489 Phil. 352
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1. It has various real properties located in Quezon City originally covered by T.C.T. Nos. 33035, 33036, 45869, 45870, 45871, 42868 and 23617, and later reconstituted, for which new titles were issued bearing T.C.T. Nos. RT-10009 (45870), RT-10010 (45871), RT-10011 (45869), RT-10012 (42868), RT-10013 (33036), RT-10014 (33035) and RT-10015 (23617);Accordingly, La Campana prayed that the consolidated titles in the name of DBP be declared null and void, and that it be declared to be the registered owner of the same. It likewise prayed that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be ordered to cancel the consolidated titles in the name of DBP, and to reinstate its cancelled titles.
2. Pursuant to various mortgages which it has constituted over the above-mentioned properties, the same were foreclosed allegedly on 25 March 1976 and on 31 March 1976, for which a Certificate of Sale was issued and inscribed on 30 April 1976 as PE-9167/T-23617;
3. Pursuant to the order of the Honorable Court of Appeals, the said Certificate of Sale inscribed was ordered cancelled on 28 March 1977, and which was inscribed on 29 March 1977 as PE-1522/T-23617;
4. The said Certificate of Sale has not been re-annotated after its cancellation even up to the present, hence, the right of redemption of the plaintiff has not yet expired and accordingly, DBP cannot as yet consolidate in its name the said titles;
5. Despite such lack of right to consolidate the said titles as La Campana’s right of redemption has not yet expired, DBP, in wanton violation of law had caused the consolidation of the titles in its name, and new titles were issued;
6. In a case decided by the Honorable Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, said court rendered a Decision promulgated on 03 November 1994 in favor of DBP, however, said Decision did not authorize DBP to consolidate the questioned titles in its name and neither did the Decision order the cancellation of the titles in the name of La Campana;
7. The consolidation resorted to by DBP, of the titles in question, was in violation of the express terms of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. (Emphases ours).[5]
A Manifestation and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss[8] dated 04 April 1997 was further filed by DBP. Through it, DBP informed the trial court that because of the finality of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, it filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution[9] before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 76 (the court of origin of CA-G.R. CV No. 34856), which was granted in an Order[10] dated 31 March 1997.
- La Campana’s right of redemption had already expired per Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, hence, the case is already barred by the principle of res judicata;
- La Campana’s attempt to revive and to relitigate the case constitutes forum shopping, hence, the case is dismissible pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94; and
- Plaintiff, Ricardo S. Tantongco, and Counsel are guilty of contempt of court due to forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court’s resolution dated April 18, 1997 is hereby reconsidered and set aside. The instant complaint is hereby reinstated. The hearing on the issue of whether there is still a need for registering and/or re-annotating the allegedly cancelled annotation of the certificate of sale is hereby set on February 9, 1998 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Hall of Justice, Annex Building, Quezon City.DBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] dated 17 November 1997 of the aforementioned Order. An Opposition/Comment[15] was thereafter filed by La Campana dated 05 December 1997.
After a careful review of the arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant Development Bank of the Philippines thru counsel on November 21, 1997, and the Opposition/Comment thereto filed by plaintiff thru counsel on December 8, 1997, the Court hereby DENIES the motion for being bereft of merit.DBP filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Pre-Trial Brief on 02 February 1998 and 06 February 1998, respectively, where it made a reservation, thus:
Defendant DBP reserves the right to question in a proper proceeding in due time the incorrectness/impropriety of the issuance of the Order dated October 28, 1997 (which reconsidered and set aside the Resolution dated April 18, 1997 which ordered the dismissal of the instant case) and the Order dated January 8, 1998, which denied DBP’s Motion for Reconsideration dated November 17, 1997 (Re: Order dated October 28, 1997).DBP, thus, filed a petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46906. It was later dismissed by the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division, on a technicality due to improper affidavit of non-forum shopping and lack of certified true copy of the assailed Order dated 08 January 1998.[18]
This Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim is filed as a matter of extreme caution only.[17]
Acting on the private respondent’s [La Campana’s] “Manifestation/Comment Ad Cautelam” and considering the petitioner’s [DBP’s] Comment filed thereto, the manifestation filed by the private respondent praying for the dismissal with finality of the instant petition is hereby Denied for lack of merit.On 21 September 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision,[22] a part of which reads:
Private respondent is hereby given ten (10) days from receipt hereof to file its Comment/Answer to the petition. Petitioner is given a period of five (5) days from receipt of private respondent’s Comment/Answer within which to file its Reply.
Viewed against the factual backdrop of this case, petitioner failed to clearly show that the respondent Court, in issuing the assailed orders, acted with grave abuse of discretion as defined by the foregoing time-tested legal standards. On the contrary, respondent Court acted cautiously and judiciously in reinstating the complaint of private respondent. Stated differently, the subject orders merely gave the contending parties an opportunity to present their cases with regard to the issues raised in the complaint.DBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[23] On 25 February 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[24] denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and consequently DISMISSED.
The instant petition is for the Annulment of Consolidation of Titles filed by La Campana against DBP and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The issue being raised by La Campana in this case is that fraud, which was never hoisted in the other case, was employed in the consolidation of the subject titles. It contends that the redemption period did not actually run because while the Certificate of Sale was annotated in the titles, the annotations were cancelled, and had not been re-annotated since. Therefore, the requirement that the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale must be annotated in the titles before the redemption period shall begin to run, was not complied with. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in the present case:
- whether the foreclosure sale was held on June 30, 1975 or on March 25, 1976;
- whether or not DBP’s right as the purchaser in the foreclosure sale has been extinguished by prescription; and
- whether or not DBP’s right to deficiency judgment has prescribed.[29]
. . . the Complaint for Annulment of Consolidation of Titles which deals with the issue of the validity of titles, i.e., whether or not they were fraudulently issued, is a question which “[c]an only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.”[30]The causes of action, and logically, the issues in the two cases, are crystal clear, very much different, requiring divergent adjudications. In short, while there is identity of parties, there is NO identity of subject matter and cause of action. This being so, different causes of action and circumstances in different cases would make reliance on the doctrine of res judicata misplaced.[31] Res judicata cannot be interposed to bar the determination of a subsequent case if the first and second cases involve different subject matters and seek different reliefs.[32]
The respondent Court’s caution in this regard could hardly be faulted for the resolution of the issue on whether or not the registration of this Court’s Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 in the manner it was annotated automatically reinstated the previously cancelled registered Certificate of Sale is a highly contentious question which merits a full-blown trial.We now come to the ancillary issue of forum shopping, as both parties have accused each other of this offense.
Assuming arguendo that res judicata may be applicable to the case at bench although the issue of whether or not private respondent’s right of redemption over the subject lands has expired was not passed upon in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856, its applicability rests on infirm legal foundations given the facts prevailing in this case.[34] (Emphases ours)
. . . Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present:Based on the foregoing requisites, neither party is guilty of forum shopping.
- Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions;
- Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
- Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
(a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction;The exceptions, as cited above, apply in this case, as the petitioner is of the belief that the principle of res judicata obtains.
(b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or
(c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff’s baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.[43]