108 OG No. 20, 2316 (May 14, 2012)
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the complaint for annulment of title with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by plaintiffs Fermin Ramos and Spouses Mario and Celestina Maruzzo is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."[3] (emphasis Ours)
"In Republic vs. Doldol, the requisite to acquire title to public land were laid down as follows:' ...The original Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Sec. 48(b) now reads:Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land.
(b) Those who themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.'
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.'
Under Article 477 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, it provides that 'the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.'
In the case at bar, plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the land in question. Legal title means registered ownership and equitable title meant beneficial ownership. Since the plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the parcels of land in question, it is obvious that there is no cloud to be removed or to be prevented from being cast upon. The voice of judicial conscience calls for the dismissal of the instant action.
***. (E)ven assuming for a moment that the action is for annulment of the certificate of title, the Court finds that the plaintiffs are not the proper parties to bring the action, but rather the Solicitor General. And even assuming further that the plaintiffs are the proper parties, the action has already prescribed because the action partakes of the nature of reconveyance which prescribes after ten years. The argument that the action has not prescribed because plaintiffs are in possession of the property does not merit the consideration of the court. The argument holds true only if plaintiffs have the legal or equitable title to the property.[15] (emphasis Ours)
Plaintiffs-appellants Ramos, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration16 dated December 14, 2005 which however was denied in an Order[17] dated October 3, 2006, Consequently, they filed a Notice of Appeal.[18]
"THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CASE FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE, WHEN ON ITS FACE THE TITLE OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS VOID AB INITIO".[19]Such is the issue of this case.
"Section 101. All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines."It is the Solicitor-General, on behalf of the government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for reversion.[20] He has the specific power and function to "represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings" and to "institute actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution."[21] It is only the State which may institute reversion proceedings under Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[22]
"Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real party in interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.Besides, the interest of plaintiffs-appellants over the subject property is contingent on the government's consideration of their claim on said property as alleged long-time occupants and possessors thereof in the concept of owner. More so that plaintiffs-appellants have not even claimed that they already applied for title over the property. But, even if they did so, still, as mere public land applicants, plaintiffs-appellants' interest would only be plain expectancy. It will not qualify them as proper parties to sue for the cancellation of Manotok's title acquired under a free patent and the land would still revert to the government. Such was what Caro vs. Sucaldito[25] held, applying Section 101, id., to wit:
In the case at bar, the private respondents are mere lessees of the property in question. As such, they have no present substantial and personal interest with respect to issues involving ownership of the disputed property. The only interest they have, in the event that petitioner's title over the subject property is cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is the hope that they become qualified buyers of the subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly, such interest is a mere expectancy. Even the private respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of ownership to the State, they only have 'pre-emptive rights' to but the subject property; that their real interest over the said property is contingent upon the government's consideration of their application as buyers of the same. It is settled that a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed." (emphasis Ours)
"Under Section 101 ***, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action or any action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof , with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal personality from Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his application for a free patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part of the public domain; this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public land. Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain. Sumail does not automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others who may apply for the same." (emphasis Ours)The above ruling applies squarely to this case. Worse, aside from the fact that plaintiffs-appellants cannot maintain an action that would result in the reversion of the land to the State, they too have not claimed that the land is their private property. Worst, the plaintiffs-appellants are not even in actual possession of the property in question, despite their claim of possession that is "open, public, notorious peaceful and in good faith, continuous, and uninterrupted and adverse against the whole world, for a period of more than thirty (30) years".[26] They merely aver that "defendants' claim of ownership is only on the 649 square meters, while the herein plaintiffs claims (sic) the entire, 11,164 square meters which includes the 649 square meters covered by the spurious title of the defendant, as plaintiff has been occupying and only waiting that the government declares the same open for private appropriation before filing his claim for ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription."[27]