674 Phil. 344
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the appealed decision with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. The foreclosure and auction sale on February 10, 1977 of BENGSON's properties covered by real estate and chattel mortgages mentioned in the notice of sale issued by the La Union provincial sheriff are set aside.
2. The writ of possession issued to GSIS as the highest bidder by the defunct Court of First Instance, sitting as a cadastral court, as a consequence of said foreclosure sale, is annulled.
3. The Register of Deeds of La Union is ordered to cancel the present certificates of title covering those properties and issue new ones in lieu thereof in the same names and with the same annotations, terms and conditions, including the mortgage in question, as appeared (sic) in the previous certificates of title as of the date BENGSON constituted the mortgage on those properties in favor of GSIS, it being understood that all expenses to be incurred incidental to such title cancellation and issuance shall be borne by GSIS.
4. GSIS is ordered to restore to BENGSON full possession of those mortgaged properties situated in San Fernando, La Union.
5. All properties under the mortgage in question, including those parcels of land situated in San Fernando, La Union and in Quezon City, shall remain under mortgage in favor of GSIS.
6. GSIS is ordered to restructure BENGSON's loan as promised, the restructuring to proceed from the premise that as of the foreclosure date, i.e. February 10, 1977, BENGSON had paid GSIS an aggregate amount of P286,000.00 on the subject loan.
7. The interest rates per annum stated in the first and second mortgage loan contracts entered into between BENGSON and GSIS, as well as all other terms and conditions provided for therein -- except as qualified by the subsequent agreement of the parties regarding the promised loan restructuring and deferment of foreclosure by reason of the arrearages incurred -- shall remain as originally stipulated upon by the parties.
8. BENGSON is ordered to pay GSIS the debenture bond with an aggregate face value of P900,000.00 at the stipulated interest rate of 14% per annum, quarterly; and to pay 14% interest per annum, compounded monthly, on the interest on said debenture bond, that had become due quarterly, in accordance with the stipulations provided for therein.
9. GSIS shall reimburse BENGSON the monthly rent of P20,000.00 representing income produced by one of the latter's mortgaged properties, i.e., the Regent Theatre building, from February 15, 1977 until GSIS shall have restored the full possession of said building, together with the land on which it stands, to BENGSON.
10. The entire record of this case is ordered remanded to the trial court and the latter is directed to ascertain whether such mortgaged properties as machineries, equipment, and other movie paraphernalia, etc., are in fact no longer in existence per report of the provincial sheriff, as well as to determine their replacement value if GSIS fails to return them; and, as prayed for by BENGSON, to receive evidence from the parties on the costs of suit awarded to it.
No pronouncement as to cost of this appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]
It x x x appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the court a quo, he was informed by Romualdo Bengzon, president of the respondent corporation, that the firm had retained the services of Atty. Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that the company would pay him the agreed compensation and that Atty. Yadao's fees were covered by a separate agreement. The private respondent, however, later ignored his billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to take part in the execution proceedings. Forthwith, he sought the entry of an attorney's lien in the records of the case. The lower court allegedly refused to make the entry and on the contrary, issued an order ordering the Philippine National Bank to "release to the custody of Mr. Romualdo F. Bengzon and or Atty. Pacifico Yadao" the sum of P2,760,000.00 (ordered by the Court of Appeals as rentals payable by the Government Service Insurance System).
Atty. Armovit then moved, apparently for the hearing of his motion to recognize attorney's lien, and thereafter, the trial court issued an order in the tenor as follows:When this case was called for hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay appeared for the petitioners.
Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are withdrawing the petition considering that they are in the process of amicably settling their differences with the plaintiff, which manifestation was confirmed by Atty. Yadao as well as the plaintiffs, Romualdo Bengson and Brenda Bengson, who are present today.
In view of this development, the petition to record attorney's charging lien, the same being in order and not contrary to law, morals and public policy, as prayed for by Attys. Armovit and Aglipay, it is hereby withdrawn. The parties, therefore are hereby directed to comply faithfully with their respective obligations.
SO ORDERED.
However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Brenda Bengson (wife of Romualdo Bengson) delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 only. Atty. Armovit protested and demanded the amount of P552,000.00 (twenty percent of P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengson made assurances that he will be paid the balance.
On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit received an order emanating from the trial court in the tenor as follows:During the hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien on October 11, 1988, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay withdrew their petition to record attorney's charging lien, which was duly approved by the Court, after which the Court directed the parties to comply faithfully with their respective obligations.
In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff submitted a pleading denominated as compliance alleging that petitioner (Atty. Armovit) has already received from the plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and by way of attorney's fees. With the receipt by the petitioner from the plaintiff of this amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its obligation.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October 11, 1988 approving the withdrawal of the petition to record attorney's charging lien, on motion of the petitioner, is now final.
SO ORDERED.
Reconsideration having been denied, Atty. Armovit went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On August 25, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition. Reconsideration having been likewise denied by the Appellate Court, Atty. Armovit instituted the instant appeal.[10]
The disposition of the Court of Appeals was that since the receipt evidencing payment to Atty. Armovit of the sum of P300,000.00 "was without any qualification as 'advance' or 'partial' or 'incomplete'," the intention of the parties was that it was full payment. The Appellate Court also noted Atty. Armovit's withdrawal of his motion to record attorney's lien and figured that Atty. Armovit was satisfied with the payment of P300,000.00.
The only issue is whether or not Atty. Armovit is entitled to the sum of P252,000.00 more, in addition to the sum of P300,000.00 already paid him by the private respondent.
There is no question that the parties had agreed on a compensation as follows:a) P15,000.00 by way of acceptance and study fee, payable within five (5) days from date;
b) 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered by favorable judgment in the cases; and
c.) the execution and signing of a final retainer agreement complete with all necessary details.
(While the parties' agreement speaks of "a final retainer agreement" to be executed later, it does not appear that the parties did enter into a "final" agreement thereafter.)
The private respondent's version however is that while it may be true that the agreed compensation was twenty percent of all recoveries, the parties later agreed on a compromise sum approved allegedly by the trial court, per its Order of October 11, 1988.
x x x x
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more -- pursuant to the contingent fee agreement -- amid the private respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against the private respondent. [11]
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that the instant petition for certiorari be given due course and, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered setting aside as null and void ab initio the respondent courts Orders dated February 24 and June 7, 1993 (Annexes A and B) and Resolutions dated November 28, 1996, August 27, 2001 and June 11, 2002 (Annexes C, D and E); and ordering respondent trial court as follows:
1. To immediately issue a writ of execution of the final and executory Decision of September 29, 1991, of the Supreme Court in Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 90983) on the twenty percent of all recoveries on the following:a. All the mortgaged properties recovered by private respondent from the GSIS by annotating petitioner's charging lien at the back of their corresponding titles.
b. The P29,982,824.19 received by private respondent on September 26, 1994, as per Sheriff's Return dated October 3, 1994 (Annex EE), plus the legal rate of interest from such date until fully paid.
2. To assess the value of the real properties recovered by private respondent from the GSIS and apply petitioner's charging lien by deducting therefrom the sum of P552,000.00 priorly applied to the accumulated rentals recovered from GSIS by private respondent. After the assessment and determination of the value of petitioner's twenty percent of all recoveries to cause the execution thereof.[20]
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VARYING THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY SUPREME COURT DECISION BY LIMITING THE EXECUTION OF PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY'S FEES OF "TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL RECOVERIES" ONLY TO THE RENTALS AND EXCLUDING THE REST OF THE RECOVERIES MADE BY THE BENGSONS.II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SENDING PETITIONER'S APPEAL TO THE ARCHIVES.III.
THE APPELLATE AND TRIAL COURTS ERRED IN DEFYING THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION AWARDING PETITIONER A CONTINGENT FEE OF "TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL RECOVERIES."[21]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against the private respondent. [22]
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays for judgment declaring respondent trial court's orders (Annexes "N" and "Q") and respondent Court of Appeals' confirmatory decisions (Annexes "R" and "T") null and void ab initio, and instead directing that petitioner be paid his attorney's fees of 20% of all monies and properties received and to be received by respondent BCBI in consequence of the final judgment secured for them by petitioner (Annex "E" in rel. annex "G"), as follows -a) 20% of P2,760,000.00, the rental arrearages due and already received by BCBI, which amounts to P552,000.00, minus the P300,000.00 paid unto petitioner, or a net balance of P252,000.00 due petitioner;
b) 20% of P15 million, the market value of the commercial lots, multi-story buildings and residential lots and houses, already placed in BCBI's possession, which amounts to P3,000,000.00 still due petitioner; and
c) 20% of P20 million worth of hotel and movie machines and equipment units, centralized air conditioning facilities, etc., to be paid in cash to BCBI, which amounts to P4,000,000.00 in unpaid fees to petitioner -
or, in the alternative, should trial of facts be deemed appropriate, that the case be remanded for further proceedings to receive petitioner's evidence on the amount of his attorney's fees due and unpaid, the same to be presided over by another trial judge chosen by proper raffle; that respondent judge Genaro Gines be prohibited from any further intervention in Civil Case No. 2794; and at all events, that treble costs be fixed and imposed upon respondents.
Petitioner also prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.[25] (Emphases supplied.)
It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.
Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. We have held that where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. x x x.[29]
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more -- pursuant to the contingent fee agreement -- amid the private respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.[31] (Emphases supplied.)