485 Phil. 35
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
That on or about the 14th day of October, 1998, in the municipality of Vigan, province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, all armed with illegally possessed firearms (unrecovered) with intent to gain, in band, did then and there stage a hold-up at the business establishment of the family of Hipolito Bagay, by wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with violence and intimidation, pointing their firearms at Hipolito Bagay, Erlinda Sabado Bagay and Johanna Go, and shot Hipolito Bagay thereby inflicting mortal gunshot wounds on him which caused his death a few days thereafter, and then wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to gain, the above-named malefactors took, stole and carried away the amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,200,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Hipolito Bagay on board a get-away vehicle, a Mitsubishi L-300 van bearing plate no. CME-337, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the late Hipolito Bagay.[3]On 06 April 1999, the case against Virgilio Corpuz was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence[4] and accordingly, his name was stricken out from the information.[5] Corpuz later became state witness. In the interregnum, accused Danilo Espidol died in jail while Alfredo Limos fled from prison on 08 March 1999 and has remained at-large.[6] As for Armando Aniasco, the trial court issued an order for his arrest on 17 July 2001 upon learning that he was detained in the Cabanatuan City Jail in Nueva Ecija for another offense.[7]
Considering that no mitigating circumstance could be considered in favour of the accused in view of the fact that the prosecution has already started to present two (2) of its witnesses against the accused, and considering the voluntariness of the plea of guilty of the accused, the Court accepts the plea of guilty and hereby finds accused SAGRADO DALACAT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide, punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 296 of the same code as charged in the information, with no extenuating circumstance hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, HIPOLITO BAGAY the sum of P50,000.00 and the further amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,200,000.00), with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.In light of the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant, the records of the case were elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Let the entire records of the case together with the documentary evidence and transcribed stenographic notes be forwarded to the Honorable SUPREME COURT for automatic review.[23]
At bottom is the issue of whether or not the plea of guilty by appellant was validly made to convict him of a capital offense. Ancillary to this are the issues of: (1) whether the prosecution evidence was sufficient to merit conviction of appellant, and (2) whether the penalty of death was properly imposed.I.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT’S PLEA OF GUILTY AS IMPROVIDENT;II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONTINUE WITH THE TRIAL AND RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE AFTER ACCUSED SAGRADO DALACAT CHANGED HIS PLEA TO A PLEA OF GUILTY;III.
SUPPOSING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT APPELLANT’S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS VALIDLY MADE, THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OFFENSE OF ROBBERY WAS COMMITTED BY A BAND;IV.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONSIDERING “BAND” AND “USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARMS” AS a QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE TO WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH.[24]
Article 294 – Robbery with violence against or intimidations of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:The information, to which Dalacat pleaded guilty, alleged that the robbery with homicide was committed in a band, which if proved would warrant the penalty of death. Apropos the plea of guilt, Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.This provision was a reproduction of its precursor prior to the amendment of the Rules of Court. Based on this rule, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court should kowtow to in order to forestall the entry of an improvident plea of guilty by the accused, namely:
The mandatory nature of these three requisites for a valid plea of guilty to a capital offense is easily deducible from the letter of the law. Lamentably, the court a quo failed to play the rules of the game.
- The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness x x x and full comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences [of his plea];
- The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
- The court must ask the accused [whether] he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he [so] desires. (Emphasis supplied.)[27]
The transcript of the hearing on 26 July 2001 is further set forth below for a clearer illustration, to wit:
ATTY. VITAMOG: For the record, Your Honor, I have just conferred with the accused, Your Honor and he really desires to change his plea of not guilty to guilty and I conferred thoroughly and explained the consequences of his plea of guilt, but still, he insisted to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty, Your Honor.
COURT: What is the name of the accused? ATTY. VITAMOG: Accused Sagrado Dalacat, Your Honor. COURT: Will you call the accused to come here? x x x x x x x x x Q. Are you really willing to change your plea of not guilty to guilty? A. Yes, Your Honor. Q Do you know the legal consequences of your plea of guilt? A. Yes, Your Honor. COURT: What can you say Fiscal? PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CABLAYAN: That the accused should be informed that the decision of this Honorable Court will be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court, Your Honor. Probably, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, Your Honor. COURT: You explained to the accused. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CABLAYAN: Yes, Your Honor. COURT: ORDER:/ When this case was called for hearing, the defense counsel Atty. Fatima Vitamog manifested in open Court that the accused Sagrado Dalacat is now willing to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty. When the accused was confronted that the legal effect of his plea of guilty will not change the facts of the case considering that the prosecution had already presented three (3) witnesses and that the penalty of the crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide is Reclusion Perpetua to death and the accused was asked of his willingness to change his former plea of not guilty to guilty. Whereupon, the prosecution also informed the accused Sagrado Dalacat that the case will be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court and that his penalty will be affirmed or lowered by the Supreme Court which was understood by the accused. Whereupon, the accused was rearraigned, and he pleaded guilty to the crime charged against him. In view thereof, the case is submitted for decision. SO ORDERED.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
On the first requisite of Section 3, Rule 116,[30] we held in a spate of cases that a searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can be truly said to be based on a free and informed judgment.[31]
COURT: Atty. Ascaño, can you not represent Atty. Vitamog? It is only the Court who will ask questions to the accused. ATTY. ASCAÑO: For the accused in collaboration with Atty. Fatima Vitamog, Your Honor. COURT: [Alright], you call the accused in the witness stand. COURT INTERPRETER: Calls the accused Sagrado Dalacat in the witness stand. (sic) TO THE WITNESS: Please stand up, raise your right hand to take your oath. Q. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth? A. Yes, sir I do. Q. Please state your name, age and other personal circumstances? A. SAGRADO DALACAT, 29 years old, single, jobless and a resident of Cabanatuan City. x x x x x x x x x QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT: Q. On June 13, 2001, you withdrew your plea of not guilty and instead with the assistance of Atty. Fatima Vitamog, you pleaded guilty to the offense charged? A. Yes, Your Honor. Q. Before you pleaded guilty with your counsel Atty. Vitamog, Atty. Vitamog explained the legal effect and consequences of your plea of guilt? (sic)
A. Yes, Your Honor. Q. And Atty. Vitamog explained that by pleading guilty to the information filed against you, you admitted all the allegations in the information? A. Yes, Your Honor. Q. And that by reason of your pleading guilty, you maybe imposed the penalty of the capital offense being a heinous crime? (sic) A. Yes, Your Honor. Q. The Branch Fiscal informed that the decision of this Court will be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court. Did you understand the explanation of the Branch Public Prosecutor? (sic) A. It was the Court Interpreter who explained, Your Honor. Q. And after being re-informed of the legal effect and consequence of your plea of guilty, do you still affirm to your plea of guilty on June 13, 2001? A. Yes, Your Honor. COURT: Do you have any questions Atty. Ascaño? ATTY. ASCAÑO: No more, Your Honor. COURT: How about the Provincial Prosecutor? PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR VILORIA: No more, Your Honor. COURT: ORDER:/ When this case was called for hearing today, Provincial Prosecutor Jessica G. Viloria and Atty. Arnulfo Manzano appeared for the prosecution while Atty. Ligaya Ascaño appeared for the accused Sagrado Dalacat in collaboration with Atty. Fatima Vitamog. In the course of the proceedings, accused Sagrado Dalacat was placed in the witness stand wherein the Court asked if he affirms and confirms to change his former plea of not guilty to guilty and the accused answered in the affirmative. Wherefore, and there being no objection on the part of the Provincial Prosecutor as well as the private prosecutor, the above-entitled case with respect to accused Sagrado Dalacat is hereby submitted for resolution. SO ORDERED.[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x. [T]rial judges x x x must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.While there is no cast-iron rule as to how a judge may conduct a “searching inquiry,” we outlined the following guidelines in a throng of cases:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.[33]In the case at bar, a cursory look at the transcripts easily reveal the fact that appellant’s plea of guilty was far from spontaneous and persistent as envisioned by Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court not only failed to probe into the spontaneity of appellant’s plea, it made no effort to apprise him of the impact of his change of plea as the accused herein was merely told that he could face the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient, for more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.[38]
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.[34]
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.[35]
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.[36]
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details of significance.[37]
The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (Emphasis supplied.)Recently, in People v. Besonia,[40] this Court, with Mr. Chief Justice Davide as ponente, echoed the caveat in People v. Camay, viz:
It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.Like the first requirement of a searching inquiry, the second and third indispensable requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules as aforecited have, likewise, remained intact through the years.
Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accused's right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the accused's fundamental rights.Irrefragably, the performance of Attys. Hermilo Barrios, Fatima Vitamog, and Ligaya Ascaño were below par of the advocacy demanded of them specially given the gravity of the offense charged and the severity of the imposable penalty. Accordingly, they are hereby ADMONISHED for their sloppiness in protecting appellant’s rights with a WARNING that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.