532 Phil. 671
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Medical Certificate of Rebecca EstrellaThereafter, respondents filed a Complaint[5] for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with justice, give respondents their due, observe honesty and good faith which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they are entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd
Lacerated wound, chin
Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right[3]
Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher
Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg posterior aspect popliteal area
and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and
antero-lateral compartment of lower leg.
Fracture, open comminuted, both tibial[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents to their destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage while its failure to rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable to respondents for the breach.[9]
In the Complaint -
1. In favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo, Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr., ordering said defendants, jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees or a total of P89,254.43;
2. In addition, defendant Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines and defendant Espiridion Payunan, Jr., shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rebecca Estrella;
3. On the counterclaim of BLTB Co. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo -
Dismissing the counterclaim;
4. On the crossclaim against Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. -
Dismissing the crossclaim;
5. On the counterclaim of Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) -
Dismissing the counterclaim;
6. On the crossclaim against BLTB -
Dismissing the crossclaim;
7. On the Third Party Complaint by Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Incorporated -
Dismissing the Third Party Complaint.
SO ORDERED.[8]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated October 7, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:The Court of Appeals held that the actual or compensatory damage sought by respondents for the injuries they sustained in the form of hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained. Accordingly, the 6% interest per annum should commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the complaint and not from the date of judgment. The Court of Appeals also awarded attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount recovered based on the retainer agreement of the parties. The appellate court also held that respondents are entitled to exemplary and moral damages. Finally, it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the claim of CDCP against Phoenix had already prescribed.
- The interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages of P79,354.43 should commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the complaint on February 4, 1980;
- Thirty (30) percent of the total amount recovered is hereby awarded as attorney's fees;
- Defendants-appellants Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each as exemplary damages and P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to Rachel Fletcher.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents; (2) whether the damages, attorney's fees and legal interest awarded by the CA are excessive and unfounded; (3) whether CDCP can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix.I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENTS BLTB AND/OR ITS DRIVER WILFREDO DATINGUINOO SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HEREIN RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE OR UNFOUNDED DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LEGAL INTEREST TO RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENT PHOENIX LIABLE UNDER ITS INSURANCE POLICY ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation. In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation,[17] we reiterated that joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo,[18] we held that:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. x x x
x x x x
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action so long as private respondent and her co- plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x xPetitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is ambiguous and arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the body of the trial court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr., are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella.[20] Moreover, there could be no double recovery because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for actual damages and attorney's fees.
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x
Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally.[19]
ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. Exemplary Damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission,[27] that:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation as they may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.[29]
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on February 9, 1993 when the trial court rendered judgment and not on February 4, 1980 when the complaint was filed. This is because at the time of the filing of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which plaintiffs may be entitled remains unliquidated and unknown, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the court and only upon presentation of proof thereon.[33] From the time the judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.
- When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
- When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
- When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the liability of Phoenix, the court a quo correctly ruled that defendant-appellant CDCP's claim against Phoenix already prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of P.D. 612, as amended, which provides:
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed within six months from the date of the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six months from the date of the accident, its claim has already prescribed.Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the insurance company concerned a written notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be filed within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought in proper cases, with the Commissioner or Courts within one year from denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action shall prescribe. (As amended by PD 1814, BP 874.)[34]