552 Phil. 166
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
About a year later, George, Jr. met Emy Ramos (Emy), who hailed from Pangasinan. George, Jr. and Emy developed an intimate relationship and, shortly after, Emy came to live with Iluminada and George, Jr. on the subject property. Even though Iluminada did not trust Emy at the beginning, the latter was able to deceive and win the old lady's confidence subsequently. It would then seem that Emy was later entrusted with the administration of Iluminada properties. In 1992, when Iluminada fell extremely ill and suffered mental lapses, Emy entirely took over the old woman's affairs, running the latter's household, as well as her businesses.PEBRERO 1, 1990
AKO SI ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN PIANO, BIYUDA AT NAKATIRA SA 119 13th AVENUE, CUBAO, QUEZON CITY AY NAGSASAAD SA KANINUMAN NA AKING IBINIBIGAY AT INPINAGKAKATIWALA ANG BUONG PAMAMAHALA AT PAG-MAMAYARI NG AMING KABUHAYAN PATI NA ANG MGA LUPANG KINATITIRIKAN NG AMING BAHAY SA KASALUKUYAN AT MGA BAHAY PAUPAHAN, SA AMING ANAK NA SI GEORGE BUTLER, JR. NA SIYA NAMING NAGING KASAMA AT KAPILING MULA SA KANYANG KAMUSMUSAN AT SIYA RIN NAMING GABAY HANGGANG SA NGAYON. IBINIBIGAY KO SA KANYA ANG LAHAT NG KARAPATAN BILANG AMING ANAK UPANG PAGYAMANIN ANUMANG KABUHAYAN ANG AMING MAIIWAN PARA SA KANYANG KINABUKASAN AT SA KABUTIHAN NG LAHAT.(Signed)ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN PIANO
(a) Iluminada's signature on the Deed of Sale, dated 21 December 1993, had been forged, as determined by George, Jr., who became very familiar with Iluminada's genuine signature through the years when he lived with her;George, Jr. also questioned the transfer of the subject property by respondent Alicia to her daughter and co-respondent Leticia shortly after acquiring the same and absent any consideration, implying that it was yet another ploy to take the subject property farther from the reach of its true owner.
(b) Around the date of execution of the Deed of Sale in 1993, Iluminada was already physically ill and mentally impaired;
(c) Iluminada never intimated to George, Jr. that she had any intention to sell the subject property;
(d) George, Jr. attested that there had been no negotiations between Iluminada and Alicia prior to the sale of the subject property; and
(e) Despite the fact that Iluminada was already physically and mentally frail, she supposedly executed the Deed of Sale, dated 21 December 1993, in Pangasinan, far from her home in Quezon City.
(a) The document, dated 1 February 1990, by which Iluminada purportedly bequeathed to George, Jr. the ownership and administration of all her properties, including the subject property, was a forgery and, thus, null and void;As to George, Jr.'s application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, respondents Alicia and Leticia opposed the same arguing that the MeTC, in Civil Case No. 22375, already settled the issue of possession of the subject property, and to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution therein would cause more harm and damage to respondents Alicia and Leticia and render the MeTC judgment useless. Therefore, respondents Alicia and Leticia prayed for the RTC to dismiss George, Jr.'s Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-01-44582, plus payment of damages for his filing of a baseless and unfounded suit.
(b) Respondent Leticia acquired the subject property from her mother and co-respondent Alicia in good faith and for value, three years after the latter bought the subject property from Iluminada;
(c) Respondent Leticia instituted before the MeTC Civil Case No. 22375 for unlawful detainer against George, Jr., and a decision in her favor was already promulgated, and which had become final and executory;
(d) George, Jr. had no cause of action against respondents Alicia and Leticia, and Civil Case No. Q-01-44582 instituted by George, Jr. before the RTC was only meant to delay the implementation of the Decision of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 22375 directing him to vacate the subject property; and
(e) Respondent Leticia has valid title to the subject property to which she had secured TCT No. N-165230 in her name in 1996. Her certificate of title should be accorded the character of indefeasibility, and any question as to its validity had already prescribed.
During that setting, the records will confirm that all of the said [herein respondents Alicia and Leticia, et al.] and counsel Viray were notified. To afford them one last chance, the repeat service of notices for today's hearing was ordered/effected and done, the details of which specifically as to the proof of service is now attached to the records.The RTC, in the same Order, gave the parties the option of either presenting evidence at a hearing or filing supporting pleadings on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; thereafter, the issue shall be considered submitted for resolution. In compliance with this Order, petitioner Felix and respondents Alicia and Leticia filed their Position Paper and Memorandum, respectively, and on 11 November 2002, the RTC issued another Order,[20] this time, granting petitioner Felix's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, thus –
The [herein petitioner Felix/representative George, Jr.'s] counsel was allowed to present briefly his case in Court and, to the appreciation of the Court, the main concern of the [petitioner Felix/representative George, Jr.] now is the "Sheriff's Second Notice to Vacate" of Branch 43, [MeTC], Quezon City. In effect, they are being asked to leave the premises in question by virtue of a Writ of Execution dated June 7, 2001 issued by the Acting Executive Judge of the said station, Judge Henri JP B. Inting.
From the records and as deciphered by the Court, the case before the lower court is one of unlawful detainer where herein [petitioner Felix/representative George, Jr.] lost and where incidentally the issue of ownership had been passed upon.
The case before this Court now will focus on the issue of ownership and/or reconveyance, the factual backgrounder being tied up to matters of inheritance and/or fraudulent acquisition and/or transfer of the subject property.
There being no direct, speedy and immediate recourse by [petitioner Felix/representative George, Jr.] in this case, there being initial merit to the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, this Court GRANTS the same.
Accordingly, the [respondents Alicia and Leticia], as well as [MeTC], Branch 43, its Sheriff and the Office of the Sheriff of Quezon City, Office of the Clerk of Court of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds are hereby DIRECTED to stop and/or desist from implementing the "Second Notice to Vacate the Premises" and/or Writ of Execution until and after this Court has heard the main case on the preliminary injunction.
For consideration of this Court in resolving the matter of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is the question on whether or not [petitioner Felix/representative George, Jr.] have the clear and unmistakable rights that will be violated in the event the enforcement of the Writ of Execution issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41 [sic] is pushed through.The RTC, in an Order, dated 25 March 2003,[21] denied respondents Alicia and Leticia's Motion for Reconsideration of its Order dated 11 November 2002.
Inasmuch as the issue before this Court is the alleged spurious and irregular transaction involving the alleged sale of the subject property, and considering that the ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41 [sic] involves only possession and not ownership, logic and prudence call for the maintenance of the status quo between the parties until after the case is decided on the merits.
To avoid any miscarriage of justice and injury to [herein petitioner Felix/representative George, Jr.], and considering that the title of the [herein respondents Alicia and Leticia] are [sic] now being assailed in this instant case, this Court is impelled under the premises to GRANT the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED, directing the [respondents Alicia and Leticia] and all persons claiming rights under them, The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, its Sheriff and the Office of the Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds to stop and/or desist from implementing the "Second Notice to Vacate the Premises" and/or Writ of Execution pending resolution of the main case, upon posting of a bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDERED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS pursuant to Section 4, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is a long-settled rule that for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) that his right has been violated and the invasion is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the property pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right, over his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one.In a Resolution dated 8 July 2004,[23] the Court of Appeals denied petitioner Felix's Motion for Reconsideration finding no sufficient reason to deviate from the findings and conclusion reached in its Decision, dated 23 April 2004.
In the case at bar, [herein petitioner Felix's] right to the possession of the subject property is not clear. [Petitioner Felix] merely bases his claim on his being an alleged heir of Mrs. Iluminada Piano, the original property owner. However, as a general rule, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings, more so when the object of the injunctive suit is a final and executory judgment already set for implementation. According to the Supreme Court, the underlying reasons for such ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. Hence, the mere existence of a judicial proceeding putting at issue the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is not enough reason to justify an exception to such general rule.
Besides, our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all the donations subject to collation would be added to it. Obviously, the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction were not met.
As for George Butler, Jr., who, while only designated as a representative of the [petitioner Felix], also claims rights over the property in question by virtue of his being an "adopted" son of the late Mrs. Piano, We note that he was the defendant in the ejectment case filed by [herein respondent] Leticia, which resulted in a final and executory judgment against him. It is a settled rule that injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level do not abate the latter. Equally settled is that, as a rule, injunction will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law.
Consequently, We are constrained to set aside the assailed orders of the respondent court, for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned orders dated November 11, 2002 and March 25, 2003 are SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Case No. Q-01-44582 is hereby DISSOLVED. The respondent court is DIRECTED to pursue proceedings in said civil case without further delay.
We find no merit in the Petition at bar. The Court of Appeals did not commit any error in setting aside the Orders, dated 11 November 2002 and 25 March 2003, of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-01-44582, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the said trial court.I.
THE HONORABLE SIX [sic] DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE INJUNCTION THEREBY TAKING THE PROPERTY OUT OF THE POSSESSION OF ONE PARTY AND PLACED IT IN ANOTHER DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE RIGHT TO POSSESS THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
THE HONORABLE SIX [sic] DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE INJUNCTION DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO APPEAR IN THE HEARING OF ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE NOTICE THEREBY WAIVING THEIR RIGHTS TO QUESTION THE ORDER GRANTING THE INJUNCTION.[24]
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory injunction which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act; and (2) a mandatory injunction which commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.[25]
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The Court also finds that the trial court's order granting the writ did not adequately detail the reasons for the grant, contrary to our ruling in University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal Jr., wherein we held that:Guided by the foregoing precedents, this Court likewise finds that the RTC Order, dated 11 November 2002, granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, is deficient for failing to state the factual and legal bases therefore.The trial court must state its own findings of fact and cite particular law to justify grant of preliminary injunction. Utmost care in this regard is demanded.The trial court in granting the injunctive relief tersely ratiocinated that "the plaintiffs appear to be entitled to the relief prayed for and this Court is of the considered belief and humble view that, without necessarily delving on the merits, the paramount interest of justice will be better served if the status quo shall be maintained." Clearly, this statement falls short of the requirement laid down by the above-quoted case. Similarly, in Developers Group of Companies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that it was "not enough" for the trial court, in its order granting the writ, to simply say that it appeared "after hearing that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for."
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings and evidence, the Court finds that the [herein respondent Leticia] has established by clear and preponderant evidence her cause of action for ejectment against [George, Jr.].The right of respondent Leticia to the execution of the aforequoted MeTC Decision is already beyond cavil for the following reasons:
The [respondent Leticia] being the registered owner of the property in question occupied by [George, Jr.], it results that she has the right to enjoy it, including the right to exclude others from its enjoyment through proper action against its possessor or holder in order to recover it (Arts. 428 and 429, New Civil Code). The Certificate of Title (TCT No. N-165230) issued in the name of the [respondent Leticia] vested in her not only ownership over the subject house and lot but also the right of possession as a necessary consequence of the right of ownership. [George, Jr.] failed to adduce any legal ground for his continued stay on the property. Besides, the records do not show that [George, Jr.] has instituted an action to assert ownership over the subject house and lot. He merely claimed that he is a foster son of the late spouses Iluminada and Ramon Piano, the previous owners who have caused the subdivison of the lot into three parcels and that he is not aware of any transaction resulting to the disposition of the portion claimed by [respondent Leticia]. It is the accepted rule that a person who has a torrens title over the subject property is entitled to the possession thereof (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136). [George, Jr.] has failed to sufficiently establish that he is entitled to the possession of the subject house and lot. After the sale of the subject property, [George, Jr.]'s possession thereof is merely tolerated since no lessor-lessee relationship exist [sic] between them. His occupancy was at the owner's sufferance and his acts was [sic] merely tolerated which could not affect the owner's possession (Arts. 537 and 1119, New Civil Code). It is a settled rule that once possession of [George, Jr.] is by tolerance, it becomes illegal upon demand by the [respondent Leticia] to vacate (Anis v. Aragon, L-4685, April 28, 1951; PNB vs. Animas, 117 SCRA 735; Yu v. De Lara, 6 SCRA 785; Saclolo vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 63; Peran vs. Pres. Judge of CFI of Sorsogon, 125 SCRA 78) for the simple reason that possession by tolerance carries with it an implied promise to vacate the property upon demand, and that the same was withdrawn when demand to vacate was made by the [respondent Leticia] upon [George, Jr.] personally and in the letter of June 20, 1998 (Annex B position paper). Likewise, prior physical possession of the property is not an indispensable requisite since [respondent Leticia] is a vendee for she merely steps into the shoes of the vendor and succeeds to her rights and interests (Aguilar vs. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 658; Dela Cruz vs. Bocar, et. al., 99 Phils. [sic] 491; Sun vs. Brillantes, 93 Phils. [sic] 175). Moreover, as held in Caniza vs. Court of Appeals, an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. After the expiration of the thirty-day period given to [George, Jr.] to vacate the subject property in the letter of June 20, 1998, made his occupation subsequently illegal. Therefore, there is no legal obstacle for the [respondent Leticia] to eject [George, Jr.] and all persons claiming right under him from the subject premises.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent Leticia] and against [George, Jr.], to wit:
1) Ordering [George, Jr.] and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the premises located at 119 13th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and to surrender the possession thereof to the [respondent Leticia];
2) Ordering [George, Jr.] to pay the [respondent Leticia] the amount of P15,000.00 per month as reasonable rental value for the use and occupancy of the subject premises beginning June 1998 and every month thereafter until [George, Jr.] finally vacates and surrenders possession thereof to [respondent Leticia];
3) Ordering [George, Jr.] to pay the [respondent Leticia] the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus P1,500.00 appearance fee; and
4) To pay the costs of suit.
An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto.This Court declared further in Sy v. Court of Appeals [38] that –
This is so because:"The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession."The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the situation. Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice. So much so that judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages arising from loss of possession.[37]
By any standard, the delay in the resolution of the unlawful detainer case and the enforcement of the decision therein is anathema to the summary nature of unlawful detainer proceedings. This is especially true under the Rule on Summary Procedure streamlining the proceedings in forcible entry and detainer cases to achieve a more expeditious and less expensive determination thereof. The pendency of the action for reconveyance does not constitute a compelling reason to delay the termination of an ejectment case, for it gives rise merely to an expectancy that the documents assailed therein may be nullified and the subject properties may be ordered reconveyed to private respondents, as compared to the clear, actual and existing legal right of petitioner to the possession of the subject property as the registered owner.[39]And in Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[40] this Court made the following significant statement –
It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, "the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership xxx only to determine the issue of possession."[41]Based on these previous rulings of this Court, the pendency before the RTC of Civil Case No. Q-01-44582 for reconveyance cannot bar the execution of the judgment rendered by the MeTC in Civil Case No. 22375 for unlawful detainer. The summary nature of Civil Case No. 22375 for unlawful detainer, as well as the finality of the Decision, dated 28 February 2001, promulgated by the MeTC in the said case, militate against any effort on the part of petitioner Felix and his representative George, Jr. to delay further the execution of said Decision.
Set the reception of evidence on the preliminary injunction proper on October 28, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. In the alternative, the parties may submit their supporting pleadings thereto. Thereafter, the incident shall be considered submitted for resolution. As usual, in the interest of time, Atty. Chan is directed to effect the service of the ORDER of this Court today by LBC to the [respondents Alicia and Leticia] and their counsel.[42]In compliance therewith, respondents Alicia and Leticia did file a Memorandum[43] which extensively discussed their argument that the execution of the final and executory judgment in MeTC Civil Case No. 22375, ordering George, Jr. to vacate the subject property, cannot be stayed by a preliminary injunction issued in the pending RTC Civil Case No. Q-01-44582. Hence, respondents Alicia and Leticia were still able to present before the RTC their opposition to petitioner Felix's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction even after the hearing which they failed to attend. Respondents Alicia and Leticia have consistently and continuously made known to the RTC and to their adversary, petitioner Felix, that they oppose the latter's application for the issuance of an injunctive writ, before and after the hearing for presentation of evidence on the matter, so that to conclude that they had waived their right to question the RTC order granting such a writ just by their absence in the said hearing would be specious and untenable.
In general, a trial court's decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As the Court had the occasion to state in Olalia v. Hizon:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the Decision, dated 23 April 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77857 is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 101, which is DIRECTED to hear and resolve Civil Case No. Q-01-44582 with dispatch. Costs against the petitioner.It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.