412 Phil. 1
PER CURIAM:
This is a “resolution,”
which is more accurately a manifesto or a petition of concerned citizens of
Tuao, Cagayan, denouncing certain acts of Judge Dominador L. Garcia, Municipal
Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan, in connection with his handling of Criminal Case
No. 399, entitled “People vs. Renato Bulatao.” The complainants are then Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan, the mayor and vice–mayor, ten (10) members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
thirty-two (32) barrio captains, ten (10) LGU department heads of Tuao,
Cagayan, and eight (8) heads of non-governmental organizations or NGOs in the
municipality of Tuao.
The “resolution,” dated
November 4, 1996, was presented to this Court. It was adopted at an assembly led by Rep. Manuel N. Mamba which picketed
the municipal trial court on that day.[1] The "resolution" was treated as an
administrative complaint and respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia was required
to answer. The matter was referred to
Executive Judge Orlando D. Beltran, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao,
Cagayan, for investigation, report, and recommendation.[2]
Thereafter, an
investigation was held during which the affidavits and sworn statements of NBI
Special Investigator Ablezer Rivera, the joint affidavit of NBI agents, Raul A.
Ancheta and Paul D. Rivera, the sworn statement of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 699, Renato Bulatao, and the testimonies of Abner P. Cardenas, clerk of
court, MTC, Tuao, Cagayan and Tomas Latauan, Jr., interpreter of the same court,
were presented. The gist of the
evidence for the complainants is as follows:
On August 23, 1996, a
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866 (illegal possession of
firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial
Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia of the
Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.[3] Respondent set the preliminary investigation
on September 4, 1996, but the same was subsequently postponed and reset to
October 23, 1996 as respondent was not present, although the complaining
officer, P/Sr. Inspector Danny F. Salvador, appeared in court. On October 23, 1996, the preliminary
investigation was again reset to October 30, 1996. On October 29, 1996, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to
the NBI that at the scheduled preliminary investigation on September 4, 1996,
P/Sr. Inspector Salvador demanded P30,000.00 from him in consideration
of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him. According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and
respondent judge on October 23, 1996. As Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the amount was reduced
to P6,000.00.
Based on Bulatao’s
report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge. The NBI gave Bulatao 12 pieces of P500.00
marked bills amounting to P6,000.00, which the latter would give to
Salvador and respondent the next day.[4]
Accordingly, at about 7
o'clock in the morning of the following day, October 30, Bulatao met the NBI
operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba, Sr., former representative of the
3rd District of Cagayan, where the entrapment was planned. Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record
his conversation with whoever will receive the money. At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial Court and waited
for his case to be called. At 10:30
a.m., respondent went out of his chambers and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos
and SPO4 Carlos Poli, representatives of P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in the preliminary
investigation. Respondent then called
Bulatao and led him and the two police officers to the office of the MTC court
personnel. Inside, respondent asked
Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he answered in the affirmative, respondent took them to his
chambers and left them there as he proceeded to his sala. After handing the money to the police
officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's
court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police officers
after recovering 11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their possession.[5]
After the matter was
referred by this Court to Executive Judge Orlando Beltran for investigation,
the latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the
respondent. The records show that
hearings were set on different dates (December 10, 1997, January 30, 1998,
February 10, 1998, March 3, 1998, March 10, 1998, September 10, 1998, October
9, 1998, November 11, 1998, January 5, 1999, February 9, 1999, March 4, 1999,
and April 5, 1999), but respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence only his counter-affidavit was
considered, in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked
permission to talk to the two police officers. He denied that he took the three to his chambers.[6]
On the basis of these
facts, the Investigating Judge made the following recommendation:
"The foregoing facts indisputably show that the respondent Judge allowed the use of his chambers by the two (2) police officers SPOII Jonathan Santos and SPOIV Carlos Poli and Renato Bulatao, the accused in the criminal case for illegal possession of firearms, so that they could talk about the "settlement" of Bulatao's case which was then pending preliminary investigation by the respondent Judge. Although the two (2) witnesses, Abner Cardenas and Tomas Latauan, Jr., claimed that they did not hear the subject of the conversation between Bulatao, on one hand, and the two (2) policemen and the respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia, on the other, before the three first-named persons went inside the chambers of the respondent Judge, it is not difficult to conclude that they must have talked about the criminal case of Bulatao and its "settlement." For if the subject-matter of their conversation were other than said "settlement" there appears no reason or purpose to allow the policemen and the accused to go inside the judge's chambers and there to continue their conversation. Simply stated, the respondent judge allowed the two (2) policemen and the accused Renato Bulatao to use his chambers so that they could consummate the arrangements for the dismissal of the case, particularly the payment of the sum of money being demanded as consideration for such dismissal.
"In this connection, the undersigned Investigating Judge cannot help but refer to the taped conversation between the two (2) policemen and Renato Bulatao inside the chamber of the respondent Judge. A portion of the translated dialogue between Poli and Bulatao, which was in Ilocano, tends to show that the P6,000.00 pay-off handed by Bulatao to the policemen was not intended for the respondent Judge but solely for the policemen and their superior, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador. However, it is not easy to disregard the implication obvious from the said conversation that the respondent Judge was privy to the entire transaction. SPOIV Poli pointedly told Bulatao "to take care of the Judge" which implies that the Judge knew of the pay-off being made and was willing to abide by the "deal" provided he would be "taken care of" by Bulatao.
"Such acts of the respondent Judge are improper, to say the least. He, therefore, violated the duty of every Judge to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. (Mortel vs. Leido, Jr. 44 SCAD 567). It cannot be over-emphasized that a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach. (Marcos, Sr. vs. Arcangel, 72 SCAD 1). Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true not only in the performance of their official duties but in all their activities, including their private life. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. (Pedro San Juan vs. Judge Lore V. Bagalsera, RTC, BR. 23, Naga City, A. M. No. RTJ-97-1395, December 22, 1997). In this case, the acts of the respondent judge were clearly improper as he facilitated, if not participated in, the obviously unauthorized/illegal transaction between the two (2) police officers and the accused Renato Bulatao for the settlement/dismissal of the latter's criminal case, in consideration of a sum of money, particularly since the offense charged against Bulatao is a grievous one and that it is one which is not allowed by law to be compromised.
"In view of all the foregoing, the undersigned Investigating Judge respectfully recommends that the respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia be found guilty of improper conduct and be punished accordingly.[7]"
The Investigating Judge's
reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two police
officers is erroneous. The recording of
private conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the
provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law,
and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.[8] The law covers even those recorded by
persons privy to the private communications, as in this case.[9] Thus, the contents of the tape recorder
cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability of respondent judge.
In all other respects,
however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance with the
evidence. We hold, however, that
respondent judge is guilty not just of improper conduct but of serious
misconduct. Serious misconduct is such
conduct which affects a public officer's performance of his duties as such
officer and not only that which affects his character as a private
individual. For serious misconduct to
warrant a dismissal from the service, there must be reliable evidence showing
that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention
to violate the law. It must (1) be
serious, important, weighty, momentary, and not trifling; (2) imply wrongful
intention and not mere error of judgment; and (3) have a direct relation to and
be connected with the performance of his official duties.[10]
In the case at bar, it is
clear that the crime of bribery was committed. Although the evidence may not be sufficient to support a conviction in a
criminal case, it is adequate for the purpose of these proceedings. The standards of integrity required of
members of the Bench are not satisfied by conduct which merely allows one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law.[11] In an administrative proceeding, such as
this case, only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required.[12]
To constitute bribery,
the following must be shown: (1) the offender is a public officer within the
scope of Art. 203; (2) the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a
gift or present by himself or through another; (3) such offer or promise is
accepted, or gift received by the public officer, (a) with a view to
committing some crime; (b) in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime, but which is unjust; or (c) to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) the act which he agrees
to perform is connected with the performance of his official duties.[13] From the records, it is evident that P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador, a public officer, solicited money from Bulatao in
consideration of the withdrawal of the case against the latter. The former categorically told the latter
that he would withdraw the criminal case against Bulatao if Bulatao gives him
P30,000.00, which was later lowered to P6,000.00. The fact that two of his men came for
the preliminary investigation and, without hesitation, followed respondent
judge to his chambers after hearing that Bulatao had the money, bears out
Bulatao's allegations. Although these
circumstances do not show conclusively that respondent judge was privy to the
crime of bribery, there is substantial evidence showing that he was at least an
accomplice to the crime who cooperated in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.[14] The following circumstances, as corroborated
by the report of the NBI and the testimonies of two employees of the MTC, who
were disinterested witnesses, show that respondent judge knowingly and
voluntarily cooperated with P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in consummating the crime:
(1) On the day of the entrapment, respondent
judge asked Bulatao if he had the money, and when he received an affirmative
answer, he took Bulatao and the two police officers to his chambers, told the
police officers to receive whatever Bulatao would give them,[15] and then left; and
(2) When Bulatao left
respondent's chambers and gave the signal to the NBI operatives waiting
outside, the marked bills were found by the agents in the possession of SPO2
Jonathan Santos, as the latter was leaving the chambers of respondent judge
with SPO4 Carlos Poli. As the
Investigating Judge observed, respondent willingly allowed his chambers to be
used for the consummation of the illegal transaction. The actions of respondent implies a wrongful intention to commit
an unlawful act while in the performance of his official duties.
Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety but even the
appearance of impropriety in all their conduct. This includes not taking an undue interest in the settlement of
criminal cases pending before them as this may compromise the integrity and
impartiality of their office.[16] As the visible representation of the law and
of justice, their conduct must be above reproach and suspicion.[17] By acting as an accomplice to P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador, respondent judge violated not only the law but also the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Nor does the fact that
respondent committed misconduct during a preliminary investigation, which is
non-judicial in character, exempt him from the disciplinary power of this Court
as the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only an addition to his
judicial functions.[18]
In Cabrera vs. Pajares,[19] where the payment of the money to respondent judge in his chambers was
witnessed by an NBI agent, this Court ordered his dismissal from the service. Likewise, in Court Administrator vs.
Hermoso,[20] where the judge received money from a party to a case pending before
his sala and was entrapped by an NBI agent, this Court ordered his
dismissal. In addition, the erring
judge is liable to the forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits
and his dismissal shall be with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, as provided by Section 9, Rule 14
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) and our current rulings.[21]
Respondent judge was
previously convicted in two administrative cases filed before this Court. In A.M. No. MTJ-91-616, entitled
"Clodualdo Escobar vs. Garcia," the Court, in a resolution dated
September l, 1992, found respondent guilty of palpable ignorance of Rule 114,
section 8 resulting in the denial of due process to the prosecution in a
criminal case. Respondent was fined an
amount equivalent to 15 days salary with warning that a repetition of the same
would be dealt with more severely. In
another case, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1049, entitled “Eloisa Bernardo v. Garcia,” the Court,
in a resolution dated June 28, 1995, found respondent guilty of deliberately
delaying his decision in a civil case and falsifying certificates of
service. He was reprimanded and ordered
to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Dominador L.
Garcia guilty of serious misconduct and accordingly orders his DISMISSAL from
the service and the forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo, pp.
34-44.
[2] Id., p. 143.
[3] Id., p. 24.
[4] Id., pp.
57-59, 65.
[5] Id., pp.
63-64, 66-68.
[6] Id., p. 122.
[7] Id., pp.
247-248.
[8] “SECTION 1. It
shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly over hear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder,
or however otherwise described. (Italics ours).
“....
“SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation. (Italics
ours).”
[9] Ramirez vs.
Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 (1995).
[10] Manuel vs.
Calimag, Jr., 307 SCRA 657 (1999).
[11] Centrum
Agri-business Realty Corporation vs. Katalbas-Moscardon, 247 SCRA 147
(1995).
[12] Lorenza vs.
Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632 (1999); Liwanag vs. Lustre, 306 SCRA 55 (1999);
REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Sec. 5.
[13] L.B. Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law, vol. 2, pp. 366-367 (14th ed., 1998).
[14] Revised Penal Code,
Art.18.
[15] Rollo, p.
132.
[16] Ferrer vs.
Maramba, 290 SCRA 44 (1998), Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.01.
[17] Cabrera vs.
Pajares, 142 SCRA 127 (1986); Quiz vs. Castano, 107 SCRA 196 (1981);
Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258 (1981).
[18] Radomes vs. Jakosalem,
320 SCRA 445 (1999).
[19] 142 SCRA 127 (1986).
[20] 150 SCRA 269 (1987).
[21] National Bureau of
Investigation vs. Reyes, 326 SCRA 109 (2000); Nazareno vs.
Almario, 268 SCRA 657 (1997); Tabao vs. Espina, 257 SCRA 298 (1996);
Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation vs. Katalbas-Moscardon, 247
SCRA 145 (1995); Lee vs. Abastillas, 234 SCRA 29 (1994); Imbing vs.
Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690 (1994).