801 Phil. 141
PERALTA, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner]:Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case before the CA which then reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC in a Decision dated July 25, 2014. The fallo of the decision reads:
1. ORDERING the [respondents] and all other persons claiming rights under them to vacate the subject portions of [the] land and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. ORDERING the [respondents] to pay attorney's fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) and Ten Thousand Pesos ([P]10,000.00) litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[13]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malolos, Bulacan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by [petitioner] Nestor Cabrera is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.Finding no cogent reason to deviate from its previous ruling, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Cabrera.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The instant petition lacks merit.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it held that "since [petitioner] failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property, the court a quo has not acquired jurisdiction over the action and all proceedings thereat are null and void," as such conclusion is contradictory to the doctrine of estoppel.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to take into consideration the tax declaration annexed to the Appellee's Brief which provided the assessed value of the property subject matter of the case.
x x x xBefore the amendments, the plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought before the RTC regardless of the value of the property. With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, P50,000.00 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.[16]
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x x
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein docs not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
x x x[15]
x x x xIn dismissing the case, the CA noted such fact, to wit:
[T]he plaintiffs are the lawful and the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land and more particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4439, a copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
[T]he defendants had illegally encroached the property of the plaintiff by means of fraud and stealth and with force and intimidation. Defendant Arnel Clarin had encroached an approximate area of SIXTY THREE (63) SQUARE METERS, while defendant Milagros Barrios had encroached an approximate area of FORTY-ONE (41) SQUARE METERS, defendant Aurora Serafin had encroached an approximate area of THIRTY (30) SQUARE METERS while defendant Bonifacio Moreno had encroached an approximate area of ELEVEN (11) SQUARE METERS, copy of the relocation plan is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B" and made an integral part of this complaint;
The plaintiffs had already informed the defendants of the illegal encroachment but the defendants refused to heed the call of the plaintiffs to vacate the land in question and threaten plaintiff with bodily harm;
That prior to the discovery of the encroachment on or about December 2005, plaintiff was in actual and physical possession of the premises.
That this matter was referred to the attention of the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Maysulao, Calumpit, Bulacan and a Lupong Tagapamayapa was constituted but no conciliation was reached and the Lupon issued a Certificate to File Action, copy of the Certificate to File Action is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof;
That notwithstanding numerous and persistent demands, both oral and written, extended upon the defendants to vacate the subject parcel of land, they failed and refused and still fail and refuse to vacate and surrender possession of the subject parcel of land to the lawful owner who is plaintiff in this case. Copy of the last formal demand dated January 18, 2006 is hereto attached and marked as Annex " " and the registry receipt as well as the registry return card as "D" Annexes "D-1," and "D-2," respectively;
That because of this unjustifiable refusal of the defendants to vacate the premises in question which they now unlawfully occupy, plaintiffs [were] constrained to engage the services of counsel in an agreed amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ([P]50,000.00) Philippine Currency, as acceptance fee and THREE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]3,000.00) Philippine Currency, per day of Court appearance, which amount the defendants should jointly and solidarity pay the plaintiffs, copy of the retaining contract is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" and made an integral part of this complaint;
That in order to protect the rights and interest of the plaintiffs, litigation expenses will be incurred in an amount no less than TEN THOUSAND PESOS ([P]10,000.00), which amount the defendants should jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiffs;
That the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]3,000.00) per month should be adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff as against the defendants by way of beneficial use, to be counted from the day the last formal demand until they fully vacate and surrender possession of the premises in question to the plaintiffs. x x x.[17]
In the case at bench, the complaint for accion publiciana filed by [Cabrera] failed to allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest therein. Not even a tax declaration was presented before the court a quo that would show the valuation of the subject property. As such, there is no way to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action or whether the court a quo has exclusive jurisdiction over the same. Verily, the court a quo erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed by [respondents] and in taking cognizance of the instant case.[18]Indeed, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. On its face, there is no showing that the RTC has jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot readily be determined which court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.[19]
x x x xHowever, it was explicated in Calimlim v. Ramirez[27] that Tijam is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. Thus:
[a] party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. . . ., it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such practice cannot be tolerated - obviously for reasons of public policy.
x x x[26]
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.In the case of La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] We illustrated the rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not, as follows:
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of judsdictiou having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[28]
x x x xGuided by the abovementioned jurisprudence, this Court rules that respondents are not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject civil case. Records reveal that even before filing their Answer, respondents assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC through a motion to dismiss as there was no mention of the assessed value of the property in the complaint. We note that the RTC anchored its denial of respondents' motion to dismiss on the doctrine enunciated in a 1977 case - that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lie with the RTC regardless of the value - which no longer holds true. Thereafter, the respondents filed their Answer through an omnibus motion to set aside order of default and to admit Answer.
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue or estoppel, held:The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863).
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. x x x.[30]
It is settled that even if the complaint he defective, but the parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of action which it intended to allege in the original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it had been previously joined by the most perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.[40] (Emphases supplied)It bears emphasis that the ruling in Tijam establishes an exception which is to be applied only under extraordinary circumstances or to those cases similar to its factual situation.[41] The general rule is that the lack of a court's jurisdiction is a non-waivable defense that a party can raise at any stage of the proceedings in a case, even on appeal; the doctrine of estoppel, being the exception to such non-waivable defense, must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.[42]
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |