108 OG No. 33, 4110 (August 13, 2012)
Before this Court are two petitions for resolution: the first, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed bythe Roman Catholic Archbishop (RCA) of San Fernando, Pampanga, assailing the March 18, 2002 Decision
[2] and the May 30, 2002 Resolution
[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66974; and the second, a Petition for Injunction under
Rule 58, filed by Benjamin Guinto, Jr. (Guinto), seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Execution
[4]
dated October 14, 2003, issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 2000(23).
The facts follow:
The
RCA of San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Most Rev. Paciano B.
Aniceto, D.D., claimed that it is the owner of a vast tract of land
located near the Catholic Church at Poblacion, Macabebe, Pampanga and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 17629 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of San Fernando on February 21, 1929.
[5]
The RCA alleged that several individuals unlawfully occupied the
subject land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands. Having no
other recourse, the RCA filed an ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2000(23), before the MCTC of Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga against the
alleged intruders, namely, Leocadio and Rufina Reyes, Jose Balagtas,
Marcial and Victoria Balagtas, Levita Naluz, Dionisio Barcoma, Felicidad
Urbina, Justiniano Reyes, Lawrence Muniz, Eduardo Soriano, Cosmer
Vergara, Perlita Bustos, Brigida Navarro, Leonoda Cruz, Leonida
Manansala, Angelito Juliano, Eduardo Ibay, Edna Yalung, Reynaldo
Mallari, Lily Masangcay, Evangelina Ablaza, Crisanto Manansala, Feliza
Esguerra, Gloria Manansala, Bienvenido and Felicisima Panganiban,
Ofroneo Caparas, Tino Enriquez, Elizabeth and Benjamin Guinto, Felix
Salenga, Eleno and Rosala Salenga, Luisa and Domingo Sison, Francia
Flores, Eduardo and Rosita Gutierrez, Zosima and Ener Basilio, Andy and
Loreto Bonifacio, Peter and Felicisima Villajuan.
[6]On
the other hand, defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of
action against them because its title is spurious. They contended that
the subject land belonged to the State, but they have already acquired
the same by acquisitive prescription as they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the land
for more than thirty (30) years.
After considering the pleadings
submitted by the parties, the MCTC rendered decision on September 28,
2001 in favor of the RCA. The trial court held that OCT No. 17629 in the
name of the RCA remains valid and binding against the whole world until
it is declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus,
defendants were ordered to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable
monthly rentals from August 15, 2000 until they shall have finally
vacated the premises.
[7]Defendants
appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, the appeal was
dismissed because of their failure to file the appeal memorandum. When
defendants elevated the case to the CA, their petition for certiorari
was not given due course for failure to file the same within the
extended period. Hence, the decision ejecting the defendants from the
premises became final.
Pursuant to Section 21,
[8] Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the RCA filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of Execution, which the MCTC granted in an Order
[9] dated February 10, 2003, as follows:
WHEREFORE,
on the basis of the rules and jurisprudence aforecited, the Motion for
Execution filed by plaintiff is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution
be issued in connection with this case which is a ministerial duty of
the Court.
Defendants' Motion for Inhibition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Thereafter, the MCTC issued another Order dated October 6, 2003, the pertinent portion of which states:
Let a writ of execution be issued to implement the Decision dated September 28, 2001.
No further defendants' motion to stay execution shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Accordingly, a writ of execution
[12]
was issued commanding the sheriff or his deputies to implement the MCTC
Decision. Thus, Sheriff Edgar Joseph C. David sent the defendants a
Notice to Vacate
[13] dated December 8, 2003.
Seeking
to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the notice to
vacate, Guinto filed the instant Petition for Injunction with Prayer
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
[14] docketed as G.R. No. 160909.
Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the ejectment case at the MCTC, some of the
defendants therein, namely, Eduardo Soriano, Jr., Edna Yalun, Evangelina
Ablaza, Felicidad Y. Urbina, Felix Salenga, Reynaldo I. Mallari,
Marciana B. Barcoma, Bienvenido Panganiban, Brigida Navarro, Eufrancia
T. Flores, Victoria B. Sodsod, Eufronio Caparas, Crisanto Manansala,
Lily Masangcay, Benjamin Guinto, Jr., Martha G. Castro and Lino
Tolentino filed Civil Case No. 01-1046(M) against the RCA for Quieting
of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Title before the RTC of Macabebe,
Pampanga.
[15] They claimed
that they are in actual possession of the land in the concept of owners
and alleged that OCT No. 17629 in the name of RCA is spurious and fake.
Before
filing its Answer, the RCA moved to dismiss the case on grounds of
noncompliance with a condition precedent, laches, and for being a
collateral attack on its title. The RCA likewise later filed a
supplement to its motion to dismiss.
In an Order
[16]
dated June 4, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss reasoning that
when the rules speak of noncompliance with a condition precedent, it
could refer only to the failure of a party to secure the appropriate
certificate to file action under the
Local Government Code, or
the failure to exert earnest efforts towards an amicable settlement when
the suit involves members of the same family. The RTC also found that
plaintiffs have a cause of action. Furthermore, the trial court held
that RCA's argument - that the property cannot be acquired by
prescription because it has title over it - is a matter of evidence
which may be established during the trial on the merits.
Aggrieved, the RCA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an Order
[17] dated July 24, 2001. Thereafter, the RCA filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction.
[18]On March 18, 2002, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision,
[19] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[20]
A motion for reconsideration
[21] of the Decision was filed by the RCA. However, in the Resolution
[22]
dated May 30, 2002, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence,
the RCA filed the present petition for review on certiorari,
[23]
docketed as G.R. No. 153829, assailing the Decision of the CA, as well
as its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
On January 14, 2004, we resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 160909 and 153829.
[24]
Subsequently, the Court resolved to treat the petition for injunction
with prayer for the issuance of a TRO in G.R. No. 160909 as a motion for
the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. No.
153829.
[25]The RCA raises the following issues:
(A)
WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 01-1046(M) FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLE IS LEGALLY DISMISSIBLE FOR VIOLATION OF
THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT;
and
(B)
WHETHER OR NOT THE CIVIL ACTION (THE ABOVE MENTIONED CIVIL CASE NO.
01-1046[M]) FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON PETITIONER'S TITLE.[26]
Essentially,
the issue before us is whether the CA erred in not holding that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
filed by the RCA.
We affirm the ruling of the CA.
Well-entrenched
in our jurisdiction is the rule that the trial court's denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under
Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. This
is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The appropriate course of
action of the movant in such event is to file an answer and interpose as
affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss.
If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may
then elevate on appeal the same issues raised in the motion.
[27]The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion.
[28]
This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in
instances when there is a clear showing that the trial court exercised
its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.
[29]
Further, the abuse of the court's discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of,
law.
[30]Here, in
dismissing the petition for certiorari, the CA did not find grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC. The appellate court was not
convinced with the RCA's argument that plaintiffs failed to comply with
the condition precedent provided in Article 477
[31] of the
Civil Code
because they allegedly did not have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property. The CA explained that the requirement
stated in Article 477 is not a condition precedent before one can file
an action for quieting of title. Rather, it is a requisite for an
action to quiet title to prosper and the existence or nonexistence of
the requisite should be determined only after trial on the merits. The
CA also agreed with the trial court in ruling that the RCA cannot raise
in a motion to dismiss the ground that the complaint is already barred
by laches for it still remains to be established during trial how long
the plaintiffs have slept on their rights, if such be the case.
Evidently, the CA is correct in finding that the denial by the RTC of
the RCA's motion to dismiss is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Next, the RCA submits that an action for quieting of
title is a special civil action covered by Rule 63, while an action for
declaration of nullity of title is governed by ordinary rules. Thus, it
contends that these cases should have been dismissed for violation of
the rule on joinder of actions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, which requires that the joinder shall not include special
civil actions governed by special rules. Such contention, however, is
utterly bereft of merit and insufficient to show that the CA erred in
upholding the trial court's decision. Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly
provides that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action.
The RCA likewise asserts that the case
for quieting of title is a collateral attack on its title which is
prohibited by law. However, we agree with the CA in holding that the
complaint against the RCA does not amount to a collateral attack because
the action for the declaration of nullity of OCT No. 17629 is a clear
and direct attack on its title.
An action is deemed an attack on a
title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging
the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is
direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
[32]The
complaint filed with the RTC pertinently alleged that the claim of
ownership by the RCA is spurious as its title, denominated as OCT No.
17629, is fake for the following reasons: (1) that the erasures are very
apparent and the title itself is fake; (2) it was made to appear under
Memorandum of Encumbrance Entry No. 1007 that the title is a
reconstituted title when in truth, it is not; and (3) the verification
reveals that there was no petition filed before any court where an order
was issued for the reconstitution and re-issuance of an owner's
duplicate copy.
[33] It is
thus clear from the foregoing that the case filed questioning the
genuineness of OCT No. 17629 is a direct attack on the title of the RCA.
As
regards the petition docketed as G.R. No. 160909 which this Court
treated as motion for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, Guinto insists that there is a need to enjoin the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution as it would cause grave and
irreparable damage to Guinto, while the RCA would not suffer any damage
if it would later be proved that indeed its title is genuine.
We disagree.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction, viz:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a)
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or
nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a
party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
And as clearly explained in
Ocampo v. Sison Vda. de Fernandez:
[34]To
be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there
exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act
sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the
invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The applicant's right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a
clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Where the applicant's right or title is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for
injunction.
A clear and positive right especially calling for
judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect
or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to
protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There
must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the
applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
In
this case, the defendants in the ejectment case possess no such legal
rights that merit the protection of the courts through the writ of
preliminary injunction. The MCTC has already rendered a decision in
favor of the RCA and ordered the defendants therein to vacate the
premises. Their appeal to the RTC was dismissed and the decision has
become final. Evidently, their right to possess the property in
question has already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to
the right of the RCA in the MCTC decision which has already become
final and executory.
[35] WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 153829 is
DENIED. The Decision dated March 18, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66974 are
AFFIRMED.
The motion for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 2000(23) is likewise
DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and
Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 160909), p. 10.
[2] Rollo
(G.R. No. 153829), pp. 21-26. Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J.
Tria Tirona with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Bernardo P.
Abesamis concurring.
[3] Id. at 28.
[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 160909), pp. 18-20.
[5] Records, p. 11.
[6] Id. at 1-9.
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 160909), pp. 21-37. Penned by Judge Valentino B. Nogoy.
[8] Sec. 21.
Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.--The
judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
taken therefrom.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 160909), pp. 13-16.
[10] Id. at 16.
[11] Id. at 17.
[12] Supra note 4.
[13] Id. at 21.
[14] Id. at 3-12.
[15] Rollo, (G.R. No. 153829), pp. 36-43.
[16] Id. at 44-45. Issued by Judge Herminio Z. Canlas.
[17] Id. at 46-47.
[18] CA
rollo, pp. 2-17.
[19] Supra note 2.
[20] Id. at 25.
[21] Id. at 29-35.
[22] Id. at 28.
[23] Id. at 3-19.
[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 160909), p. 38.
[25] Id. at 39.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 153829), p. 9.
[27] Urethane Trading Specialist, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 164632, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 188, 191-192.
[28] See
Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31 & 176010-11, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 324, 336 and
Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 182-183 (2002).
[29] Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 227, 234.
[30] Id.
[31]
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property.
[32] Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152627, September 16, 2005, 470 SCRA 99, 107-108.
[33] Rollo (G.R. No. 153829), p. 37.
[34] G.R. No. 164529, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 79, 94-95.
[35] See
Medina v. City Sheriff, Manila, 342 Phil. 90, 97 (1997).