784 Phil. 899
MENDOZA, J.:
Considering that no appropriate remedy was pursued within the reglementary period, the September 12, 2011 decision in the LRC case became final and executory. In January 2012, the Republic filed a motion for execution which was granted by the RTC-Branch 138 in its March 16, 2012 Order.[12]
- TCT No. 75239 in the names of the spouses Vicente Miranda and Baldomera Miranda - cancelled and transferred to "the Republic of the Philippines with TCT No. 006-2012000526.
- TCT No. 76129 in the names of the spouses Cresence Padilla and Leonarda Recinto Padilla - cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines with TCT No. 006-2012000527.
- TCT No. 77577 in the name of Vivencio Leus - cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines with TCT No. 006- 2012000528.[11]
Shifting to another point, We are in awe on how LRA Case No. M-5469 was decided. There are some observations that tinker with our curiosity. It is quite strange and mind boggling too that in LRA Case No. M-5469, it seems apparent that the decision made therein was only based on the decision dated September 22, 1972 pertaining to the forfeiture case without regard for taking into account the January 23, 1975 decision in the malversation case acquitting Florentino Molinyawe. Of course, it is understandable that no mention of the acquittal was made in petitioner's Petition for annulment of the owner's duplicate copy of the TCTs covering the subject properties. Interestingly too, private respondents merely opted to file a motion to dismiss, instead of filing their answer and presenting the trial court (Branch 138) the January 23, 1975 decision. Had these been considered, a complete turn of events could have transpired considering that such acquittal necessarily rendered the forfeiture of the properties ineffective and invalid. By the virtue of the acquittal, the forfeiture of his properties became ineffective. Consequently, it is but proper that his forfeited properties be given back to him or in his absence, to his heirs. That said, the decision in LRA Case No. M-5469 is, to Us, a flawed decision. But then, of course, this is not a matter that necessitates a discussion in the present case mindful of the fact that this is not within the thrust of a petition for certiorari. In certiorari, We are only limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders and as earlier stated, no such abuse of discretion was found to be availing under the circumstances.[13]Not in conformity with the CA decision, the Republic filed the subject petition based on the following
The Republic emphasizes that RTC-Branch 57 gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the respondents' Amended and Supplemental Petition because, in the first place, it had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 10-658. Citing jurisprudence, it argues that an amendment of a pleading is not permissible when the court has no jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, by admitting the Amended and Supplemental Petition, it was allowing the respondents to alter both the factual and legal findings of the RTC-Branch 138 in its decision in LRC No. M-5469, which had long become final and executory.GROUNDS:
THE DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE SINCE:
1) RTC-BRANCH 57 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING RESPONDENTS' AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AS IT HAS NO JURISDICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 10-658; AND 2) THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION UNDER RULE 65 WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CIVIL FORFEITURE CASE IS CONTINGENT OR DEPENDENT ON THE CRIMINAL CASE.[14]
Lis pendens — which literally means pending suit — refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over the property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.In the case at bench, considering that a judgment in Civil Case No. 6379 had been rendered in favor of the Republic and said judgment already attained finality, the RTC-Branch 57 could no longer claim and exercise jurisdiction over the respondents' original complaint/petition for cancellation of lis pendens and quieting of title in. Civil Case No. 10-658. It is also to be noted that when the respondents filed their motion to admit their amended and supplemental petition before RTC-Branch 57, the decision in LRC Case No. M-5469 rendered by the RTC-Branch 138 had likewise attained finality. The RTC-Branch 57 cannot definitely alter a final and executory decision of a co-equal court by such a move. To do so would certainly defeat the clear purpose of amendments provided by the rules and amount to a grave abuse of discretion as well. Thus:
A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial court before which the action involving the property is pending. This power is said to be inherent in the trial court and is exercised only under express provisions of law. Accordingly, Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the trial court to cancel a notice of lis pendens where it is properly shown that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated. Be that as it may, the power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso facto cancelled.
In theorizing that the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 253 has the inherent power to cancel the notice of lis pendens that was incidentally registered in relation to Civil Case No. 2137, a case which had been decided by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 and affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal, petitioner advocates that the cancellation of such a notice is not always ancillary to a main action.
The argument fails.
From the available records, it appears that the subject notice of lis pendens had been recorded at the instance of Bruneo F. Casim (Bruneo) in relation to Civil Case No. 2137 — one for annulment of sale and recovery of real property — which he filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 against the spouses Jesus and Margarita Casim, predecessors-in-interest and stockholders of petitioner corporation. That case involved the property subject of the present case, then covered by TCT No. 30459. At the close of the trial on the merits therein, the RTC of Makati rendered a decision adverse to Bruneo and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved, Bruneo lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54204, which reversed and set aside the trial court's decision. Expectedly, the spouses Jesus and Margarita Casim elevated the case to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R, No. 151957, but their appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time.
A necessary incident of registering a notice of lis pendens is that the property covered thereby is effectively placed, until the litigation attains finality, under the power and control of the court having jurisdiction over the case to which the notice relates. In this sense, parties dealing with the given property are charged with the knowledge of the existence of the action and are deemed to take the property subject to the outcome of the litigation. It is also in this sense that the power possessed by a trial court to cancel the notice of lis pendens is said to be inherent as the same is merely ancillary to the main action.
Thus, in Vda. de Kilayko v. Judge Tengco, Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tanchoco v. Aquino, it was held that the precautionary notice of lis pendens may be ordered cancelled at any time by the court having jurisdiction over the main action inasmuch as the same is merely an incident to the said action. The pronouncement in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, citing Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is equally instructive —
The notice of lis pendens . . . is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by. the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. . . .
Clearly, the action for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in this case must have been filed not before the court a quo via an original action but rather, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 as an incident of the annulment case in relation to which its registration was sought. Thus, it is the latter court that has jurisdiction over the main case referred to in the notice and it is that same court which exercises power and control over the real property subject of the notice.[Emphases Supplied]
But even so, the petition could no longer be expected to pursue before the proper forum inasmuch as the decision rendered in the annulment case has already attained finality before both the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court on the appellate level, unless of course there exists substantial and genuine claims against the parties relative to the main case subject of the notice of lis pendens. There is none in this case. It is thus well to note that the precautionary notice that has been registered relative to the annulment case then pending before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 has served its purpose. With the finality of the decision therein on appeal, the notice has already been rendered functus officio. The rights of the parties, as well as of their successors-in-interest, petitioner included, in relation to the subject property, are hence to be decided according the said final decision.[17]In view of the finality of the decisions in Civil Case No. 6379 and LRC Case No. M-5469, the RTC-Branch 57 had no legal or valid basis in admitting the respondents' amended and supplemental petition.; It should have dismissed motu proprio the respondents' motion to admit amended and supplemental petition for lack of jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court allows this, to wit:[Emphases Supplied]
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.The respondents argue that even assuming for the sake of argument that the RTC-Branch 57 did not have jurisdiction to hear the action for the cancellation of lis pendens, it was already mooted by the decision rendered in LRC Case No. M-5469. They claim that the LRC case filed by the Republic was the primordial reason for the amendment and supplementation of the original petition.
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.[Emphases Supplied]
Section 107. Surrender of withhold duplicate certificates. Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the: registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if not any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.The Republic was compelled to do so because the respondents failed or refused to surrender their owners' duplicate copies of the subject TCTs. The respondents did not deny the fact that they were duly notified of the said LRC proceedings but they failed to participate therein. So, on September 12, 2011, RTC-Branch 138 rendered a decision in favor of the Republic and against the respondents. To reiterate, the decision declared, among others, the owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 null and void, cancelled the same and directed the RD-Makati to issue new owner's duplicate copies of the subject TCTs in the name of the Republic. Thereafter, TCT Nos. 006-2012000526, 006-2012000527 and 006-2012000528 were issued.
The principle of immutability of a final judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a strong, credible, and effective court. The principle prohibits any alteration, modification or correction of final and executory judgments as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.On the CA's remark that Florentino's acquittal necessarily rendered the forfeiture of the properties ineffective and invalid, it clearly was an obiter dictum. Moreover, it had no substantial or procedural basis. The cases were separate and distinct from one another. Indeed, there is no law, rule or jurisprudence that mandates the automatic dismissal of a forfeiture case after an acquittal in the criminal case for malversation. Illustrative of this point is Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines,[19] where it was ruled:
On this point, the Court has repeatedly declared:
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by law. [. . .], the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of immutability of judgment is adhered to by necessity notwithstanding occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would be even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to protect.
Once a judgment is issued by the court in a case, and that judgment becomes final and executory, the principle of immutability of judgments automatically operates to bar any modification of the judgment. The modification of a judgment requires the exercise of the court's discretion. At that stage — when the judgment has become final and executory — the court is barred from exercising discretion on the case; the bar exists even if the modification is only meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law as these are discretionary acts that rest outside of the court's purely ministerial jurisdiction.[18]
As early as Almeda v. Judge Perez, we have already delineated the difference between criminal and civil forfeiture and classified the proceedings under R.A. 1379 as belonging to the latter, viz.:Besides, the CA itself recognized that it had no bearing. In fact, it wrote that it was not within the thrust of a petition for certiorari."Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, they are criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action."In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is required prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but the other steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal . . . . (citations omitted)
Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based solely on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of forfeiture suits that will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.[20]