583 Phil. 618
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
MEDIAN CONTAINER CORPORATIONIn the August 20, 2003 Process Server's Return,[3] no date of filing of which is indicated, process server George S. de Castro stated that Summons was served on MCC on August 7, 2003 at its given address upon one Danilo Ong (Ong) as shown by Ong's signature at the left bottom portion of the Summons, below which signature the process server wrote the words "General Manager."
Lot 421 C-4 Katipunan Road Extension, California Village,
San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City
CARLOS T. LEY AND FELY C. LEY
No. 14 Adams Street, West Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila (Underscoring supplied)
. . . A careful perusal of the "authority" discloses that a certain Atty. Ramon S. Miranda delegated his authority to Atty. Mendoza to "sign the complaint and/or Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in the case entitled MBTC v. Median Container Corporation and Spouses Carlos T. Ley and Fely C. Ley filed before the RTC-Makati City. This authorization was given only on June 03, 2003.By Order[9] of January 9, 2004, the trial court denied MCC's Motion to Dismiss. As for the spouses Ley's motion to dismiss, the trial court denied it for being premature. And the trial court denied too the movants' respective motions for reconsideration.[10]
As previously discussed, Atty. Mendoza verified the complaint and signed the certification against forum shopping on May 28, 2003. Therefore, it is clear that Atty. Mendoza did not have the proper authorization when he executed the verification and certification against non-forum shopping because his authority came only at a later date, on June 03, 2003 or six days thereafter. In effect, there is no valid and effective verification and certification by plaintiff in its Complaint.[8] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)
The case invoked by [MCC] in support of its position that service of summons was improper, is E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Benito where the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (a partnership) where service of summons was made on a branch manager instead of the general manager at the partnership's principal office. . . .[17] (Emphasis in original)Its Motion for Reconsideration[19] having been denied,[20] MCC filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari[21] raising the following issues including, this time, the impropriety of service of Summons upon it, thus, whether:
x x x x
After considering the facts and developments in this case in their totality, we believe - as the public respondent did - that the ruling in the cited Villarosa case should be applied with an eye on the unusual facts of the present case. We find it significant that the process server in this case certified that he served the summons upon the "general manager" of the petitioner. The process server apparently was fully aware of the strict requirements of the Rules as interpreted in the cited Villarosa case. The twist in the process certification is the petitioner's claim that Danilo Ong, the person who received the summons, was not the general manager but was a mere former employee. In other words, unlike in Villarosa where summons was served on the branch manager (a patently wrong party under the requirements of the Rules), there was, in the present case, the INTENTION on the part of the process server to observe the mandatory requirements on the services of summons and to serve it on the correct recipient.[18] (Emphasis in the original; capitalization and underscoring supplied)
. . . A COMPLAINT SHOULD PROPERLY BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 7, SECTON 5 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION PORTION THEREOF HAVING BEEN SIGNED AND EXECUTED BY ONE WHO HAD NO AUTHORITY TO BIND THE PARTY-PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF SUCH SIGNING AND EXECUTION;Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement.[23] It is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.[24] That explains why a court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.[25]
. . . IT IS FULL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 14, SECTION 11 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, OR THE MERE INTENTION OF THE PROCESS SERVER TO SERVE THE SUMMONS ON THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, THAT DETERMINES THE VALIDITY OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS A DOMESTIC PRIVATE CORPORATION; and
. . . IT IS THE ACTUAL RECEIPT OF THE SUMMONS, OR THE VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES, THAT VESTS THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
. . . In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et. al. . . . , the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. . . . , the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. LandBank, . . . , the Court had dismissed Uy's petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit [verification] and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.In the case at bar, simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, Metrobank submitted both a certification of non-forum shopping and proof that Atty. Mendoza who signed it on its behalf was authorized to do so. The proof of authorization of Atty. Mendoza was dated later than the date of his signing of the certification of non-forum shopping, however, thus giving the impression that he, at the time he affixed his signature, was not authorized to do so. The passing on June 3, 2004 of a Board Resolution of authorization before the actual filing on June 23, 2004 of the complaint, however, is deemed a ratification of Atty. Mendoza's prior execution on May 28, 2004 of the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.[30]
In the instant case, the merits of petitioner's case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary's certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
. . . [W]e searched the records - particularly the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner - for the reason why and how service was made on a former employee who was then at the correct address, who signed for the summons, and whom the process server identified as "general manager". We note that aside from the bare allegation that the court did not have jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, no statement was ever made to explain why a former employee was at petitioner's premises and ended up receiving the summons served by the process server. Truly, we wondered why a process server who apparently knew the technicalities of his duties so served the summons and then certified that service was upon the general manager, even naming Danilo Ong as the general manager.persuades as this Court notes the dubious proof that Ong had resigned from MCC at the time the summons was served. Consider this: The signature attributed to Ong in the photocopy of his purported July 31, 2002 letter of resignation effective also on July 31, 2002, and the signature attributed to him in the photocopy of the August 1, 2002 Quitclaim he purportedly executed, appear to have been written by a hand different from that which affixed the signature attributed to him on the Summons.
This aberrant turn of events and the questions it raises convince us that we cannot view the service of summons in this case along the strict lines of Villarosa whose attendant facts are both simple and different. What should assume materiality here are the following circumstances: that the process server went to the correct address of the petitioner to serve the summons; that the summons was received at that address by a person who was there; that the petitioner does not dispute that it ultimately received the summons; and that the process server certified in his return that service was duly made upon the general manager whom he identified as Danilo Ong who acknowledged receipt of the summons by signing on the lower portion thereof.[33] (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied),