108 OG No. 27, 3236 (July 2, 2012)
On appeal by
certiorari [1] from the Decision
[2]
of the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61304
dated 31 May 2004, granting the Petition of Jum Angel (respondent) to
REVERSE and
SET ASIDE the Decision
[3]
and Order of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) denying
payment of death benefits due to private respondent as widow of Sergeant
Benjamin Angel (Sgt. Angel) under Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise
known as "Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund."
The relevant factual antecedents of the case, as gathered by the court, are the following:
The
late Sgt. Angel started his military training on 1 July 1974. On 7
October 1977, he was admitted into active service. He was later
promoted to the rank of Corporal in December 1982 and to the rank of
Sergeant in July 1986. He was in active service until his death on 3
March 1998.
On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was "fetched/invited"
from his post by a certain Capt. Fabie M. Lamerez (Capt. Lamerez) of the
Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army to shed light on his
alleged involvement in a "pilferage/gunrunning" case being investigated
by the Philippine Army.
[4]On or about 2 p.m. of the same day, he was placed inside a detention cell to await further investigation.
The
following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside
his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. According to the
Autopsy Report conducted by the Crime Laboratory of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), the cause of death was
asphyxia by strangulation.
Respondent,
the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the PNP
Criminal Investigation Command, alleging that her husband was murdered
and named the "elements of Intelligence Service Group" led by Capt.
Lamerez as suspects.
On 8 April 1998, upon investigation, the
Office of the Provost Marshal reported that Sgt. Angel died under
suspicious circumstance while in line of duty. The Provost Marshal
found it incredible that Sgt. Angel would take his life, in view of his
impending retirement and being a father to four (4) children. The
Provost Marshal concluded that foul play may have been committed against
Sgt. Angel and recommended that the case be tried by a court martial.
On
25 April 1998, the Inspector General, upon referral of the case, held
that there is no evidence suggesting foul play in the death of Sgt.
Angel and maintained that the detention of Sgt. Angel could have
triggered a mental block that caused him to hang himself.
The
case was referred to a Judge Advocate General, to determine whether or
not Sgt. Angel died while in line of duty. On 3 December 1999, Judge
Advocate General Honorio Capulong in his report recommended that Sgt.
Angel be declared to have died in line of duty.
On 15 March 2000,
the Philippine Army through Chief of Staff Brig. General Pedro V.
Atienza, Jr., issued General Order No. 270 declaring the line of duty
status in favor of Sgt. Angel. Section 1 of the Order states:
I.
Declaration of in Line of Duty Status - the death of the late Sgt.
Benjamin R. Angel 633863, Philippine Army formerly assigned with SBTM,
ASCOM who died on March 3, 1998 at ISG, Fort Bonifacio, Makati is
declared IN LINE OF DUTY STATUS. [5] (Emphasis ours)
By
reason thereof, respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for
death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
On 29 September 1999,
the GSIS denied the respondent's claim on the ground that Sgt. Angel's
death did not arise out of and in the course of employment. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by the GSIS.
On appeal before the ECC, the ECC in its Decision
[6] dated 13 April 2000 likewise denied the claim for want of merit. The relevant portion of the decision states that:
After
careful deliberation of the facts attendant to this case, this
Commission believes that the death benefits prayed for under P.D. 626,
as amended, cannot be granted. It has been stressed time and again that
the thrust of Employees' Compensation Law is to secure adequate and
prompt benefits to the employee and his dependents in the event of a
work-related disability or death. In this connection, Rule III, Section
1(a) of the Implementing Rules of PD 626, as amended, defines when an
injury or death is considered compensable, to wit: "For the injury and
the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment."
The circumstances surrounding this case do not meet the aforementioned
conditions. Clearly, the deceased was not performing his official duties
at the time of the incident. On the contrary, he was being
investigated regarding his alleged involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning
case when he was found dead in his cell, an activity which is foreign
and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective
mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as the documents appear
bereft of any showing to justify a casual connection between his death
and his employment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
of the respondent System appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this case
DISMISSED for want of merit. [7]
Respondent
appealed the case before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Before the appellate court, she raised the
issue that the ECC erred:
- In declaring that
the death benefits prayed for under P.D. 626, as amended, cannot be
granted, as the deceased was not performing his official duties at the
time of the incident.
- In declaring that the subject
matter of the investigation, during which he was found dead in his cell,
is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier.
- In
declaring that the mantle of the law cannot be extended to the deceased
as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify a causal
connection between his death and his employment. [8]
On 31 May 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the ECC ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated April 13, 2000 of respondent ECC is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the GSIS [is] ORDERED to pay the death benefits due the petitioner as widow of Sgt. Angel under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. [9]
The
appellate court in its decision pointed out that Sgt. Angel was manning
his post at the Army Support Command when "invited" by Capt. Lamerez of
the Intelligence Service Group to undergo an investigation concerning a
gunrunning/pilferage case in the Philippine Army. Sgt. Angel was never
arrested; he went with Capt. Lamerez to shed light on the
investigation.
[10] It was never shown that Sgt. Angel's subsequent detention was a punishment for any wrong doing.
[11] Furthermore, the appellate court recognized the peculiar nature of a soldier's job as decided by the Supreme Court. To quote:
x
x x a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day
official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military
law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his
superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of
course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be
presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on
an approved vacation leave. [12]
Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Petitioner
GSIS raises the issue whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded
the law and jurisprudence when it set aside the ECC Decision dated 13
April 2000 that for the injury and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out of
and in the course of employment.
Court's Ruling
GSIS
contends that the death of Sgt. Angel did not arise out of in the
course of employment as provided by Section 1, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 626, otherwise known as
the "Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund." The widow, on
the other hand, counters that her husband died in line of duty so that
such death is compensable under the Fund.
The contentions bring
out the issue whether or not the declaration by the Philippine Army that
the death of Sgt. Angel was "in line of duty status" confers
compensability under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626
otherwise known as "
Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund."
We rule in favor of petitioner GSIS.
For the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the law provides:
Implementing Rules of P.D. 626, [13] RULE III - COMPENSABILITY, Section 1. Grounds.
(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. (Underscoring supplied)
Pertinent
jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee
must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
2) the employee must have been performing his official functions; and 3)
if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer.
[14]It
is important to note, however, that the requirement that the injury
must arise out of and in the course of employment proceeds from the
limiting premise that the injury must be the result of an accident.
The term
accident has been defined in an insurance case.
[15] We find the definition applicable to the present case. Thus:
The
words "accident" and "accidental" have never acquired any technical
signification in law, and when used in an insurance contract are to be
construed and considered according to the ordinary understanding and
common usage and speech of people generally. In substance, the courts
are practically agreed that the words "accident" and "accidental" mean
that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The definition
that has usually been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an
event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation - an event
that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known
case, and therefore not expected.
An accident is an event which
happens without any human agency or, if happening through human agency,
an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected
by the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an injury
which happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured
without his design, consent, or voluntary cooperation.
Significantly,
an accident excludes that which happens with intention or design, with
one's foresight or expectation or that which under the circumstances is
expected by the person to whom it happens.
The exclusion of an
intentional or designed act which exclusion refines the definition of
accident that we find applicable to the provisions of the implementing
rules of the law is specifically provided for in Article 172 of the law,
Presidential Decree No. 626. Thus:
Art. 172.
Limitation of liability - The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for
compensation to the employee or his dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence or otherwise provided under this title. (Underscoring supplied)
The
factual foundation of respondent's claim is that on the day following
Sgt. Angel's detention for investigation of his alleged involvement in a
pilferage/gunrunning case, his lifeless body was found hanging inside
his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. The autopsy report
stated that the cause of death as
asphyxia by strangulation.
With
the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did
not result from an accident which is compensable under Presidential
Decree No. 626. It was on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or
designed act which removes the resulting death from the coverage of the
State Insurance Fund. It is unexpected that the discussion below by the
GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals, veered away from the
indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident and,
instead, focused on the requirement that the death must arise out of or
in the course of employment. Such that, the ECC denied compensability
because:
Clearly the deceased was not performing his
official duties at the time of the incident. On the contrary, he was
being investigated regarding his alleged involvement on a
pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell, an
activity which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier.
Thus, the protective mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as the
documents appear bereft of any showing to justify causal connection
between his death and his employment. [16]
Led
into a confined debate, the Court of Appeals merely met the ECC's
reasons and said that even during the investigation, Sgt. Angel was
still in the performance of his duties. The Court of Appeals alluded to
the ruling that a soldier is on active duty status 24-hours a day and
concluded that the ECC should not have ignored the official findings of
the military that the deceased sergeant died while in the performance of
his duties.
We should undo the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the ECC ruling.
1.
The finding of the military authorities that Sgt. Angel died while in
the line of duty is not binding on the ECC. This is not a new ECC
doctrine. Apropos is the case of
Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,
[17] even if the case concerns the PNP and not the AFP. Thus:
x
x x the proceedings before the PNP Board and the ECC are separate and
distinct, treating of two (2) totally different subjects; moreover, the
PNP Board's conclusions here may not be used as basis to find that
private respondent is entitled to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as
amended. The presumption afforded by the Order relied upon by the PNP
Board concerns itself merely with the query as to whether one died in
the line of duty, while P.D. No. 626 addressed the issue of whether a
causal relation existed between a claimant's ailment and his working
conditions. Plainly, these are different issues calling for differing
forms of proof or evidence, thus accounting for the existence of a
favorable presumption in favor of a claimant under the Defense
Department Order, but not under P.D. No. 626 when the disease is not
listed under Annex `A' of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation.
Paraphrasing
the above ruling, we find that the proceedings before the Philippine
Army which finally resulted in the issuance by the Chief of Staff of
General Order No. 270 that the death of Sgt. Angel was "in line of duty
status" may not be used as basis for the finding that the widow of Sgt.
Angel is entitled to compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended. Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding that the
death resulted from an accident and was not occasioned by the sergeant's
willful intention to kill himself. It is not enough, as erroneously
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to support
the conclusion that the sergeant died while in the performance of his
duties since he was not arrested but was merely invited to shed light on
the investigation which was "part of xxx official duties to cooperate
with the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine Army." There must be
evidence that the sergeant did not take his own life considering the
fact that he was "found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord
tied around his neck."
2. The scene and setting of apparent
suicide was contested by herein respondent, wife of the sergeant through
a complaint before the PNP Criminal Investigation Command alleging that
her husband was murdered and named the elements of Intelligence Service
Group led by Capt. Lamerez as suspects. The alleged murder vis-à-vis
the apparent suicide is precisely the determinant of compensability,
with death "in line of duty" as a given factor. The sergeant was
fetched from his post for investigation and he died in a detention cell
while awaiting further investigation. The findings regarding his death
provided by the Provost Marshall and the Inspector General are
conflicting. The former found it incredible that the deceased would
take his life in view of his impending retirement and being a father to
four children and concluded that foul play may have been committed. The
latter held that there was no evidence suggesting foul play maintaining
that the detention of Sgt. Angel could have triggered a mental block
that caused him to hang himself. The conflict was not resolved by
subsequent official actions. The Judge Advocate General recommended
that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died while in line of duty which
declaration was done by the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army.
Noticeably, the declaration went no further than state that Sgt. Angel
"died on March 3, 1998 at ISG, Fort Bonifacio, Makati." There was no
mention about the cause of death. There was nothing in the declaration
that would resolve the contradiction between the conclusion of foul play
reached by the Provost Marshall and the finding of the Inspector
General that there is no evidence suggesting foul play. The senior
officers merely declared the fact that death occurred inside Fort
Bonifacio.
From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in
favor of the positive finding that there is no evidence of foul play
over the inference that foul play may have been committed. The
circumstances of Sgt. Angel's death - his lifeless body was found
hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck −
taken together with the unrebutted finding that there is no evidence of
foul play - negate respondent's claim of murder of her husband and of
compensability of such death. It was not accidental death that is
covered by Presidential Decree No. 626.
3. We are not unmindful
of the fact that liberality of the law in favor of the working man and
woman prevails in light of the Constitution and social justice.
[18] But, as stated in
Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,
it is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits
are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. There is now
an intention to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's
obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to
receive separation for work connected death or disability.
[19]There
is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon
undeserving claims for compensation. It is well to remember that if
diseases or death not intended by the law to be compensated are
inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State
Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases
not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for
the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their
families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases
and deaths occur. [20]
This
Court sympathizes with the sad predicament of respondent, the widow of
Sgt. Angel. Such, however has already been considered in fixing the
equilibrium between obligation and right in employees' compensation
cases. It can no longer tilt the balance in respondent's favor.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED. The Decision dated 13 April 2000 of the Employees' Compensation Commission is
REINSTATED.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Leonardo De Castro,* Brion, and
Peralta,** JJ., concur.
* Per Special Order No. 1006.
** Per Special Order No. 1040.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (former Supreme Court
Associate Justice) with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court), concurring.
Rollo, pp. 57-63.
[3] Dated 13 April 2000.
[4] Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[5] Id. at 59.
[6] Id. at 60.
[7] Decision of the ECC. Id. at 70-71.
[8] Decision of the Court of Appeals. Id. at 61.
[9] Id. at 63.
[10] Id. at 61.
[11] Id. at 62.
[12] Nitura v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 89217, 4 September 1991, 201 SCRA 278, 284.
[13] ECC Resolution No. 2799, 25 July 1984.
[14] Government Service Insurance System v. Mecayer, G.R. No. 156182, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 100, 108.
[15] Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92383, 17 July 1992, 211 SCRA 554, 556 citing 43 Am. Jur. 2d 267.
[16] Rollo, pp. 70-71.
[17] G.R. No. 128523, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 514, 534-535.
[18] Id. at 531 citing
Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121545, 14 November 1996, 264 SCRA 248, 256.
[19] Id. citing
Tria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 96787, 8 May 1992, 280 SCRA 834, 841-842.
[20] Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17;
Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 58445, 27 April 1989, 172 SCRA 845, 852.