407 Phil. 182
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated September 11, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch II in Civil Case No. 90-52519 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription.
SO ORDERED."[2]
"On March 23, 1990, [Petitioner] William Alain Miailhe, on his own behalf and on behalf of Victoria Desbarats-Miailhe, Monique Miailhe-Sichere and Elaine Miailhe-Lencquesaing filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages against [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines and defendant Development Bank of the Philippines before the [trial] court. It was alleged, to wit:Respondent herein thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the appellate court.x x x x x x x x x
- That plaintiffs were the former registered owners of three parcels of land located at J.P. Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila with an aggregate area of 5,574.30 square meters, and a one (1) storey building erected thereon, formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80645 of the Register of Deeds of Manila;
- That the above-mentioned properties had been owned by and in the possession of plaintiffs and their family for over one hundred (100) years until August 1, 1976;
- That on August 1, 1976, during the height of the martial law regime of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines, through its armed forces, forcibly and unlawfully took possession of the aforesaid properties from defendants;
- That [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines, through its armed forces, continued its lawful and forcible occupation of the premises from August 1, 1976 to August 19, 1977 without paying rentals, despite plaintiffs' demands therefor;
- That meanwhile, the Office of the President showed interest in the subject properties and directed defendant DBP to acquire for the government the subject properties from plaintiff;
- That on or about August 19, 1977, through threats and intimidation employed by defendants, plaintiffs, under duress, were coerced into selling the subject properties to defendant DBP for the grossly low price of P2,376,805.00 or about P400.00 per square meter;
- That defendant DBP, in turn, sold the subject properties to [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the President, in 1982;
- That the only factor which caused plaintiffs to sell their properties to defendant DBP was the threats and intimidation employed upon them by defendants;
- That after the late President Marcos left the country on February 24, [sic] 1986 after the EDSA revolution, plaintiffs made repeated extrajudicial demands upon defendants for [the] return and reconveyance of subject properties to them, the last being the demand letters dated 24 October 1989, copies of which are attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes `A' and `A-1';
- That despite demands, defendants unjustifiably failed and refused, and still unjustifiably fail and refuse, to return and reconvey the subject properties to plaintiff;
x x x x x x x x x
(par. 4-13 of the Complaint, pp. 28-29, Rollo).
On May 25, 1990, [respondent] filed its Answer denying the substantial facts alleged in the complaint and raising, as special and affirmative defenses, that there was no forcible take-over of the subject properties and that the amount paid to private respondents was fair and reasonable. Defendant DBP also filed its Answer raising as Special and Affirmative Defense that [petitioner's] action had already prescribed.
On August 3, 1990, the [trial] court issued an Order setting the pre-trial on September 20, 1990. Petitioner and private respondents filed their respective pre-trial briefs.
On March 5, 1992, [respondent] filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action ha[d] prescribed pursuant to Article (1)391 in relation to Article (1)390 of the Civil Code. Defendant DBP likewise filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of the Affirmative Defense raising the same ground of prescription as contained in the [respondent's] Motion to Dismiss.
On September 11, 1992, the [trial] court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:`WHEREFORE, the motion for a preliminary hearing is hereby denied and the resolution of the motion to dismiss is deferred until trial x x x.' (pp. 23-26, rollo)."[3]
"Whether the Court of Appeals committed gross reversible error in finding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.In the main, the Court will determine whether the action for the annulment of the Contract of Sale has prescribed.
"Whether the Court of Appeals committed gross reversible error in setting aside the trial court's order of 11 September 1992 and in finding that:
- petitioner's action had prescribed; and,
- petitioner's extrajudicial demands did not interrupt prescription."[5]
"Sec. 2. Hearing of motion. -- At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the same.In the present case, the trial court deferred until trial the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, because it found that the Complaint did not show on its face that the action had already prescribed. It deemed it better to allow the parties to present their evidence in a full-blown trial.
"SEC. 3. Resolution of motion. -- After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
"The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
"In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (3a)"
"x x x. We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; x x x and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence."The records in this case indubitably show the lapse of the prescriptive period, thus warranting the immediate dismissal of the Complaint.
"12. That after the late president Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986 after the EDSA revolution, plaintiffs made repeated extrajudicial demands upon defendants for [the] return and reconveyance of subject properties to them, the last being the demand letters dated 24 October 1989, copies of which are attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes `A' and `A-1';"[8]The foregoing was reiterated in the following statements in petitioner's Pretrial Brief:[9]
"x x x. During the height of the martial law era, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, through his armed forces, forcibly and unlawfully took possession of the property and after a year, directed the defendant Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP") to buy the same from the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were forced to sell the property for the measly sum of P2,376,805.00, which [translated] to about P400.00 per square meter. The property was later sold by defendant DBP to the defendant Republic of the Philippines ["Republic"], acting through the Office of the President. Plaintiffs pray the Honorable Court to declare their sale null and void and to order reconveyance of the property."Moreover, courts were functioning after Marcos left the country. There was no hiatus in the judicial system. This is manifest in then Acting Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee's Circular No. 2, which is reproduced hereunder:
The foregoing clearly shows that the alleged threat and intimidation, which vitiated petitioner's consent, ceased when Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986. Since an action for the annulment of contracts must be filed within four years from the time the cause of vitiation ceases, the suit before the trial court should have been filed anytime on or before February 24, 1990. In this case, petitioner did so only on March 23, 1990. Clearly, his action had prescribed by then.
"TO: ALL JUSTICES OF THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SANDIGANBAYAN; AND ALL JUDGES OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS AND SHARI'A COURTS
"Reports have been received that some justices and judges have ceased or suspended performing their duties pending action on the courtesy resignations submitted by them in compliance with the call of the President of the Philippines.
"Courts are expected to continue discharging their judicial functions without interruption and delay in order to ensure the speedy disposition of their pending cases. You are, therefore, directed to continue with your regular sessions and the hearing and adjudication of cases and the proper discharge of your functions, until further notice from this court.
"Strict compliance thereof is hereby enjoined.(Sgd) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE
Acting Chief Justice"
"ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor."In other words, petitioner claims that because he is covered by the term "creditor," the above-quoted provision is applicable to him.
"Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
The period shall begin:
In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.