108 OG No. 28, 3379 (July 9, 2012)
This is an administrative complaint for gross
dishonesty and falsification of an official document against Judge
Angeles S. Vasquez, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Ligao City.
The Antecedents
In a complaint
[1]
received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on 7 March
2010, Atty. Jose Vicente D. Fernandez stated that he was the counsel of
Dr. Maria Susan L. Rañola in several cases instituted for the recovery
of the properties the latter conjugally owned with her late husband
Ronald O. Rañola. The cases were against Spouses Fernando and Maria
Concepcion Rañola (Spouses Rañola). Spouses Rañola also instituted an
ejectment case against Dr. Rañola. These cases were docketed as S.P.
No. 431 (Petition for Letters of Administration and Settlement of
Estate), Civil Case No. 2400 (Fernando and Ma. Concepcion Rañola vs. Ma.
Susan Rañola), Civil Case No. 2352 (Ma. Susan Rañola, et al. vs.
Spouses Fernando and Ma. Concepcion Rañola), and People vs. Fernando
and Ma. Concepcion Rañola, et al. All these were raffled to the court
presided over by respondent Judge Vasquez.
Complainant reported
that during the first week of February 2006, he was asked by respondent
judge to file a motion for his inhibition in Civil Case No. 2352 on the
ground that respondent judge was the counsel, prior to his appointment
as public prosecutor, of the Rañola family. Hence, complainant filed a
Motion for Inhibition
[2]
dated 23 February 2006 seeking for the recusal of the judge but citing
as a ground instead, his blood relationship with respondent judge.
Complainant is closely related by blood with respondent judge since his
late paternal grandmother is also a Vasquez, from the Vasquez clan to
which respondent belongs.
No action was taken by respondent judge
on the Motion. It was only after a year, i.e., 28 February 2007, after
complainant filed a Supplemental Motion for Inhibition,
[3]
on the ground of manifest bias, partiality and inexcusable delay in the
proceedings, that respondent judge ruled and denied the two motions in
an Order
[4] dated 13 March 2007.
According
to complainant, the Supplemental Motion for Inhibition was triggered by
the apparent bias of respondent judge for the Spouses Rañola. This
partiality was allegedly manifested in the following instances: (1)
respondent's undue insistence that complainant's client unconditionally
agree to his proposed compromise agreement which is downright
unfavorable to them; (2) concluding the pre-trial proceedings more than a
year after it was started; (3) ordering complainant's client to pay
docket fees beyond that prescribed by the Rules; and (4) requiring the
payment of a P5,000.00 witness fee before a hostile witness could be
compelled to take the witness stand.
Complainant asserts that the partiality of respondent towards Spouses Rañola is well-rooted, as detailed in the sworn statement
[5]
of Buenconsejo B. Quides. The said affidavit narrated respondent's
"transactional" relationship with the Spouses Rañola which started when
he was still an assistant provincial prosecutor, and continued to his
present position as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 13, Ligao City. In
exchange of favors, respondent allegedly used the coercive power of his
public office to serve the private interests of the spouses.
Claiming
that the allegations in the motions for his inhibition were lies and an
affront to his integrity, respondent judge filed on 24 April 2007 a
Petition with the Commission on Bar Discipline to seek the disbarment of
complainant. In a Notice of Resolution
[6]
dated 6 February 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to
dismiss the disbarment case. In view of such dismissal, a Petition for
Review was filed by respondent before this Court, docketed as A.C. No.
7884.
Complainant laments that despite the filing of the
disbarment case, respondent still refused, on a third Motion for
Inhibition, to recuse himself. Instead of inhibiting himself from the
case, respondent in his 12 June 2007 Order
[7]
denied the motion and suggested that complainant withdraw his
appearance as counsel in the case, as well as in other related cases.
Another
matter that complainant emphasized in his complaint was the dishonesty
allegedly committed by respondent when he accomplished his Personal Data
Sheet (PDS) for the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Complainant alleged
that when respondent filed his application to the Judiciary in 2005, he
placed an "x" in the box indicating a "No" answer to the question: "
Have you been charged with or
convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction of any law, decree,
ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal, or any other government
office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or any foreign
country, or found guilty of an administrative offense or imposed any
administrative sanction? (Question No. 24), and Have you ever been
retired, dismissed or forced to resign from employment? (Question No.
25)."
Complainant submitted that respondent lied by answering
"No" to these questions since he had been criminally charged for
indirect bribery in the early 1970s. He alleged that this fact is
evidenced by the record in Criminal Case No. 7911, filed on 11 December
1974, before the City Court of Legazpi, indicting respondent for
Indirect Bribery. With regard to Question No. 25, respondent allegedly
likewise lied because he tendered his resignation from his position as
clerk of court to evade the administrative case that may arise from the
indirect bribery incident.
Complainant asserted that in brazenly
giving untruthful statements in his PDS, respondent committed dishonesty
and falsification of public documents. Thus, he filed the instant
administrative case with the prayer that respondent be dismissed from
the Judiciary.
In his Comment
[8]
dated 4 May 2010, respondent prayed that the administrative complaint
filed against him be dismissed. He clarified that the in-chamber
conferences held in Civil Case No. 2352 resulted in the amicable
settlement of the case based on the stipulation of the parties. As to
the question of docket fees, he explained that he merely followed
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules. He also explained that in requiring
complainant's client to pay P5,000.00 witness fee, he was merely being
sensitive to the needs of the accountant who was based in Naga City and
who had to spend for the trip and meals in coming over to the court, not
to mention her loss of income.
He denied that he favored the
causes of the Spouses Rañola. He explained that while he was then a
prosecutor in Ligao, he had to handle all criminal cases within his
assigned jurisdiction. Unavoidably, he had to pass upon cases filed and
prosecuted by the Rañolas. Respondent maintained that the fact that
the Spouses Rañola cases were filed in his sala, does not necessarily
mean that he is biased in their favor.
As to the affidavit of
Quides, respondent claimed that this is self-serving and mere hearsay,
devoid of any materiality and ought not to be admitted.
On the
issue of dishonesty, respondent averred that in answering Questions 24
and 25, there was no attempt on his part to falsify or perjure his PDS.
He does not deny the fact that he was charged with indirect bribery.
He explained that what he could vaguely recall of the embarrassing,
traumatic and grueling incident which led to his having been charged
with indirect bribery was that it was due to his "leftist" association
and leaning. He alleged that the dictatorship then wanted to silence
everyone, more so, the young professionals of government bureaus and
offices.
[9] As he could not
be hailed to a court martial for his supposed "communist" stance, he was
set up with a "planted" evidence to pave the way for the filing of a
criminal case against him for indirect bribery.
[10] He emphasized that he was never caught in
flagrante delicto. The evidence against him, to reiterate, were merely set up by the military, thus, his acquittal.
Contrary
to complainant's assertions, respondent maintained that he was not
forced to resign as a clerk of court. He noted that the indirect
bribery case was filed on 11 December 1974 while he resigned as a clerk
of court on 30 April 1973 (more than one year before the indirect
bribery case was filed). He allegedly resigned out of disgust and
conviction that the government he was serving was not protecting its own
civil servants but was out to silence anyone so that its stranglehold
could be perpetrated.
[11]Respondent
bemoans the struggles his family had to go through because of the
trumped up charge for indirect bribery. He alleged that in his resolute
attempt to forever bury the scandal from his memory, he was so
successful that he has absolutely forgotten the matter, only to be
revived after a lapse of 36 years, with the filing of the instant
administrative case. He was sort of enveloped by amnesia as far as the
incident was concerned, so much so that in answering Question No. 24 in
his PDS, he automatically and without a blink of an eye, checked the
word "No."
[12]In a Reply
[13]
dated 17 May 2010, complainant stated that respondent's defense of
amnesia of the selective kind is a defense already thrown out by
jurisprudence. He insisted that respondent misrepresented and falsified
his PDS to conceal the information that would have hurt his eligibility
for the position he was applying for.
Complainant furnished the Court with a copy of the 31 October 2008 Decision
[14]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101266 which declared
null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction respondent's Orders dated 16
May 2007 on the issue of filing fees and 13 June 2007 and 14 August
2007 on the issue of witness fee.
OCA's Report and Recommendation
In its Report
[15]
dated 3 November 2010, the OCA found respondent administratively liable
for: (a) his failure to act with dispatch on the motion for his
inhibition in Civil Case No. 2352; and (b) dishonesty. The OCA did not
sustain respondent's flimsy defense of amnesia in concealing from his
PDS the fact that he was charged with indirect bribery. Being charged
with a crime is an incident in one's life that cannot be easily
forgotten, especially when the same is made in connection with the
performance of one's duty. In the instant case, respondent was charged
with the said crime when he was still a clerk of court. The OCA noted
the fact that though respondent claims that he has forgotten said
charge, he can still vividly remember the incident and the circumstances
that he claims to have led to his arrest. Accordingly, the OCA
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of Forty Thousand
(P40,000.00) Pesos.
Our Ruling
We
agree with the findings of the OCA on respondent's gross inefficiency
and dishonesty although we differ with respect to the penalty imposed.
On
the other hand, we see no reason for this Court to look into the rest
of the allegations of the complainant. The issue concerning the
assessment of witness and filing fees had already been passed and ruled
upon by the CA in a judicial proceeding. Also, the allegations of bias
and partiality of respondent judge in connection with the denial of the
motions of inhibition filed by complainant are matters which are
judicial in character and may not be addressed in this administrative
complaint. Orders of inhibition are not administrative in character;
they are judicial in nature.
[16]
Thus, the propriety of the action of the judge in denying the motions
for inhibition should have been raised in a judicial proceeding and not
in this administrative action.
On Respondent's Gross InefficiencyThe
Court, in the exercise of its administrative supervision over the lower
courts, has the authority to look into the time spent by respondent
judge in resolving the incident. As observed by the OCA, respondent
judge failed to resolve the motion for his inhibition within the 90-day
reglementary period. He acted on the first and second motions for
inhibition, which were filed on 27 February 2006 and 28 February 2007,
respectively, only on 13 March 2007, or more than a year after the
filing of the first motion.
In the orderly administration of
justice, judges are required to act with dispatch in resolving motions
filed in their court. The parties have the right to be properly
informed of the outcome of the motions they have filed and the
Constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their case. Taking into
account the circumstances in this case, we find no reason for
respondent judge's delayed action. Delay in resolving motions and
incidents pending before a judge's sala within the reglementary period
fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and cannot be
condoned.
Under Section 15(1)
[17] of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05
[18]
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to dispose of
their cases promptly and decide them within the prescribed periods.
[19] The failure of a judge to decide a case seasonably constitutes gross inefficiency.
[20] It violates the norms of judicial conduct and is subject to administrative sanction.
The imposable penalty for gross inefficiency varies depending on the attending circumstances of a case. In a Resolution
[21]
dated 8 July 1998, this Court, through then Associate Justice Reynato
S. Puno, exhaustively discussed the penalties that were imposed on
several cases involving gross inefficiency. Thus:
We
have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within
ninety (90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or
suspension from service without pay for such. The fines imposed vary
in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided
within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances-- the damage suffered by the
parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc. Thus,
in one case, we set the fine at ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for
failure of a judge to decide 82 cases within the reglementary period,
taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was the
judge's first offense. In another case, the fine imposed was sixty
thousand pesos (P60,000.00), for the judge had not decided about 25 or
27 cases. Still in other cases, the fines were variably set at fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00), for nineteen (19) cases left undecided,
taking into consideration that it was the judge's first offense; twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for three (3) undecided criminal cases;
eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00), for not deciding a criminal case for
three (3) years; forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), for not deciding 278
cases within the prescribed period, taking note of the judge's failing
health and age; and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), for belatedly
rendering a judgment of acquittal in a murder case, after one and
one-half years from the date the case was submitted for decision. In
another case, suspension without pay for a period of six (6) months was
imposed since, besides the judge's failure to timely decide an election
protest for eight (8) months, the judge submitted false certificates of
service and was found guilty of habitual absenteeism. [22] (Emphasis supplied.)
The following pronouncements in
OCA v. Judge Quilatan [23] further
illustrated the flexibility of the parameters in the determination of
the amount of fine that may be imposed on judges for gross inefficiency:
Under
the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision is a
less serious offense punishable by suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months, or a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP
20,000.
There were cases, however, in which the Court did not
strictly apply the Rules, imposing fines below or more than the maximum
amount allowed, thus:
In two cases, we imposed a fine
of five thousand pesos (P5,000) on a judge who was suffering from
cancer, for failing to decide five (5) cases within the reglementary
period and failing to decide pending incidents in nine (9) cases; and
xxx. In one case, the judge was fined twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000) for undue delay in rendering a ruling and for making a grossly
and patently erroneous decision. In another case, the judge was fined
forty thousand pesos (P40,000) for deciding a case only after an undue
delay of one (1) year and six (6) months and for simple misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law, considering also that said undue delay was
his second offense. Finally, the fine of forty thousand pesos (P40,000)
was also imposed in a case for the judge's failure to resolve one (1)
motion, considering that he was already previously penalized in two
cases for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for Gross Ignorance
of Procedural Law and Unreasonable Delay. (citations omitted) [24]
In
the case at bar, respondent resolved the pending incident only after
more than a year from the date the motion was filed. It bears stressing
that the incident does not even involve a complex issue, it being a mere
motion for inhibition. On a positive note, an examination of the
records with the Legal Office of the OCA would show that this is the
first time that he has been administratively charged. Under the
foregoing circumstances, for gross inefficiency, we find the imposition
of fine in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos reasonable.
On Respondent's DishonestyThe making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
[25]In
Plopinio v. Zabala-Cariño,
[26]
this Court had the occasion to identify the reckoning point when a
specific charge should be reflected in the PDS. Thus, a person is
considered formally charged:
(1) In administrative proceedings - xxx.
(2) In
criminal proceedings - (a) upon the finding of the existence of
probable cause by the investigating prosecutor and the consequent filing
of an information in court with the required prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor
or the Ombdusman or his deputy; (b) upon the finding of the
existence of probable cause by the public prosecutor or by the judge in
cases not requirng a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule
on Summarry Procedure; or (c) upon the finding of cause or ground to
hold the accused for trial pursuant to Section 13 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. [27] (Emphasis supplied.)
The Book of Entry of Judgment
[28]
of the City Court of Legazpi shows that: (1) respondent was accused of
indirect bribery on 11 December 1974 by Assistant City Fiscal Amisola in
Criminal Case No. 7911; (2) he posted a bail bond in the amount of
P400.00; and (3) he was acquitted of the crime on 24 October 1977.
It
is, therefore, beyond question that respondent had been formally
charged. Clearly, he failed to disclose the information when he answered
"No" to Question No. 24 of the PDS, which he filed with the JBC in
2005.
That respondent is guilty of dishonesty in accomplishing
his PDS is impossible to refute. It was not mere inadvertence on his
part when he answered "No" to that very simple question posed in the
PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant,
and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it
anyway.
[29]Respondent,
a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well the consequences of
making a false statement in his PDS. Being a former public prosecutor
and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of
the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes the act
all the more unacceptable. Clearly, there was an obvious lack of
integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of the
judiciary.
[30]As
visible representation of the law, respondent judge should have
conducted himself in a manner which would merit the respect of the
people to him in particular and to the Judiciary in general. He should
have acted with honesty in accomplishing his PDS, instead of
deliberately misleading the JBC in his bid to be considered and
eventually appointed to his present position. Such lack of candor has
blemished the image of the judiciary. His contention that the indirect
bribery case had been dismissed is immaterial, he was duty bound to
disclose such information when he was applying for judicial position.
Had it not been for this administrative complaint, such matter would
have escaped the attention of this Court.
Dishonesty, being in
the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.
[31]Thus, in
Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,
[32]
respondent judge was dismissed from the service for withholding the
information in his application for appointment the fact that he was
facing criminal charges for homicide and attempted homicide. This Court
ratiocinated:
His record did not contain the
important information in question because he deliberately withheld and
thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason
for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been
taken into account against him if it had been disclosed.
xxx
[I]t behooves every prospective appointee to the [j]udiciary to apprise
the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for
judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his
integrity and probity. He did not discharge that duty. [33]
Respondent judge in
Gutierrez v. Belan,
[34]
was likewise dismissed from the service for indicating in his PDS
submitted to the JBC that there was no pending criminal or
administrative case against him notwithstanding that he had been
indicted in a criminal case which then remained pending.
[35]The penalty of dismissal, however, is not exclusive. Section 11, Rule 140
[36]
of the Rules of Court, provides the following alternative sanctions
against a judge found guilty of dishonesty or any other offense falling
under the classification of a serious charge provided in Sec. 8 of the
same Rule:
- Dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
- Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
- A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. (Emphasis supplied.)
The recent case of
OCA v. Judge Aguilar[37] is very much instructive on this matter:
xxx,
Rule IV, Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules also provides that in
the determination of the penalties to be imposed, extenuating,
mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered.Among the circumstances
that may be allowed to modify the penalty are (1) length of service in
the government, (2) good faith, and (3) other analogous circumstances.
In
several jurisprudential precedents, the Court has refrained from
imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or
regulation in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the
respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his
or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent's advanced age,
among other things, have had varying significance in the determination
by the Court of the imposable penalty. For equitable and humanitarian
reasons, the Court reduced the administrative penalties imposed in
[several] cases[.]
This Court proceeded to discuss a number of cases
[38]
on dishonesty to show the variation in penalties actually imposed. In
sum, most respondents received either a penalty of six (6) months
suspension or one (1) year suspension without pay on account of the
presence of mitigating circumstances. On the other hand, there were two
(2) isolated cases mentioned where respondents (a branch clerk of court
of the Metropolitan Trial Court and an Executive Assistant of the Court
of Appeals) were only fined in the amount of P5,000.00 and P10,000.00,
respectively.
For failure to disclose in her PDS the following:
(a) that she has been formally charged for falsification, perjury and
estafa; (b) that there was a pending administrative case against her
before the Office of the Ombudsman; and (c) that she was later adjudged
guilty of misconduct in the same administrative case, respondent judge
in
Aguilar was correspondingly suspended from the service for six
(6) months without pay. In the imposition of the penalty of
suspension, this Court considered, among others, the following: (a) that
the criminal complaint and the administrative cases involve the
notarization of private documents, which had no relation to the
performance of her official functions; (b) her length of government
service; and (c) that the charge was the first and only administrative
complaint brought before the Judiciary for which she was found guilty.
This Court distinguished
Aguilar from
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Estacion, Jr., Gutierrez v. Belan and
Re: Non-Disclosure before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime Quitain, where the respondents were meted the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service, in the following manner:
In Estacion,
the respondent judge failed to disclose his pending criminal cases for
homicide and attempted homicide when he applied to the Judiciary; while
in Belan, the respondent judge failed to previously disclose a
pending criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries. In Quitain, the previous administrative case
which the respondent judge failed to disclose upon his application for
judgeship was one for grave misconduct for which he was dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of benefits prior to his application
to the Judiciary. The seriousness of the case or cases which respondent
judges failed to disclose in their PDS or applications for judgeship,
and the absence of mitigating circumstances, sufficiently differentiate Estacion, Belan, and Quitain, from the one at bar.
In
the present case, respondent judge similarly failed to disclose in his
application the serious charge of indirect bribery against him. We rule
as we did in
Yalung v. Judge Enrique M. Pascua,
[39] where this Court fined and suspended respondent judge for six (6) months for gross inefficiency and dishonesty.
[40]As in the present case, the dishonesty of respondent judge in
Yalung also
involved misrepresentation in accomplishing his PDS submitted to the
JBC. In particular, respondent in that case, in answering Question No.
24
[41] in the negative, "made
it appear that he had never been charged with any violation of the law,
decree, ordinance, or regulation"
[42] when he had been previously charged for bribery/extortion. Also, both respondents in
Yalung and
the present case have been in the government service for a considerable
length of time. Respondent has served the judiciary for five (5) years
after his retirement from the Office of the City of Prosecutor, Ligao
City. In addition, both have no prior administrative record. A
six-month suspension from office is, ordinarily, in order.
We
must, however, of necessity consider the compulsory retirement of
respondent on 12 October 2010. The penalty of suspension can thus no
longer be implemented. In lieu thereof, the penalty of fine may still
be imposed,
[43] the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the court.
In
Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, [44] for negligence in accomplishing his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 2002, this Court held:
xxx
And since petitioner is already compulsorily retired, he can no longer
serve his suspension; yet, this Court can still order, in lieu of such
penalty, the forfeiture of the amount equivalent to petitioner's salary for six months from his retirement benefits. [45] (Emphasis supplied.)
However, in
Judge Basilla v. Ricafort, [46]
for dishonesty, this Court opted to impose upon respondent Legal
Researcher a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos to be deducted
from her retirement benefits. It ratiocinated:
Section
52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases provides that
dishonesty is a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even on the
first time of commission.
Taking into account respondent's forty
(40) years of service in the government, the OCA submits that the
penalty imposable upon her is suspension. Considering, however, that
suspension can no longer be imposed due to respondent's retirement on
February 14, 2007, We opt to impose upon her a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). [47] (Emphasis supplied.)
In
the case at bar, while we note that respondent is covered by the
exacting standards of judicial conduct even while he was still applying
for a judicial position, we cannot ignore respondent's heretofore
unblemished judicial service and the fact that this is his first
offense.
All considered, we deem it sufficient to impose the
penalty of fine in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in
lieu of the penalty of six (6) months suspension from office. The total
amount of fines in this case is Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos, which
includes the fine of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos for gross
inefficiency.
WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency and
dishonesty, respondent Judge Angeles S. Vasquez, RTC, Branch 13, Ligao
City, is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00)
PESOS to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-14.
[2] Id. at 21-22.
[3] Id. at 23-29.
[4] Id. at 30-33.
[5] Id. at 37-40.
[6] Id. at 36.
[7] Id. at 52-54.
[8] Id. at 64-73.
[9] Id. at 68.
[10] Id. at 69.
[11] Id. at 69-70.
[12] Id. at 71.
[13] Id. at 97-112.
[14] Id. at 113-132.
[15] Id. at 133-140.
[16] Supreme Court Circular No. 7, 10 November 1980 and Administrative Circular No. 1, 28 January 1988.
[17]
"Section 15(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four (24)
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve (12) months for all collegiate
courts, and three (3) months for all other lower courts."
[18] "Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods."
[19] Re: Judge Danilo M. Tenerife, A.M. No. 94-5-42-MTC, 20 March 1996, 255 SCRA 184, 187.
[20] Id.[21] Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City, A.M. No. 97-9-278-RTC, 8 July 1998, 292 SCRA 8.
[22] Id. at 23-24.
[23] A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745, 28 September 2010, 631 SCRA 425.
[24] Id. at 428-429.
[25] Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro, A.M. No. P-04-1844, 23 July 2004, 435 SCRA 11, 21 citing
Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana , 386 SCRA 1 (2002)
further citing
People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913 (1955).
[26] A.M. No. P-08-2458, 22 March 2010, 616 SCRA 269.
[27] Id. at 278-279.
[28] Rollo, p. 60.
[29] Samson v. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 423, 429.
[30] Id. at 430.
[31] Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,
supra note 25 at 21.
[32] A.M. No. RTJ-87-104, 11 January 1990, 181 SCRA 33.
[33] Id. at 37.
[34] A.M. No. MTJ-95-1059, 7 August 1998, 294 SCRA 1.
[35] Id. at 16.
[36] As amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, effective 1 October 2001.
[37] A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, 7 June 2011.
[38] Id. citing the following cases:
OCA v. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366, 16 April 2009, 585 SCRA 82;
Concerned Employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. Paguio-Bacani, A.M. No.
P-06-2217, 30 July 2009, 594 SCRA 242;
Concerned Employee v. Valentin, 498 Phil. 347 (2005);
Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty against Elizabeth Ting, 502 Phil. 264 (2005);
Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, 396 Phil. 150 (2000);
Floria v. Sunga, 420 Phil. 637 (2001);
Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, 507 Phil. 222 (2005); and
de Guzman v. Mendoza, 493 Phil. 690 (2005)
.
[39] A.M. No. MTJ-01-1342, 21 June 2001, 359 SCRA 241.
[40] Id. at 250 citing
Bolalin v. Occiano, 266 SCRA 203(1997).
[41]
"24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise
imposed a sanction for violation any law, decree, ordinance or
regulation by any court, quasi-judicial office or tribunal of the
Philippines or in any foreign country, or found guilty of an
administrative offense?"
Id. at 248.
[42] Id. at 249.
[43] OCA v. Judge Leonida, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198, 18 January 2011;
Atty. Bautista v. Judge Causapin, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2044, 22 June 2011.
[44] G.R. No. 169982, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 534.
[45] Id. at 595.
[46] A.M. No. P-06-2233, 26 September 2008, 566 SCRA 425.
[47] Id. at 434.