577 Phil. 185
CARPIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Visitacion Caminas and Jose V. Caminas against defendants Sps. Jesus Garcia and Lorelei A. Garcia, Sps. Rosario Angeles K. de Guzman and Rodolfo de Guzman and Sps. Elizabeth and Marcial Vargas, declaring said plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the subject property and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to divest defendants spouses Rosario Angeles K. de Guzman and Rodolfo P. de Guzman and spouses Elizabeth Vargas and Marcial Vargas of the title to the subject property and to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72646 issued in the name of spouses Rosario Angeles K. de Guzman and Rodolfo de Guzman and to invest title thereto in favor of plaintiffs Visitacion Caminas and Jose V. Caminas by issuing another transfer certificate of title in their names.Spouses De Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and issued an order[14] dated 10 February 1994, this time awarding ownership of the property to spouses De Guzman:
Ordering defendants Jesus Garcia and Lorelei A. Garcia to pay defendants Elizabeth Vargas and Marcial Vargas the amount of P700,000.00 and defendants Rosario Angeles K. de Guzman the amount of P562,500.00 with legal rate of interest thereof.
SO ORDERED.[13]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court dated April 20, 1993 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants spouses Rosario Angeles K. de Guzman and Rodolfo de Guzman against plaintiffs spouses Visitacion Caminas and Jose V. Caminas and plaintiffs spouses Elizabeth and Marcial Vargas, declaring said defendants as the absolute owners of the subject property embraced in TCT No. 72646.Spouses Caminas and spouses Vargas filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Ordering defendants Jesus Garcia and Lorelei A. Garcia to pay plantiffs spouses Visitacion Caminas and Jose V. Caminas the amount of P850,000.00 and plaintiffs Elizabeth Vargas and Marcial Vargas the amount of P700,000.00 with legal interest thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Premises Considered, the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated February 10, 1994 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the original decision dated April 20, 1993 is REINSTATED.The appellate court stated that as between spouses Caminas and spouses Vargas, spouses Caminas have a better right to the property. The appellate court ruled that as neither of the sales were registered, spouses Caminas have a better right being the first possessor in good faith. The appellate court likewise ruled that spouses Caminas have a better right than spouses De Guzman over the property. According to the appellate court, the registration of the mortgage cannot defeat the right of spouses Caminas since the mortgage was executed by one who was no longer owner of the property. The appellate court further noted that spouses De Guzman failed to prove that they were mortgagees in good faith.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:Executive Order No. 648 created the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) to assume the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the NHA, among other purposes. Executive Order No. 90 later renamed the HSRC the HLURB.
- Unsound real estate business practices;
- Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
- Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, FRDC's act of mortgaging the condominium project to Bancom and FEBTC, without the knowledge and consent of David as buyer of a unit therein, and without the approval of the NHA (now HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957, was not only an unsound real estate business practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer. David, who has a cause of action for annulment of the mortgage, the mortgage foreclosure sale, and the condominium certificate of title that was issued to the UBP and FEBTC as [the] highest bidders at the sale. The case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB) as provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of 1978.The Court reiterated this ruling in Home Bankers Savings and Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals[18] which involves a mortgage entered into by the same Trans-American Sales and Exposition that is a party in this case, thus:
The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of the President that HLURB has jurisdiction to declare invalid the mortgage contract executed between Garcia/TransAmerican and petitioner over the subject lots insofar as private respondents are concerned. It correctly relied on Union Bank of the Philippines vs. HLURB, et al. where we squarely ruled on the question of HLURB's jurisdiction to hear and decide a condominium buyer's complaint for: (a) annulment of a real estate mortgage constituted by the project owner without the consent of the buyer and without the prior written approval of the NHA; (b) annulment of the foreclosure sale; and (c) annulment of the condominium certificate of title that was issued to the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, x x xOn the contention that spouses Vargas are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction, the well-settled rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. An examination of the records of the trial court will reveal that in its Rejoinder dated 27 February 1993, spouses Vargas raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court since the case properly falls within the jurisdiction of the HLURB.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623). The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one who file the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec.30, Rule 132, Ibid.), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code). (Emphasis supplied)In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,[23]the Court expounded on the issue of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:In this case, the trial court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, spouses Vargas are not barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court and the principle of estoppel does not apply.The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same `must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.Verily, Lozon, Union Motors, Dy and De Rossi aptly resolve the jurisdictional issue obtaining in this case. Applying the guidelines in Lozon, the labor arbiter assumed jurisdiction when he should not. In fact, the NLRC correctly reversed the labor arbiter's decision x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam]. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in [Tijam] which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in [Tijam]not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.In Tijam, the lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. Hence, the Court ruled that the issue of jurisdiction may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.
The failure of the appellees to invoke anew the aforementioned solid ground of want of jurisdiction of the lower court in this appeal should not prevent this Tribunal to take up that issue as the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court is apparent upon the face of the record and it is fundamental that a court of justice could only validly act upon a cause of action or subject matter of a case over which it has jurisdiction and said jurisdiction is one conferred only by law; and cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties; hence may be considered by this court motu proprio. (citations omitted)The Court shall no longer dwell on the issue of forum shopping. Even if spouses Vargas were guilty of forum shopping, the fact remains that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Spouses Caminas only raised the issue of forum shopping in their opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration (filed by the spouses Vargas) dated 22 October 1998 before the Court of Appeals.[28] In Young v. Keng Seng,[29] the Court ruled that the violation of the rule on forum shopping should be raised at the earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading. The fact that spouses Vargas filed a case before the HLURB was made known to the spouses Caminas before the trial court rendered its decision. Yet, spouses Caminas failed to question the alleged forum shopping before the trial court or in their appeal brief before the Court of Appeals.