had agreed with the conclusion of Justice Atienza. There was no secret there.
“Accused Marcos makes an issue of the fact that some copies of the decision made available to media after the promulgation still bore the names of Justices Amores and del Rosario in the first page thereof. This was because when drafts of the decision were prepared for circulation to Justices Amores and del Rosario, their names were added to the draft in the office of the undersigned. When extra copies were reproduced for media, a clerical error resulted in someone producing the first page which had the five names including those of Justice Amores and del Rosario rather than the first page which had contained only names of three (3) members of the regular division.
“Since the Administrative Orders creating and dissolving the Special Division were all on record, there can be no great discovery there except only the discovery of clerical oversight.
“In sum, no irregularity can be attributed to the dissolution of the Special Division resulting from Justice Jose S. Balajadia’s and of the undersigned’s agreeing with the opinion of Justice del Rosario and, consequently, concurring with the conclusion of Justice Atienza. Certainly, no prejudice was brought about to either accused Marcos or to accused Dans. Certainly, no bias. (Rollo in G.R, 126995, pp. 383-387; Reply of Marcos, p. 88).