558 Phil. 759
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as amended, committed as follows:Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.[5]
That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control seven (7) heat- sealed transparent plastic bags each containing 97.92 grams, 95.46 grams, 40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74 grams of white crystalline substance, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted gave positive result to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[4]
FINDINGS:Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment. According to him, he used to work as a caretaker of "Curacha," a beer house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported for work at six o'clock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him. One of these men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the bar. He allegedly accompanied the men outside so he could confirm the identity of the owner of the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green colored Isuzu Gemini car which according to him was driven by his employer, Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he was then brought to the police headquarters where he was asked regarding his address and the name of his employer. After two days, he was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact the owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession of shabu and Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have been the one charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was driving the Gemini car.
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.[8]
WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is hereby AFFIRMED.[13]In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Bueno's testimony to be "clear and unequivocal"[14] and should therefore prevail over appellant's defense of denial.[15] The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellant's contention that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been viewed with disfavor and has become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[16] It also took note of appellant's failure to give any credible reason why the police singled him out considering that they were strangers to one another prior to the date of the incident.[17]
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.[18]Appellant contends that the trial court's reliance on the prosecution's evidence was erroneous considering that he, as a mere grade school graduate, could not have concocted his narration of the events that led to his arrest.[19] He also maintains that he was an easy target of police operatives, since he was a new employee in the videoke bar and was therefore unfamiliar with the people who frequented said establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty required for conviction and that the trial court should not have applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties on the part of the police officers. [20]
PROS. LUNA:We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3 Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt appellant's culpability. His testimony regarding the circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7 March 1999 — from the moment their office received a confidential tip from their informer up to the time they accosted appellant — deserved to be given significance as it came from the mouth of a law enforcement officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.[27]
Thank you, your honor.
Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime in the month of March 1999?
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know him?
A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.
Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you please point him out?
A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning of March 7, 1999?
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: What were you doing then at that time?
A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
Q: Who were your companions at that time?
A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual incident at that time?
A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.
Q: About what?
A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed to deliver an undetermined amount of "shabu"?
A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the telephone that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC 411 who will deliver at said place.
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next?
A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana?
A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.
Q: What did you do next?
A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q: Where is this located?
A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City.
Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?
A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate number PFC 411, sir.
Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to identify it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1 and B-2. What relation has this to the one you mentioned?
A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.
Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?
A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
Q: Specifically, what did you do?
A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.
Q: What happened after flagging down the car?
A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police officers, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?
A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver?
A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.
Q: What did you do next? In your case what did you do?
A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
COURT:
Q: Did you know what Padlan did?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do?
A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent document for his gun.
Q: What do you mean "he was asked"? Who was asked?
A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?
WITNESS:
A: He said that the gun is not his.
Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon what did you do as police officer?
A: I ordered him to get down from the car.
COURT:
Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the driver's seat.
Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?
A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it contained shabu, sir.
Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?
A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the evidence, sir.
Q: What did you do with the "shabu"?
A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.
Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?
A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride sir.[26]
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article —
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. [31]
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.[33]
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the case.When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[35]