330 Phil. 653
TORRES, JR., J.:
"a. Ordering defendant and all other persons claiming rights under him to vacate and peacefully surrender the leased premises to the plaintiff;The undisputed facts, as appearing on the record, are the following:
b. Sentencing the defendant to pay to the government the real property tax including penalties due on the building since January 1988 up to March 31, 1991, or to reimburse plaintiff of whatever amount she paid to the government as real property tax due on the building since January 1988 up to March 31, 1991;
c. Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30,000.00 by way of and as attorney's fees;
d. Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 a month starting April 1991 for the continuous use and occupation of the subject premises until defendant finally surrender and vacate plaintiff's premises; and
e. The costs of this suit.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs and remedies as the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the premises."
"1. Term of the Lease: This Contract of Lease shall be for a period of seven (7) years beginning (April) 1, 1984 up to (March) 31, 1991.On June 13, 1991, Sandel filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, seeking to recover possession of the leased premises and the commercial building constructed thereon by Martinez, docketed as Civil Case No. 19960 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan City.
2. Purpose of Lease: The LESSEE will construct in the leased premises a commercial building, according to plans and specifications, blue print copies of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof.
3. Securing Building Permit/s and other Licenses: The LESSEE shall secure the building permit/s and licences necessary in the construction of the building.
4. Period to Construct Building: The LESSEE shall complete the construction of the building as mentioned in the attached plans and specifications within four (4) months from the date hereof.
5. Monthly Rentals: The LESSEE for the first six (6) years of the contract shall pay to the Lessor the sum of P4,000.000 and thereafter or on the seventh (7th) year, the sum of P4,500.00, as monthly rentals for the leased premises payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month, at the office of the Lessor or her authorized agent; Provided, however, that the LESSEE's obligation to pay the rental shall start upon the completion of the building, but if it is not completed within four (4) months hereof as provided in the proceeding paragraph, the monthly rental shall already accrue and shall be paid by the LESSEE.
6. Insurance: xxx
7. Transfer of Ownership: Upon the termination of this lease, the ownership and title of the building shall automatically transfer to and in favor of LESSOR without need for an implementing document therefor.
8. Taxes: Real Estate taxes on the land shall be borne by LESSOR while those on the building shall be paid by the LESSEE.
9. Repairs: xxx
10. Prohibition against Sub-lease: xxx
11. Prohibition against Conveyance and Mortgages: xxx
12. Waiver: xxx"
"WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing considerations, apart from the MODIFICATION that the second order declared null and void, should be that dated January 9, 1992 (instead of January 9, 1991 as therein stated), the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs in this instance against private respondent-appellant.Hence, this petition.
SO ORDERED."
Private respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court to try the case, since the subject matter of the action filed is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the Regional Trial Court's original jurisdiction under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Thus, it is necessary to determine the ownership of the premises sought to be recovered, and to arrive at this, resort must be made to the determination of the validity of the stipulations in the lease agreement, a function which is allegedly beyond the Metropolitan Trial Court's jurisdiction.I
THAT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION ON THE EJECTMENT CASE BECAUSE THERE IS A NEED TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE.II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN GRANTING THE WRITS OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION AGAINST THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.[5]
"7.1. Under paragraph 2 thereof, she is the absolute and registered owner of the two (2) parcels of land under leased (sic) to PRIVATE RESPONDENT situated in A. Mabini St., Kalookan City, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No. T-134746 and T-134747 when in the Lease Contract itself what was reflected was TCT No. C-8844 which is a parcel of land designated as Lot 858-B.From these aforestated matters, private respondent posits his observation:
7.2. Under paragraph 4, the Contract of Lease was executed pending formal exchange of Lot 858-A and presently covered by TCT No. 134743 with Lot 858-B-1 in possession of adjoining owner Pedro Sandel, which circumstance had not been described or indicated in the contract of lease.
7.3. Under paragraph 7, the PETITIONER upon termination of the contract shall become the automatic owner of the building without need of any implementing order, the validity of which provision is presently being assailed as contrary to law.
7.4 Under paragraph 8, the real estate taxes on the building shall be borne by the PRIVATE RESPONDENT, which only ratifies his ownership on the said building and whose efficacy is likewise being raised upon for the Metropolitan Trial Court’s determination."
"that there are basic matters which the court has to consider like questions involving ownership, determination of the validity of certain provisions in the contract of lease (Annex "H"), the agreements as sted (sic) in the execution of the Deed of Exchange (Annex "I") all of which are crucial for the determination of the parties' respective claims. Allegedly, these matters which the Metropolitan Trial Court certainly could not intrude into or exercise competent jurisdiction for they are issues incapable of pecuniary estimation as laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of De Rivera vs. Halili (9 SCRA 59, 63-64) and Dy Sun vs. Brillante (93 Phil 175)."[7]This submission appears to be predicated on the ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
"In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint as well as in the answer raised issues for the determination of the validity of the lease agreement containing provisions on automatic adjudication of a commercial building and whether the real property involved in the said lease is the same property covered by two new titles; whether one who is not the owner of property could encumber through lease agreement a property which does not belong to her; whether the deed of exchange with a certain Pedro Sandel who owns the property on which the commercial building was built was valid without notice to the defendant (herein petitioner) who is under the law entitled to the right of first refusal. Clearly, these matters brought before the Court for its determination cannot be assessed in terms of money. As aforementioned, the jurisdiction of a Metropolitan Trial Court does not extend to civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. The Regional Trial Courts has the exclusive original jurisdiction in such actions."[8]The private respondent’s reliance on the ruling enunciated in De Rivera vs. Halili and Dy Sun vs. Brillante is misplaced, for these cases were decided well before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the law on which the determination of the present issue rests. In De Halili vs. Rivera, issued on September 30, 1963, it was held that the assertion of the parties of their respective rights to own the properties in controversy converted the litigation into an inquiry into the nullity or validity of the presented documents, or from a mere detainer suit to one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus beyond the legitimate authority of the Justice of the Peace to rule on.
"Appellee set up the defense in the MTC that private appellant does not own the whole or portion of the leased premises - but this could not divest the Kalookan MTC of its jurisdiction to try the case for the reason that in an ejectment case, the mere filing of an answer raising the question of ownership will not deprive an inferior court of its jurisdiction."[13]Consequently, the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment (or detainer) case will not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This has to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the efficiency of this kind of actions dependent upon the defendant in all cases.[14]
"In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land (Semira vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 577). Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building."ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing premises, the decision dated September 22, 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the RTC of Kalookan City, Branch 123 in Civil Case No. C-266, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 53, denying private respondent's motion to dismiss is hereby MODIFIED in that the case is hereby REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan City, for continuance and for further proceedings on the merits.