343 Phil. 467
KAPUNAN, J.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent to pay complainant’s retirement pay in the amount of PESOS: THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWELVE & 30/100 (P37,812.30).On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), respondents reiterated their defense that complainant’s cause of action had already prescribed. As proof thereof, respondents presented as “newly-found evidence” an “Application for Retirement Benefit”[4] which complainant filed with the Social Security System (SSS) on March 11, 1991. Said document was obtained by respondents from the SSS Field Services Division in Bacolod City.
SO ORDERED.[3]
x x x [C]omplainant-appellee declared in his application under “History of Employment” that he was an employee of Augusto de Guia (deceased spouse of Respondent - de Guia) and that his period of employment covers only from July 1, 1973 to December 31, 1978. This newly found evidence is an admission against complainant-appellee’s interest since this piece of document will show that he was separated last December 31, 1978, contrary to his claim in this instant case that he worked from 1962 until July 1991. If complainant-appellee was dismissed in 1978, then clearly his cause of action had already prescribed.[5]Respondents, likewise, argued that assuming complainant’s action had not prescribed, he still would not be entitled to any retirement benefits since he was only 48 years old when he was separated from employment in 1978, well below the 60-year old retirement age prescribed by the Labor Code.
It is not disputed as found by the Commission that the applicant had applied for retirement benefits under the Social Security System and may have already enjoyed the said benefits. Moreover, even on the assumption that the complainant was separated from the service on February 28, 1991, he is not covered by R.A. 7641 which took effect on January 7, 1993, years before his separation from the service.[6]In this special civil action for certiorari, complainant, now petitioner, claims that:
The Honorable Commission did not only abuse its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction BUT THE DECISION IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE.[7]First, petitioner takes exception to the following pronouncement in the impugned resolution:
One more observation in the instant case is that the evidence relied on by the complainant to show merit in his claim for retirement benefits is the latter’s application for retirement benefits tending to show that complainant was still in the service up to February 29, 1991. This particular evidence was not made available to the Labor Arbiter in the proceedings below. Thus, he could not be faulted for his findings against the respondents.[8]Petitioner brands the above pronouncement as “totally untrue” since the records show that the application for retirement benefits was used as evidence by private respondent, not by petitioner.
ART. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or other applicable employment contract.In Llora Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon,[10] we interpreted the provisions of the above article to mean that:
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining or other agreements.
xxx Article 287 does not itself purport to impose any obligation upon employers to set up a retirement scheme for their employees over and above that already established under existing laws. In other words, Article 287 recognizes that existing laws already provide for a scheme by which retirement benefits may be earned or accrue [sic] in favor of employees, as part of a broader social security system that provides not only for retirement benefits but also death and funeral benefits, permanent disability benefits, sickness benefits and maternity leave benefits.[11]As a consequence of our ruling in the above case, Congress enacted Republic Act 7641,[12] amending Article 287 of the Labor Code to read as follows:
ART. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.R.A. 7641 took effect on January 7, 1993. Nevertheless, we did not hesitate to give retroactive effect to said law in Oro Enterprises, supra, as follows:
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.
Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288 of this Code.
RA 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute that – absent a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer – can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor. There should be little doubt about the fact that the law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only from the date of the law’s enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started. xxxThe case of Oro Enterprises, however, does not find application in the instant petition. In CJC Trading, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[14] we enumerated the requirements for the proper application of Oro Enterprises, as follows:
Republic Act 7641 took effect on 07 January 1993, while the appeal of private respondent was still pending consideration by the NLRC. Still for determination at the time was, among other things, the issue of whether or not private respondent has, in fact, been effectively retired.[13]
x x x We read Oro Enterprises as holding that R.A. No. 7641 may be given effect where (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant was in compliance with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits.[15]
HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT
E M P L O Y E R | From | To | A D D R E S S |
---|---|---|---|
Augusto de Guia | 07-01-73 | 12-31-78 | Tanjay, Negros Oriental |
CERTIFICATE OF SEPARATION FROM LAST EMPLOYER UNDERSIGNED EMPLOYER CERTIFIES THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED HEREIN WAS SEPARATED FROM HIS EMPLOY ON ACTUAL DATE OF SEPARATION > | DATE OF CERTIFICATION February 28,1991 |
---|---|
FULL NAME OF EMPLOYER/AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE AUGUSTO DE GUIA | |
EMPLOYER’S DESIGNATION/CAPACITY Actg. Administratrix | (Sgd.) TEODORA C DE GUIA SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYER/ AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE |