542 Phil. 284
GARCIA, J.:
Exhibit “A” | - The Petition for Registration containing seven (7) pages and mandatory annexes designated as A-1 to A-3; |
Exhibit “A-1” | - Lot Plan No. Ccn-07000094 of Lot 1 comprising Cad. Lot Nos. 3151, 3152, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161; |
Exhibit “A-2” | - Technical Description of Lot No. 1; |
Exhibit “A-2” | - Technical Description of Lot No. 1; |
Exhibit “A-3” | - Certification of Non-requirement of Surveyor's Certificate; |
Exhibit “B” | - Order resetting date of Initial Hearing to September 23, 1998; |
Exhibit “B-1” | - Newspaper Clipping; |
Exhibit “C” | - Affidavit of Publication issued by Banat News; |
Exhibit “D” | - Certificate of Publication issued by the Land Registration Authority; |
Exhibit “E” | - Certificate of Posting issued by the Court Sheriff; |
Exhibit “F” | - Certificate of Publication issued by the NPO; |
Exhibit “F-1” | - Copy of Notice of Initial Hearing; |
Exhibit “G” | - Copy of the Indorsement addressed to the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Danao City, from Salvador Oriel, Chief, Docket Division, Land Registration Authority, dated July 7, 1998; and |
Exhibit “H” | - Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General. |
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the issuance of title to Lot 1 of the Consolidation-Subdivision of Plan Ccn-07-000094, being a portion of Lot 3152, 3151, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161, Cad. 681-D, Danao Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of Maslog, Danao City, Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu, containing an area of SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE (64,909) square meters, for and in the name of San Lorenzo Development Corporation, with principal office address at Ground Floor, Stanford Tower Condominium, 1870 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Malate, Metro Manila.On November 7, 2001, petitioner Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, therein making known that it was elevating the case to the CA. In the CA, the Republic’s appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 73996.
Upon finality of this Decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of applicant in accordance with Sec. 39 of PD 1529.
SO ORDERED.
In the matter of jurisdiction, petitioner Republic maintains that the MCTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case on account of its failure to conduct the initial hearing thereof within the period fixed in Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which mandates that the date and hour of initial hearing shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the Order. In the Republic’s own words:[6]
- Whether or not the defective and/or want of notice by publication of the initial hearing(s) of the case a quo vested the trial court with jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof; and
- Whether or not deeds of sale and tax declarations/clearances constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under C.A. No. 141.
After a series of postponements, the trial court finally set the initial hearing of the case on September 23, 1998 in an order issued on May 15, 1998 xxx. The notice of initial hearing, however, was issued only on June 6, 1998.It is noteworthy that both parties invoke the decision of the Court in Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[7] decided January 31, 2005, albeit each cites different portions thereof, and for different purposes. The common reliance on said case is well-placed as it is, indeed, of a similar factual setting. Furthermore, that case tackles the same two (2) issues presently raised: compliance with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration, and proof of possession for the requisite period.
Pursuant to Section 23, P.D. 1529, the initial hearing of the case must have to be not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing. The Order having been issued on May 15, 1998, the initial hearing should have been set not earlier than June 29, 1998 (45 days from May 15, 1998 and not later than August 13, 1998 (90 days from May 15, 1998). Unfortunately, the initial hearing was scheduled and actually held on September 23, 1998, some forty-one (41) days later than the prescribed period.
Even if counted from June 8, 1998 (date of notice of hearing), still the hearing on September 23, 1998 is seventeen (17) days late than the prescribed period of ninety (90) days, the last day of which fell on September 6, 1998.
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation.Moreover, it is evident in Manner Properties, Inc. that what is more important than the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via publication. In fact, in its memorandum,[9] petitioner Republic “concedes (a) that respondent should not be faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted on September 23, 1995 was outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that respondent might have substantially complied with the requirement thereunder relating to the registration of the subject land.”[10] Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, we find for the respondent, in that its application for registration was rightfully given due course by the MTCC.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant complied with the jurisdictional requirements.
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set beyond the 90-day maximum period. x x x.
We have held that “a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties.”[8] A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)Similarly, Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 – the Property Registration Decree – provides, inter alia, as follows:
Section 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:Here, in support of its application for registration, the respondent corporation submitted a certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that the parcel of land sought to be registered forms part of the general area classified as alienable and disposable public land under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-467 dated June 7, 1938. It also submitted tax declarations and/or clearances, the earliest of which is in the year 1964 for Lots 3150 and 3160; 1963 for Lot 3151; and 1948 for Lots 3152, 3159 and 3161.
1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier; (Emphasis supplied)
x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation had started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
All that the CENRO certificate evidences is the alienability of the land involved, not the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof by the respondent or its predecessors-in-interest for the period prescribed by law.
- That the land is alienable public land; and
- That his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.[13]