108 OG No. 33, 4103 (August 13, 2012)
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 24, 2000 Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 43076. The CA had
ordered the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition permanently
enjoining the prosecution of Jose Marfori in Criminal Case Nos. 170660
to 170676 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City,
and ordered the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 94-70092,
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Likewise
assailed is the appellate court's Resolution
[2] dated February 12, 2002, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts follow:
On
June 4, 1984, Jose F. Marfori acquired a five-storey commercial
building, known as the Marsman Building, from the Development Bank of
the Philippines. As the land on which the building stood was owned by
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Marfori entered into a contract of
lease of the said lot with the PPA. The contract was for a period of
twenty-five (25) years, renewable for a similar period, and was subject
to the condition that upon the expiration of lease, the building and all
other improvements found on the leased premises shall become the PPA's
sole property. Marfori then incurred huge expenses for the
rehabilitation of the building and leased some portions of the building
to the PPA.
Thereafter, on April 10, 1987, Marfori executed a
dacion en pago and
assignment of rights transferring the ownership of the Marsman Building
to Making Enterprises, Inc. (Making), on the condition that Making
would assume all of Marfori's obligations.
[3]
Making was represented by its General Manager, Cristina Lee, and
Executive Vice-President, Angelita Ma. Tamano, in the said transaction.
Marfori's
wife, Emerenciana, alleged that she did not consent to the transfer of
the Marsman Building to Making. She claimed that the building is part
of their conjugal property as it was acquired during their marriage.
[4]
On April 12, 1994, she filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint against
Making, the spouses Joaquin and Angelita Tamano, the spouses Lester and
Cristina Lee, and the PPA for Recovery of Ownership, Annulment of
Contract with Damages, Receivership, Accounting and Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order.
[5] She sought, among others, to annul the
dacion en pago and
assignment of rights and prayed for the appointment of a receiver to
preserve the rentals of the building. She also prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the PPA from paying its
rentals to Making and from approving the transfer of the Marsman
Building.
In an Order
[6]
dated October 18, 1995, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr. of the RTC,
Branch 17, of Manila denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and the application for receivership.
The
RTC noted that in 1987, Emerenciana's complaint for the same cause of
action was dismissed by the RTC, Branch 51, of Manila for improper
venue.
[7] The RTC was not
convinced that she would indeed suffer grave injustice and irreparable
damages if a writ of injunction enjoining the PPA from paying rentals to
Making and approving the transfer of the Marsman Building is not issued
considering that she re-filed her complaint only on April 12, 1994, or
more than six years after her first complaint was dismissed. As regards
her prayer for the appointment of a receiver, the RTC held that the
appointment of a receiver is an equitable relief and a court of equity
will not ordinarily appoint a receiver where the rights of the parties
depend on the determination of adverse claims of legal title to real
property and one party is in possession.
Emerenciana moved for reconsideration of the order. However, the RTC denied the motion.
[8]Not
satisfied, Emerenciana filed before the CA a petition for certiorari
and receivership with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39161. On March 29, 1996, however, the CA
dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance.
[9] Reconsideration of the dismissal was likewise denied in a Resolution dated November 29, 1996.
[10]Meanwhile,
with regard to the criminal cases mentioned at the outset, records show
that in 1987, Marfori issued twenty-two (22) checks in favor of
Cristina Lee. Lee deposited the checks to her account with the
Philippine Bank of Communications, but the same were dishonored for the
reason of "Account Closed." Thus, she filed complaints against Marfori
for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City.
[11]Before
he could be arraigned, Marfori sought reinvestigation of the criminal
cases against him, arguing that he was not given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence to prove that the checks were already
paid or liquidated.
[12] The
RTC granted Marfori's motion and ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation, Assistant
City Prosecutor Afable E. Cajigal rendered a joint resolution,
[13]
which was later approved by City Prosecutor Gabriel N. Dela Cruz,
finding cause to dismiss the criminal complaints against Marfori. On
August 11, 1995, Asst. City Prosecutor Cajigal filed a motion to dismiss
before the RTC of Caloocan City, which motion was granted by Judge
Emilio L. Leachon, Jr. on the same date.
[14]Claiming
that she was not notified of the order for reinvestigation, Angelita
Ma. Tamano moved to set aside the joint resolution.
[15]
Prosecutor Cajigal then reversed his previous findings and recommended
the setting aside of the joint resolution and dismissal order.
[16] Said resolution was approved by 1
st
Assistant City Prosecutor Rosauro Silverio. Thus, Asst. City Prosecutor
Cajigal filed seventeen (17) informations for violation of B.P. 22
against Marfori before the MeTC of Caloocan City.
[17] Warrants for Marfori's arrest were also issued by Judge Marcelino L. Sayo.
Aggrieved, Marfori filed with the Caloocan City RTC a petition
[18]
for certiorari and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining
order against Judge Sayo; Asst. City Prosecutors Cajigal, Silverio and
Dela Cruz; and Making, who was represented by Tamano. Marfori
maintained that all the checks were drawn in favor of Cristina Lee, but
the prosecutors deliberately made it appear in the new informations that
the checks were drawn in favor of Making. He prayed that Judge Sayo be
enjoined from proceeding with the trial of the criminal cases and that
the informations for violation of B.P. 22, as well as the warrants of
arrest, be declared void.
Making, represented by Tamano, filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that the general rule is that a criminal
prosecution may not be restrained by injunction.
[19]In an Order dated April 18, 1997, the RTC granted Making's motion and dismissed Marfori's petition.
[20] Meanwhile, on November 27, 1996, Marfori and his wife had filed with this Court a Consolidated Petition
[21]
docketed as G.R. No. 126841 asking among others, for the appointment of
a receiver to preserve the rentals collected from the Marsman Building
and the issuance of an injunction to enjoin the implementation of the
warrants of arrest issued against him. Respondents argued that the
filing of the criminal cases against Marfori had no factual and legal
justification and hence, should be enjoined.
The Court, after
finding no special and important reasons for it to take cognizance of
the case in the first instance, referred the petition to the CA for
consideration and adjudication on the merits.
[22]On February 16, 1998, respondents filed an Amended Consolidated Petition
[23]
with the CA. They added that Judge Castañeda, Jr. likewise erred in
denying in Civil Case No. 94-70092 their motion to present crucial
documents wherein Tamano allegedly made a declaration against her
interest. They likewise reiterated in their amended petition their
prayer for the appointment of a receiver to take over, manage, and
administer the Marsman Building.
In their Comment,
petitioners countered that respondents had lost all their rights to the
building after they ceded it to Making in 1987. Petitioners also
charged respondents with forum shopping.
[24]
They argued that when Emerenciana's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and receivership was denied by the RTC, she
appealed the denial to the CA. When she failed to obtain a favorable
action, she and her husband filed a petition with the Supreme Court
involving the same subject matter and the same issues as in
Emerenciana's earlier petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 39161. Petitioners
alleged that respondents hid the real purpose of their action by
cleverly lumping together the civil and the criminal cases in their
Consolidated Petition.
On July 24, 2000, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition filed by petitioners Jose and
Emerenciana Marfori is hereby GRANTED, and judgment rendered as follows:
1)
That writs of certiorari and prohibition be issued permanently
enjoining the further prosecution of Criminal Case Nos. 170660 to
170676, inclusive, against petitioner Jose Marfori; and
2) That,
after posting of a bond in an amount to be determined by the Trial
Court, let a receiver be appointed in Civil Case No. 94-70092, to take
custody, manage, and administer the Marsman Building and all rents
collected therefrom, during the pendency of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[25]
The
CA brushed aside petitioners' argument that respondents were guilty of
forum shopping, holding that technical rules of procedure must be
relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.
As to the order
granting the prayer for the appointment of a receiver, the CA ruled that
respondents have sufficiently proven their interest in the Marsman
Building. The CA found that unless a receiver is appointed, there is a
danger of loss or material injury considering that petitioners possess
absolute control of the building.
Meanwhile, as to the criminal
cases, the CA ruled that the public prosecutors gravely abused their
discretion when they set aside the earlier resolution recommending the
dismissal of the criminal cases against Marfori based solely on the
ground that Tamano was not given the chance to comment on Marfori's
motion for reinvestigation. The CA noted that in the joint resolution,
the prosecutors thoroughly studied the case and concluded that the
checks subject of the criminal cases were not issued with valuable
consideration since it was impossible for Marfori to have been indebted
or for petitioners to lend the amount of P4,051,518.08 stated in the
checks because the complainants/Making Enterprises only earned
P49,352.95 in 1987.
Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration questioning the appointment of a receiver
[26] and the order permanently enjoining the further prosecution of Marfori in Criminal Case Nos. 170660 to 170676.
[27] However, the CA denied both motions in its Resolution of February 12, 2002 as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the motions are hereby DENIED. However, in order to ensure that the
objectives of Sec. 1 (a) Rule 59, the basis of Our decision, will be
carried out effectively, the trial court is DIRECTED to appoint [as] a
receiver, after compliance of the bond requirement, a private banking
institution which shall exercise...powers as such pursuant to Sec. 6,
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Hence, the present petition.
Essentially,
petitioners present the following issues: (1) Whether the CA erred in
granting the application for the appointment of a receiver for the
Marsman Building; and (2) Whether the CA erred in permanently enjoining
the criminal prosecution of Jose Marfori.
We grant the petition.
At
the outset, we note that the CA erred in taking cognizance of
respondents' consolidated petition as respondents are guilty of
deliberate forum shopping. We note that the petition for appointment of a
receiver for the Marsman Building was originally filed by Emerenciana
before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 94-70092. The RTC denied the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the
application for receivership. Emerenciana filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC. She then filed a petition
for certiorari and receivership with prayer for preliminary injunction
before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39161. In a Resolution dated
March 29, 1996, the petition was dismissed for being insufficient in
form and substance. She sought reconsideration of the dismissal, and her
motion was likewise denied by the CA on November 29, 1996.
However,
records show that two days earlier, or on November 27, 1996, while her
motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution dismissing her petition
was still pending resolution before the CA, she and her husband filed
with this Court a consolidated petition, praying for the appointment of a
receiver over the Marsman Building. Clearly, CA-G.R. SP No. 39161 was
still pending with the CA when respondents filed their consolidated
petition with this Court.
Moreover, we note that respondents were
not candid when they stated in their certification of non-forum
shopping that there is no other action or proceeding involving the same
issues that is pending before this Court, the CA, or any other tribunal
or agency.
[29]There is
forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or
in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another
forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. Forum-shopping
exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential
facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject
matter, and issues. Forum-shopping exists when the elements of
litis pendentiaare present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicatain the other.
[30]
Thus, there is forum-shopping when, between an action pending before
this Court and another one, there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and (3) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicatain the action under consideration; said requisites also constitutive of the requisites for
auter action pendantor
lis pendens.
[31]Applying
the above test, there is no question that there is identity of parties,
cause of action and reliefs sought between the consolidated petition in
G.R. No. 126841 and the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 39161. For resorting
to forum shopping, the consolidated petition of the spouses Marfori
should have been dismissed with prejudice.
But even on the merits, the application for an appointment of a receiver must be denied.
An application for the appointment of a receiver under Section 1(a), Rule 59 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, requires that the property or fund subject of the action
is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured,
necessitating its protection or preservation. Section 1 provides,
SECTION 1. Appointment of receiver.--Upon
a verified application, one or more receivers of the property subject
of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court where the
action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court,
or a member thereof, in the following cases:
(a) When it appears
from the verified application, and such other proof as the court may
require, that the party applying for the appointment of a receiver has
an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the action
or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to
administer and preserve it;
x x x x
Here,
respondents submit that they have satisfactorily established their legal
right over the Marsman Building. They alleged that the building and the
income and rentals thereof are in danger of being lost, removed or
materially injured by the apathy, neglect and fraudulent design of
petitioners thereby rendering the appointment of a receiver both urgent
and imperative.
[32] However,
they failed to show how the building as well as the income thereof would
disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. They were not
able to prove that the property has been materially injured,
necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a
harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations,
[33] respondents must prove a clear right to its issuance. This they failed to do.
We
furthermore observe that in granting the appointment of a receiver, the
CA merely concluded that respondents have sufficiently proven that they
have an interest in the Marsman Building. It further held that unless a
receiver is appointed, there is a danger of loss or material injury,
considering that petitioners presently possess absolute control of the
building and the rentals accruing thereof. However, there was no
justification on how the CA arrived at its conclusion.
It must be stressed that the issue of the validity of the
dacion en pago
and assignment of rights executed by Marfori in favor of Making still
has to be resolved in Civil Case No. 94-70092. Until the contract is
rescinded or nullified, the same remains to be valid and binding. Thus,
we agree with the RTC when it held that courts of equity will not
ordinarily appoint a receiver where the rights of the parties depend on
the determination of adverse claims of legal title to real property and
one party is in possession.
As regards the second issue, the
Court finds no longer necessary to pass upon the correctness of the
order of the CA permanently enjoining the prosecution of Jose Marfori in
Criminal Case Nos. 170660 to 170676 before the MeTC of Caloocan City.
The Court notes that during the pendency of this petition, Jose Marfori
passed away on October 2, 2004.
[34] Pursuant to Article 89, paragraph 1
[35] of the
Revised Penal Code,
as amended, the death of Marfori totally extinguished his criminal
liability. Because Marfori died even before arraignment and trial, there
is no relevance in declaring the extinction as well of civil liability
that was based exclusively on the crime for which an accused is
convicted (
i.e.,
ex delicto). Only civil liability predicated on a source of obligation other than the
delict, if any, survived the death of the accused, which the offended party can recover by means of a separate civil action.
[36] WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
PARTLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2000 Decision and February 12, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 43076, insofar as they ordered the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 94-70092, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
In view of the death of Jose Marfori, Criminal Case Nos. 170660 to
170676 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City are hereby
ordered
DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and
Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 65-75. Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, with
Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. concurring.
[2]
Id. at 78-79. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with
Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestaño concurring.
[3] CA
rollo, Vol. I, pp. 504-508.
[4]
Jose Marfori and Emerenciana Calma-Marfori were married on June 28,
1970 as evidenced by a copy of their marriage contract; Records, Vol. I,
p. 13.
[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. 94-70092; id. at 1-12.
[6] Rollo, pp. 80-86.
[7] Civil Case No. 87-42132.
[8] CA
rollo, Vol. I, pp. 163-164.
[9] Rollo,
p. 90. Resolution dated March 29, 1996, penned by Associate Justice
Jaime M. Lantin, with Associate Justices Eduardo G. Montenegro and Jose
C. dela Rama concurring;
[10] Id. at 88.
[11] CA
rollo, Vol. I, pp. 76-77.
[12] Id. at 96-97.
[13] Id. at 99-103.
[14] Order dated August 11, 1995; id. at 105.
[15] Id. at 106-112.
[16] Id. at 116.
[17] Id. at 117-133.
[18] Rollo, pp. 252-263.
[19] Id. at 264-267.
[20] Id. at 268-269.
[21]
Id. at 91-123. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Receivership and
Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order.
[22] Id. at 270-271.
[23] Id. at 172-204.
[24] Id. at 205-210.
[25] Id. at 74-75.
[26] Id. at 224-241.
[27] Id. at 304-326.
[28] Id. at 78-79.
[29] CA
rollo, Vol. I, p. 38.
[30] Polanco v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182426, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 489, 495-496.
[31] San Juan v. Arambulo, Sr., G.R. No. 143217, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 725, 729.
[32] CA
rollo, Vol. I, p. 316.
[33] Vivares v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155408, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 80, 87.
[34] See
rollo,
pp. 533-537. Attached to the Manifestation is a copy of Marfori's
Certificate of Death issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar in
Angeles City, Pampanga. Id. at 538.
[35] Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
x x x x
[36] See People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, September 14, 2010, 630 SCRA 445, 448, citing People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239.