549 Phil. 146
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
A parcel of land (Lot 3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-180944, being a portion of Lot 3-A-2-B (LRC) Psd-140722, LRC Record No. 19405), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of Alcala, Province of Pangasinan, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2 by Lot 2 of the subdivision plan, and points 3 to 4 by property of the Heirs of Luis Soriano; on the SE., points 4 to 5 by property of the Heirs of Luis Soriano, and points 5 to 6 by property of Andres Dumpao; on the SW, points 6 to 7 Lot 3-B (LRC) Psd-54161; and on the NW., points 7 to 1 by Burgos street, 15.00 M. wide, and points 2 to 3 by Lot 2 of the subdivision plan. Containing an AREA OF ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO (1,492) Square Meters, more or less. Its technical description appears on TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 101871 — Register of Deeds for Pangasinan. Its assessed value is P9,600.00 as per Tax Dec. No. 6599 of Alcala.[4]As to the above properties, Nicomedes and Maria Rosario apparently executed an Agreement on Separation of Conjugal Properties[6] which reads:
(a) A parcel of residential land (Lot 1, Plan Psu-79891), situated in Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an area of two hundred ninety-two (292) square meters and covered by TCT No. 1037 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, issued to the names of Nicomedes and Ma. Rosario.
(b) A parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-79891) situated in Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an area of sixteen (16) square meters and covered by TCT No. 1037 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.[5]
I. MAIN MOTIVE OF THE AGREEMENT. Because of the absence of descendant, WE the undersigned spouses have adopted this AGREEMENT, in order to provide a Guidance and to prevent any possible misunderstanding and litigation between the surviving Spouse and the Heirs and successors of the predeceased Spouse. WE HOPE that the Courts of Justice will give legal value to these Agreements.On 22 June 1981, Maria Rosario caused the annotation and registration of the said agreement on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1037.
x x x x
V. The parcel of land in No. 2 SECTION A, including the House of strong materials built thereon and all Furnitures to be found therein, will belong exclusively to the Husband.
VI. The parcels of lands (Lot No. 1 and Lot No. 3) in SECTION B, including the House of strong materials built thereon and all Furnitures to be found therein, will belong exclusively to the Wife.[7]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:Respondents, through counsel Atty. Jose Antonio M. Guillermo (Atty. Guillermo), filed a Notice of Appeal dated 5 October 2002.[15]
- Allowing and granting the probate of the Holographic Will of Maria Rosario Braganza De Castro Rupisan (Spl. Proc. Case No. A-1278) and a certificate of its allowance to be attached to the Holographic Will is accordingly hereby issued, attested by the seal of this Court, pursuant to and in consideration with Section 13, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and which must be duly recorded with the Office of the Clerk of Court, as well as in the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Alaminos, Pangasinan;
- Dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. A-2106 for utter lack of merit, and
- Ordering plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-2106 to jointly and solidarily pay defendant moral damages in the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00); the reduced sum of exemplary damages in the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), including attorney's fees and costs of litigation in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).[14]
To emphasize the point, if it is true indeed that the plaintiff received through counsel on October 2, 2002, the Decision of this Honorable Court, then he has (sic) up to October 17, 2002 within which to perfect the appeal in Civil Case No. 2106 which is the timely filing of the Notice of Appeal, together with the payment to the Clerk of Court of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 22 November 2002 insofar as it dismissed their appeal in Civil Case No. A-2106. Acting on this motion, the trial court in an Order dated 16 July 2003 dismissed both appeals including that in Special Proceedings No. A-1278. The Court ruled that inasmuch as respondents' counsel of record, Atty. Guillermo, already filed his Withdrawal of Appearance on 4 October 2002, the Notice of Appeal filed on 5 October 2002, signed by said counsel, was invalid and no longer bound his clients, respondents therein. The RTC ratiocinated:
x x x x
However, with respect to Special Proceeding Case No. 1278, considering that Rule 141 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: "where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from notice of judgment or final order" and in which case therefore, with respect to Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278, the Notice of Appeal is deemed perfected except for the approval of the Record on Appeal.
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. A-2106, not having been perfected within the time provided for by law in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, the said appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.[18]
During the January 20, 2003 hearing which are for purposes of approval of the record on appeal and to determine whether such record on appeal filed by the oppositor in Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278 is in order and whether or not the other matters treated in the Opposition to the Motion for Approval of the Record on Appeal filed by petitioner are impressed with merit, the following facts surfaced, to wit:Anent Special Proceedings Case No. A-1278, the RTC disallowed the appeal thereon on the ground that respondents did not comply with the requirements provided by law. It said that aside from the fact that the documents involved were not arranged in chronological order the same also did not contained any data that will show the court that the appeal was perfected on time. It added that neither the Compliance dated February 11, 2003 filed by respondents contained any data showing that the appeal was perfected on time. The trial court said that these requirements are mandatory[20] and non-compliance therewith is fatal to the appeal.x x x x
- That on October 4, 2002, as shown by the date of the pleading entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance" filed by Atty. Jose Antonio M. Guillermo and which contained the conformity of no less than the oppositor himself, Romeo Rupisan, the said counsel, Jose Antonio M. Guillermo, stated as follows: "the undersigned attorney upon the request and conformity of plaintiff/oppositor respectfully withdraws his appearance as counsel for plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-entitled cases" and prayed that his Withdrawal of Appearance be noted by this Court;
- The aforesaid pleading was received and docketed in this court on November 12, 2002;
- However, notwithstanding the aforesaid withdrawal, the aforesaid counsel, Atty. Jose M. Guillermo, submitted and filed with this Court, without the conformity of oppositor, Romeo Rupisan, a "Notice of Appeal" dated October 5, 2002 in the above-consolidated cases and which was received by this Court on October 9, 2002;
- In the meantime, on November 8, 2002, this Court is in receipt of a "Motion for Approval of Record on Appeal" filed by Seguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako, which motion is dated October 29, 2002;
- Subsequently on November 11, 2002 (the same date of receipt by this court of Atty. Guillermo's Withdrawal of Appearance), this Court received the "notice of Appearance" dated November 5, 2002 of Seguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako, as counsel for the plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-captioned cases;
- Thereafter, on November 12, 2002, Atty. Jose M. Guillermo, filed with this court an "Opposition" dated November 12, 2002, to defendant/petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, alleging among others as follows: (a) that he is still the counsel of record for plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-captioned cases inasmuch as his Withdrawal of Appearance has not yet been acted upon by this court and considering that to his own knowledge, no new counsel has yet entered its appearance for plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-captioned cases; (b) That a record on appeal is not required in the instant case.
Verily, this Court has not acted on Atty. Guillermo's Withdrawal of Appearance dated October 4, 2002 and received by this court on November 12, 2002 considering that same is not a motion and he prayed that his Withdrawal of Appearance be just noted by the court while the Notice of Appeal dated November 5, 2002 was received by this Court on October 9, 2002. Thus, it appears that with reference to date, the Withdrawal of Appearance came ahead before the Notice of Appeal. However, with respect to the filing, the Notice of Appeal was filed ahead than the Withdrawal of Appearance.
Rupisan alleged on his Notice of Appeal that he received a copy of the Decision rendered by this Court dated September 25, 2002 on October 2, 2002 which means therefore that he has (sic) until October 17, 2002 within which to file his appeal. Although his Notice of Appeal dated October 5, 2002 and was received by this Court on October 9, 2002, the appeal/docket fee was paid late as payment was made only on October 23, 2002.[19]
WHEREFORE, for reasons above-stated, including those stated in the Order of this court dated November 22, 2002, which are not in conflict with the above, plaintiff/oppositor's appeal is denied. Accordingly, the decision of this Court dated September 25, 2002, has now become final and executory.[21]Respondents hastily filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was given due course. A Decision was rendered on 10 November 2004, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the respondent court denying the notice of appeal filed by petitioners for late payment of docket fees are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court is directed to give due course to petitioners' notice of appeal.[22]The Court of Appeals applied a liberal interpretation of the rules. It found the delay excusable as respondents demonstrated their willingness to pay the docket fees as manifested in their immediate compliance with the said requirement.[23]
Petitioner faults respondents for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed RTC order of 16 July 2003. Petitioner's theory is that a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals may be availed of only after having earlier filed a motion for reconsideration before the trial court.
- DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP No. 79405 NOTWITHSTANDING RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO FILE A PRIOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS AGAINST THE JULY 16, 2003 ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO.
- CAN A LAWYER WHO WAS PRIORLY DISMISSED BY HIS CLIENT STILL INTERVENE IN THE CASE BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHOUT THE CONFORMITY OF HIS FORMER CLIENT? STATED DIFFERENTLY, IS THERE A VALID NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THE INSTANT CASE.
- EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS VALIDLY FILED, WERE RESPONDENTS IN THE PRESENT PETITION ABLE TO PERFECT THEIR APPEAL ON TIME AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PLACING THE SELF-SERVING AND GRATUITIOUS EXPLANATION OF RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THEIR DELAY IN THE PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES, WITHIN THE REALM OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE LATE PAYMENT OF APPELLATE COURT DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.
- WHAT IS THE LEGAL STANDING OR HOW SHOULD THE MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL TOGETHER WITH THE RECORD ON APPEAL FILED BY SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO BE TREATED IN THE ABSENCE OF A VALID SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL?[25]
SEC. 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.Admittedly, Atty. Guillermo filed a Notice of Withdrawal on 4 October 2002. The withdrawal notwithstanding, the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 2002 initially allowed the appeal of the respondents in Special Proceedings No. A-1278, although it rejected the appeal in Civil Case No. A-2106. Be that as it may, we are inclined to allow the Notice of Appeal for both cases inspite of the obvious procedural lapse. When non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, in its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction.[30] This lack of intention to delay is shown by the fact that the Notice of Appeal was filed on 5 October 2002, or only a difference of one day from the filing by Atty. Guillermo of his Notice of Withdrawal. The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities. [31] While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice especially when such strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial court itself when it initially gave due course to the Notice of Appeal. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties.[32] Under the circumstances we find that the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Guillermo should be considered valid.
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.The failure of the appellant to pay the docket fees is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal under Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the same rule which states:
x x x x
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
SECTION 1. x x x.From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court.
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41.
Also without merit, in our view, is petitioner's plea for a liberal treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to the technical rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has consistently held that payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas v. Commission on Elections [245 SCRA 702 (1995)], such payment is an essential requirement before the court could acquire jurisdiction over a case:In Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,[34] decided 6 April 2000, the private respondents therein failed to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. They paid the fees only after the Court of Appeals had dismissed the appeal, that is, six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal "in the interest of substantial justice" without other justification. This Court, through then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, though not persuaded, recognized that there are exceptions to the stringent requirements of the law on payment of the docket fees. thus:The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 306 (1982). The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law."
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of this thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."[35] (Emphasis supplied.)Sure enough, the foregoing jurisprudence truly blazed the trails for a liberal application of the strict interpretation of the law.[36]