780 Phil. 645
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Immediate cause : Irreversible Shock Antecedent cause : Acute Myocardial Infarction Underlying cause : Hypertensive Heart Disease
Death compensation --- US$ 60,000.00 Children Allowance
(3 minors x $15,000.00) --- US$ 45,000.00 Burial Allowance --- US$ 1,000.00 TOTAL --- US$106,000.00
As earlier mentioned, [Godofredo]'s contract was supposed to expire on March 20, 2003, but then he was repatriated on March 16, 2003, i.e., four (4) days before the expiration of his contract. Seemingly, we can assume, ipso facto, that [Godofredo] was quickly repatriated on March 16, 2003 because of his continuous headaches and body pains, more pronounced in the nape area. And, rightly so, because on March 17, 2003 [Godofredo] was treated at the clinic of Dr. Cayetano Reyes in Cavite and was diagnosed as suffering from "Essential Hypertension." The ship captain must have been informed of [Godofredo]'s illness on board; Otherwise, who will issue the discharge and repatriation Order? This explains why the sudden discharge of [Godofredo] on March 16, 2003. Thus, to our (sic) mind, [Godofredo] 's repatriation was due to medical reason, and not due to finish contract as claimed by [petitioners]. Lamentably, none of the parties adduced evidence to prove their respective averments in this regard, not even the ship's logbook or the Master's order of discharge. Assuming arguendo, that [Godofredo] was not medically repatriated, would he be entitled to compensation benefits? YES, [Godofredo] would still be entitled to compensation benefits under Section 20(A) of the POEA Contract because he died due to work-related illness x x x.
Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the repatriation of [Godofredo] were shrouded with doubts and ambiguities, ergo. We are constrained to resolve such doubts and ambiguities in favor of labor. "It is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or, in the interpretation of agreements and writings, should be resolved in the former's favor." (Nicario vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 125340, September 17, 1998).[21]
As borne out by the records, [Godofredo] disembarked from the vessel on March 16, 2003. The following day (March 17), he was treated at the clinic of Dr. Cayetano G. Reyes who diagnosed him as suffering from "Essential Hypertension" and required to rest for one (1) week with medication (Annex "D", [respondents'] position paper). On March 19, 2003, [Godofredo] lost his life. Cause of death indicates:Immediate Cause - Irreversible Shock
Antecedent Cause - Acute Myocardial Infarction
Underlying Cause - Hypertensive Heart Disease
(Annex "E", Suppra. [sic])
It must be stressed, at this point, that [Godofredo]'s treatment happened in one day (24-Hour) interval from his arrival in Manila and his death occurred within two days (48-Hour) from his treatment by Dr. Cayetano G. Reyes. In a span of only three days (72-hour) from [Godofredo]'s repatriation, a loss of a father - the only breadwinner in the family, suddenly struck the Repiso family like a lightning from the sky.
The sequence of events led us to conclude that [Godofredo]'s illness (Hypertension) was work-related as it was caused and/or aggravated by the nature of his work as Messman on board the vessel "M/T Umm Al Lulu."
In compensation benefits, the rules of the Employee's Compensation Commission (PD 626) are similar to the rules of the POEA Contract insofar as the principle of work-related illness and theory of aggravation are concerned. The rule is: "For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed in Section 32-A of the POEA Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied; Otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Vela. De Inquillo vs. ECC, G.R. No. 51543, June 6, 1989)." Another case, "if the illnesses are not occupational diseases, the claimant must present proof that he contracted them in the course of his employment, x x x (Galanida vs. ECC, et al., GR No. 70660, September 24, 1987)." (See Azucena's Labor Code, Vol. 1, 5th Ed. p. 387).
Noteworthy mentioning here is the fact that [Godofredo]'s illness (Essential Hypertension) is an Occupational Disease and listed No. 20 in Section 32-A of the POEA Contract. On this score alone, we find [Godofredo]'s death compensable in accordance with Section 20(A) of the POEA Standard Contract. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone, x x x.[22]
Did [Godofredo conceal] his hypertension (essential) during the pre-employment medical examination? The answer is NO. "Hypertension can be easily detected by a simple blood pressure check up using blood pressure apparatus. Hypertension, also called High Blood Pressure, condition in which the blood pressure in either arteries or veins is abnormally high. Blood pressure is the force exerted by the blood against the walls of the blood vessels, x x x Known as the "silent killer" because it may be present for years with no perceptible symptoms, hypertension is usually detected by a routine blood pressure test, x x x Hypertension is usually classified by cause as either essential (of unknown origin) or secondary (the result of a specific disease or disorder)." (p. 202, Vol. 6, the New Encyclopedia Britannica).
[Godofredo] underwent this kind of routine blood pressure test every time he was on contract with [petitioners] to board an ocean-going vessel. This Pre-employment Medical Examination is done by the company-designated physician before the signing of employment contract. Once the seaman-applicant passed this examination, he is, for all intents and purposes, considered fit to work on board the vessel. And [Godofredo] was subjected to this kind of medical examination for several times in the long years of his employment with CF Sharp since 1990. For [petitioners] to claim that [Godofredo] hid his illness during the pre-employment medical examination is, to us (sic), preposterous-if not, absurd, x x x
x x x x
As to the Fourth Issue, we rule likewise in favor of [respondents]. There is no credence to [petitioners'] argument that [Godofredo]'s failure to report to CF Sharp within three (3) days from his return is fatal to [respondents'] claim for compensation benefit. The reasons are obvious: how can [Godofredo] report to CF Sharp when on the second day of his arrival in Manila he was being treated by Dr. Cayetano Reyes? And on the third day, while about to report to CF Sharp office, he collapsed and eventually died on March 19, 2003? We need not elaborate the obvious. Besides, the three-day mandatory reporting requirement applies only to the forfeiture of sickness allowance on the assumption that the seafarer signed off from the vessel for medical treatment. It does not apply to death benefit compensation under Section 20 (A) of the POEA Contract. Under these circumstances, we find it not only unnecessary, but also impossible for [Godofredo] to comply with the three-day mandatory reporting requirement.[23]
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is rendered, as follows:
- Declaring that the death of seaman Godofredo Repiso occurred during the term of his employment contract and the same was work-related;
- Ordering [petitioners] jointly and severally, to pay [respondents] the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$50,000.00) as death benefit;
- Ordering [petitioners], jointly and severally, to pay [respondents] the amount of TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$21,000.00) as additional benefits due each child of Luzviminda Repiso and the late Godofredo Repiso, at US$7,000.00 per child (US$7,000.00 x 3 = US$21,000.00);
- Ordering [petitioners], jointly and severally, to pay [respondents] burial expenses in the amount of ONE THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$1,000.00); and
- Ordering [petitioners], jointly and severally, to pay [respondents] ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as and by way of attorney's fees.
Claims for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for lack of merit.
Payment can be made in US DOLLARS or in PHILIPPINE PESOS [equivalent] at the time of payment.[24]
"Section 2. Commencement/Duration of Contract
A. The employment contract between the employer and seafarer shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport [or seaport] in the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. It shall be effective until the seafarer's date of arrival at the point of hire upon termination of his employment pursuant to Section 18 of this Contract.
xxxx
and,
Section 18. Termination of Employment.
A. The employment of the seafarer shall cease when the seafarer completes his period of contractual service aboard the vessel, signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire.
It is not an uncommon practice in the shipping industry that seafarers get off at the nearest and convenient port before the expiration of their contracts. Yet, this does not mean that they have not completed their services. The provisions on termination would not have found their way to the standard contract if their purpose were not to clarify how term of employment or term of contract should be interpreted. On this basis, We hold that when [Godofredo] disembarked on March 16, 2003, he did so for no other reason but that he already finished his contract of 10 months. We cannot accept the claim that he was repatriated for medical reasons because no evidence was ever adduced to prove it so. Even the Labor Arbiter noted that there was no ship logbook or Master's report, to indicate that [Godofredo] was suffering from any illness before he was repatriated. His death three (3) days after arrival, unfortunate it may seem, is merely circumstantial.
Moreover, We find that support from jurisprudence that "term of contract" refers to the actual existence of employer-employee relations. In the most recent case of Gau Sheng Phils, vs. Estella Joaquin (G.R. No. 144665, September 8, 2004), the Supreme Court denied the claim for death benefits on the ground that seaman Joaquin's employment had been terminated on the date he was repatriated, upon mutual consent, which was merely 28 days after he was deployed. Thus, there is here a categorical recognition that term of employment is not necessarily the duration of the contract. On this criterion alone, the claim for death and burial benefits must fail.[26]
Even under the old contract, We find the issue of work relation applicable. In the same Gau Sheng case (infra), the high court ruled that death compensation cannot be awarded unless there is substantial evidence showing that (a) the cause of death was reasonably connected with his work; or (b) the sickness for which he died is an accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died.
In the instant case, [respondents were] unsuccessful in proving that [Godofredo]'s death was brought about by his recent work on board. [Ciodofredo] never complained of or reported any illness to [petitioners] before, during and after his disembarkation from M/T Umm Al Lulu. Based on the records, [petitioners] came to know of [Godofredo]'s death only months after his repatriation on March 16, 2003, or in September 2003 when they received the first letter of demand from [respondents] for payment of death benefits. The only documents they presented to support their claims were the doctor's certificate showing that [Godofredo] was diagnosed on March 17, 2003 as having essential hypertension and the death certificate showing the cause of death as hypertensive heart disease. But these do not prove that he contracted or suffered from the illness while on board during the term of his employment from May 20, 2002 to March 16, 2003. In fact, he was not even repatriated for medical reasons but for a finished contract.
On the other hand, [petitioners] substantially established that [Godofredo] 's death was not a factor. [Respondents] did not deny that as a messman, [Godofredo] 's duties were largely limited to the preparation of food in an assisting capacity to the Chief Cook. To our mind, there is thus nothing in his duties that could increase the risk of contracting a hypertensive heart disease.
Although hypertension and heart disease are admittedly work-reiated illnesses, they being included in the list of occupational diseases under the standard contract, [respondents] failed to meet the requisite conditions for compensability. Section 32-A of the contract provides that: "hypertension classified as primary or essentials is considered compensable if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability; Provided, that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest x-ray report, (b) ECG report, (c) blood chemistry, (d) funduscopy report, and (e) C-T scan." And for cardiovascular diseases (or heart diseases), it is required that: "Any of the following conditions must be met: (a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work, (b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be [of] sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship, (c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship."
Records show that these conditions have not been satisfied. As earlier stated, it was not shown that [Godofredo] contracted or suffered from the illness while on board. Neither did the nature of [Godofredo] 's work as messman involve severe strain.
A.t this juncture, We must stress that award of compensation under the POEA standard contract can not rest on speculations or presumptions. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Rosario vs. Denklav Marine (G.R. No." 166906, March 16, 2005):x x x. It would be too presumptive for this Court to contemplate even the probability that Romeo contracted this illness while on board M/T Endurance. The burden is on the beneficiaries to show a reasonable connection between the causative circumstances in the employment of the deceased employee and his death or permanent total disability, x x x.
To reiterate, the [respondents] failed to discharge this burden. Thus, the Labor Arbiter should have denied both claims for death and burial benefits.[27]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [petitioners'] appeal is GRANTED.
The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET- ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint [for] lack of merit.[28]
The above observations of the Labor Arbiter are more in consonance with the principle that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. In the case of NFD International Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC, the Supreme Court held:"Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Private respondent having substantially established the causative circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to have transpired during his employment, we find the NLRC to have acted in the exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability benefits to private respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings."
Contrary to the finding of the NLRC, records do not show that Godofredo disembarked from the vessel at the nearest and convenient port due to "end of contract." Neither was it shown or proven by [petitioners] that Godofredo's contractual service aboard the vessel "M/T UMM AL LULU" was completed or that he signed-off from the vessel. On the contrary, We find by preponderance of evidence that Godofredo was repatriated on 16 March 2003 for medical reasons before his contract was to end on 20 March 2003. In fact, as also found by the Labor Arbiter, Godofredo immediately sought medical treatment at the Clinic of Dr. Cayetano G. Reyes on 17 March 2003, where he was required to rest for one (1) week with medication.
Conversely, this Court is at a [loss] why [petitioners], having easy access over the ship's logbook or master's report, failed to present the same before the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter to disprove [respondents'] claim that [Godofredo] was repatriated for medical reasons and to prove the latter's end of contract. Their failure to do so only constrains us more to believe that indeed, Godofredo was repatriated for medical reasons on 16 March 2003, or three (3) days before his untimely death on 19 March 2003.[30] (Citation omitted.)
On a final note, the doctrine annunciated in the case of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, wherein the High Court held that the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels, need not be emphasized. The provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of the Seamen. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the NLRC, Third Division, dated 24 August 2006 and 27 February 2007, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The 23 September 2005 Decision of the labor arbiter is REINSTATED. No costs.[32]
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious, reversible error of law in failing to consider that the contract of employment of Mr. Godofredo Repiso was terminated upon his arrival in the Philippines (the point of hire) as provided in POEA-SEC.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious, reversible error of law in failing to consider that Mr. Godofredo Repiso never died of an illness suffered on board as there was no evidence showing any medical discomfort or incidents on board leading to such conclusion.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious, reversible error of law in failing to consider that respondents' failure to submit evidence of any incident on board is not equivalent to substantial evidence required in any quasi-judicial proceedings, such as the NLRC, to prove an illness suffered on board.[35]
- That the employee shall be employed on board under the following terms and conditions
1.1 Duration of Contract 10.00 months 1.2 Position MESSMAN/GP 1.3 Basic Monthly Salary $560.21 per month 1.4 Living Allowance $ 0.00 per month 1.5 Hours of Work 44.00 per week 1.6 Overtime Rate $224.08 per month for the first 90.00 OT hours $3.50 in excess of 90.00 OT Hours 1.7Vacation leave with pay
6.00 days per month 1.8 POINT OF HIRE MANILA- The herein terms and conditions in accordance with [Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)] Department Order No. 4 and
[POEA] Memorandum Circular No. 09, both Series of 2000, shall be strictly and faithfully observed.- Any alterations or changes, in any part of this Contract shall be evaluated, verified, processed, and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Upon approval, the same shall be deemed an integral part of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels.
- Violations of the terms and conditions of this Contract with its approved addendum shall be ground for disciplinary action against the erring party.[39]
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
- COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
- In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
x x x x
- The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
- The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.
- The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master's best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer's remains.
- The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphasis supplied.)
The prevailing rule under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the illness leading to the eventual death of seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. An injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
[B]efore Faustino Inductivo was made to sign the employment contract with petitioners he was required to undergo, as a matter of procedure, medical examinations and was declared fit to work by no less than petitioners' doctors. Petitioners cannot now be heard to claim that at the time Faustino Inductivo was employed by them he was afflicted with a serious disease, and that the medical examination conducted on the deceased seaman was not exploratory in nature such that his disease was not detected in the first instance. Being the employer, petitioners had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, screen and choose their applicants and determine whether they were medically, psychologically and mentally fit for the job upon employment. The moment they have chosen an applicant they are deemed to have subjected him to the required pre-qualification standards.
But even assuming that the ailment of Faustino Inductivo was contracted prior to his employment on board "MT Rowan," this is not a drawback to the compensability of the disease. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.
x x x x
Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any pre-existing disease. (Citation omitted.)
SECTION 19. REPATRIATION
x x x x
(B) If the vessel arrives at a convenient port before the expiration of the contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seafarer from such port, provided the unserved portion of his contract is not more than one (1) month. The seafarer shall be entitled only to his earned wages and earned leave pay and to his basic wages corresponding to the unserved portion of the contract, unless within 60 days from disembarkation, the seafarer is rehired at the same rate and position, in which case the seafarer shall be entitled only to his earned wages and earned leave pay.
Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the recognition that medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Accordingly, the phrase "work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract" under Part A (1) of the said provision should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer's work-related death should have precisely occurred during the term of his employment. Rather, it is enough that the seafarer's work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment. Taking all things into account, the Court reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the laborer's death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his master's profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated. (Emphases supplied.)
Meanwhile, on the opposite end of the jurisprudential spectrum, the Court, in a number of cases, granted claims for death benefits although the seafarers' death therein had occurred after their repatriation primarily because of the causal connection between their work and the illness which had eventually resulted in their death.
In the 1999 case of Wallem Maritime Service, Inc. v. NLRC, the death benefit claims of the heirs of the seafarer who had died after having been repatriated on account of "mutual consent" between him and his employer was allowed by the Court because of the "reasonable connection" between his job and his illness. As pertinently stated in that case:It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.
It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of Faustino Inductivo's employment had contributed to the aggravation of his illness - if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his employment - and therefore it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It cannot be denied that there was at least a reasonable connection between his job and his lung infection, which eventually developed into septicemia and ultimately caused his death. As a [utility man] on board the vessel, he was exposed to harsh sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts, etc., all of which invariably contributed to his illness.
Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any pre-existing disease.
Later, the Court, in Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. NLRC - a sickness and permanent disability claims case decided under the auspices of the 1984 version of the POEA-SEC (which, unlike the present standard contract, only requires that the Illness of death occur during the term of the employment whether work-related or not) - significantly observed that:Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.
The Court similarly took into account the work-relatedness element in granting the death benefits claim in Inter orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo, a 2010 case decided under the 1996 POEA-SEC which operated under parameters identical to the 1984 POEA-SEC. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of that ruling:It was established on record that before the late Lutero Remo signed his last contract with private respondents as Cook-Steward of the vessel "M/T Captain Mitsos L," he was required to undergo a series of medical examinations. Yet, he was declared "fit to work" by private respondents' company designated-physician. On April 19, 1999, Remo was discharged from his vessel after he was hospitalized in Fujairah for atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. His death on August 28, 2000, even if it occurred months after his repatriation, due to hypertensive cardio-vascular disease, could clearly have been work related. Declared as "fit to work" at the time of hiring, and hospitalized while on service on account of "atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure," his eventual death due to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could only be work related. The death due to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could in fact be traced to Lutero Remo's being the "Cook-Steward." As Cook-Steward of an ocean going vessel, Remo had no choice but to prepare and eat hypertension inducing food, a kind of food that eventually caused his "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease," a disease which in turn admittedly caused his death.
Private respondents cannot deny liability for the subject death by claiming that the seafarer's death occurred beyond the term of his employment and worsely, that there has been misrepresentation on the part of the seafarer. For, as employer, the private respondents had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, thoroughly screen and choose their applicants to determine if they are medically, psychologically and mentally fit for employment. That the seafarer here was subjected to the required pre-qualification standards before he was admitted as Cook-Steward, it thus has to be safely presumed that the late Remo was in a good state of health when he boarded the vessel.
More recently, in the 2013 case of Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated v. Candava, also decided under the framework of the 1996 POEA-SEC, the Court pronounced that the seafarer's death therein, despite occurring after his repatriation, remains "compensable for having been caused by an illness duly established to have been contracted in the course of his employment."[51] (Citations omitted.)
[Considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as relative jurisprudential context, the rule, restated for a final time, should be as follows: if the seafarer's work-related injury or illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter, his death, as in this case) occurs during the term of his employment, then the employer becomes liable for death compensation benefits under Section 20 (A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. The provision cannot be construed otherwise for to do so would not only transgress prevailing constitutional policy and deride the bearings of relevant case law but also result in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social justice.[52]
Admittedly, Faustino Inductivo did not subject himself to post-employment medical examination within three (3) days from his return to the Philippines, as required by the above provision of the POEA standard envployment contract. But such requirement is not absolute and admits of an exception, i.e., when the seaman is physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement. Indeed, for a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical attention one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time. It is quite understandable that his immediate desire was to be with his family in Nueva Ecija whom he knew would take care of him. Surely, under the circumstances, we cannot deny him, or his surviving heirs after his death, the right to claim benefits under the law.[54]