507 Phil. 697
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, all foregoing considered, the complaint thus filed for mandamus with a Prayer for a Writ for Preliminary Injunction with Damages is hereby DISMISSED for being a premature cause of action. Without pronouncement as to costs.[9]Petitioner's motion for reconsideration likewise failed to sway the trial court by Order dated 28 June 1996.[10]
In view of the foregoing, the instant complaint of Mr. Nilo Paloma former General Manager of Palompon Water District against Messrs. Danilo Mora, Hilario Festejo, Bryn Bongbong and Ms. Maxima Salvino for Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and Illegal Dismissal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of prima facie case.[14]In its Decision[15] dated 15 November 2002, the Court of Appeals yielded to the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated 12 March 1996 and 28 June 1996 in Civil Case No. PN-0016, are AFFIRMED in toto.[16]Equally unavailing was petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals on 01 April 2003.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17.[17]The central inquiry raised in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its challenged decision. Concretely, we are tasked to resolve: (1) whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate the General Manager thereof, and (2) whether or not the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal of petitioner.
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.[23] Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.[24]
Section 23. Additional Officers. - At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall define their duties and fix their compensation. Said officers shall serve at the pleasure of the board.Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was later amended by P.D. No. 768 on 15 August 1975 to read:
SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the board. (Emphasis supplied)Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.
An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when the Board opts to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only an expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated from office. The protection afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-Laws on Removal Of Officers and Employees, therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner.[27] (Emphasis supplied)In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within the wide arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case is the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Here, considering that the petitioner is at loggerheads with the Board, the former's services obviously ceased to be "pleasurable" to the latter. The Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of the General Manager thereof the moment the latter's services cease to be convivial to the former. Put another way, he is at the mercy of the appointing powers since his appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause and following Orcullo there is no need of prior notice or due hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. Hence, petitioner is treading on shaky grounds with his intransigent posture that he was removed sans cause and due process.
Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.The Court has previously sustained the validity of dismissal of civil servants who serve at the pleasure of the appointing power and whose appointments are covered by Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 as cited above. Thus, in Orcullo, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[29] petitioner was hired as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program-BOT Center. In upholding the termination of his employment prior to the expiration of his contract, we held that petitioner serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. This Court ruled in Orcullo –
The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows:
(1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;
(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
(4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished; . . . (Underscoring supplied.)
A perusal of petitioner's employment contract will reveal that his employment with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase "unless terminated sooner." Thus, while such employment is co-terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. We agree with the appellate court's interpretation of the phrase "unless terminated sooner" to mean "that his contractual job as Project Manager IV from March 11, 1996 to January 30, 2000 could end anytime before January 30, 2000 if terminated by the other contracting party-employer CCPAP. (Emphasis supplied)Neither is it the Court's business to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198. One of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.[30]
Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the retroactivity of the law to pending cases and must, therefore, be taken to be of prospective application. The general rule is that in an amendatory act, every case of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive effect.[32] Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested,[33] the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.[34]Republic Act No. 9286
AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 198, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973", AS AMENDED
Approved: April 2, 2004. . .
Sec. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:Sec. 23. The General Manager. – At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. (Emphasis supplied.)Sec. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.[31]
. . .
. . . Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of the petitioner, Tanjay Water District, and respondent Tarlac Water District and all water districts in the country, they come under the coverage of the civil service law, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in the case at bar is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.[36] In Villaflor v. Court of Appeals,[37] we revisited the import of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to wit:
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. . .In a surfeit of cases, this Court has held that quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are better-equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the field of their expertise.[38] This is consistent with the powers and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, to carry into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws,[39] including, in this case, P.D. No. 198.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian dispute over the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract. In Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Vasquez [240 SCRA 502], the Court recognized that the MWSS was in the best position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a waterworks project was compatible with its development plan. (Emphasis supplied)