566 Phil. 379
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
xxxOn October 19, 1994, after the pre-trial conference, the trial court issued a pre-trial Order stating that:
Before the start of the hearing of the urgent motions on July 1, 1994, the Court inquired from the parties why the Memorandum of Agreement, copy of which was attached to their motions, was not pushed through or not signed, and it was during the exchange of words between the parties and counsels that they have finally agreed to dispense with the issue on the injunction, leaving the issue on damages alone to be litigated between the parties in the instant action, because they have arrived at certain agreements, thus: the respondents shall restore the damaged building or residence of the petitioners by preparing the necessary plans, specifications and bills of materials, and to submit the same to the Office of the Building Official of Cebu City for the issuance of a permit and to secure the necessary Certificate of Occupancy, all at the expense of the respondents. A copy of the plans, specifications and bills of materials shall be furnished the petitioners who may make the necessary suggestions thereabout to the Office of the Building Official. That the respondents and/or the contractor of the building hired by the respondents to construct and/or reconstruct the damaged residential building of the petitioners should restore the foundation or the soil which caved-in during the start of the construction and/or excavation of the respondents’ building, Richmond Plaza, which is only about six (6) meters from the petitioners’ residence, and the soil/foundation should be filled up and restored to its original condition and in accordance with the standard requirements. That respondents bind themselves jointly and severally to pay the petitioners for any damage in case of any defect in the construction of petitioners’ residence and or the collapse or any
damage thereof as a result and by reason of the foundation or condition of the soil.
By virtue of the foregoing agreements, the issue on the injunction has been dispensed with, correspondingly, the temporary restraining order was deemed lifted.
Compliance with the foregoing agreement is hereby enjoined.
During the hearing of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the parties agreed to dispense with the issue on injunction, hence, the only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages in accordance with their complaint and the defendants in accordance with their counterclaim.On August 28, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for execution of the July 11, 1994 Order. However, it was denied by the trial court in its Order of November 23, 1995 on the ground that the motion should be resolved when the case shall be decided.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants by ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages, the sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, the sum of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit.On appeal by respondents, the Court of Appeals,[3] on February 17, 2005, rendered its Decision affirming the trial court’s Decision with modification in the sense that the award of moral damages is reduced to P300,000.00 from P500,000.00.
The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
Further, the defendants are hereby ordered to do and perform all at the expense of defendants, the following:
i. To complete the restoration of the foundation of the soil which caved-in to its original condition and in accordance with the standard requirements;
ii. Prepare the plans, specifications and bills of material for the restoration of the damaged residential building of the plaintiffs;
iii. Submit said plans, specifications and bills of materials to the Office of the BuildingOfficial of Cebu City;
iv. Secure the necessary permit from the Office of the Building Official of Cebu City as well as the necessary Certificate of Occupancy; and
v. Construct and/or reconstruct the damaged residential building of the plaintiffs in accordance with the approved plans, specifications and bills of materials.
Appellee’s pray for the issuance of an execution pending appeal on the grounds that appellants have succeeded in delaying the appeal, that both appellees are of advanced age and suffering from debilitating diseases, and that the appellants have disposed of some of their properties, thus, threatening the judgment on appeal to be ineffectual.On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
As records would show, the herein contested decision, inter-alia, orders the payment of moral damages together with attorney’s fees wherein execution pending appeal are not allowed (Engineering Construction Inc. v. NPC, 163 SCRA 9 [1988]; Valencia v. CA, 184 SCRA 561 [1990]; Echauz v. CA, 199 SCRA 381 [1991]; RCPI v. Lantin,
[985]). The said High Court:xxx The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners’ act will have to be determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral damages and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.Accordingly, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal dated April 28, 1999 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Suffice it to state at this point that the Court of Appeals did not err in granting petitioners’ motion. They and their counsel are deemed to have received a copy of its Decision. Indeed, the latter’s failure to file with the Court of Appeals a notice of change of address is fatal to petitioners’ case.Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:Clearly, it is the duty of the counsel to promptly inform the court of a change of his address. The contention of defendants-appellants’ counsel that his failure to inform the Court of his change of address was due to the fault of his legal secretary in not including the instant case in the inventory of his cases is a lame excuse and deserves no consideration. It has to be stressed that it devolves upon every counsel to take full responsibility in supervising the work in his office with respect to all the cases he handles and he should not delegate this responsibility to his legal secretary.
Sec. 3. Signature and address. – Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.
x x x
Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule or alleges scandalous or indecent matters therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
x x x
Sad to say, the negligence of defendants-appellants’ counsel in failing to inform the Court of his change of address which resulted to his non-receipt of Our Decision when the same was served to him in his old address, which is the address of record when the said judgment was promulgated, binds defendants-appellants.
x x x
The service of our Decision to defendants-appellants’ counsel at his address of record on March 2, 2005 was valid. It follows that the reglementary period of fifteen days within which the defendants-appellants may file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court on Our Decision shall be counted from such date or defendants-appellants had only until March 17, 2005 to file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Apparently, when plaintiffs-appellees filed the motion for entry of finality of judgment on December 12, 2005, Our Decision had already attained finality as no motion for reconsideration or petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court was ever filed by defendants-appellants within the reglementary period, or on or before March 17, 2005.
x x x