108 OG No. 10, 1030 (March 5, 2012)
The heirs of a missing seaman may file their claim
for death compensation benefits within the three-year period fixed by
law from the time the seaman has been presumed dead.
This Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] assails the Decision
[2] dated June 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78759, which granted the petition for
certiorari and reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated May 30, 2003
[3] and July 31, 2003
[4] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CASE No. OFW (M) 2000-05-00302-30 (NLRC NCR CA No. 031095-02).
Factual AntecedentsKorphil
Shipmanagement and Manning Corporation (Korphil) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of seafarers for its foreign
principals. On March 24, 1994, it hired Vedasto C. Pantollano (Vedasto)
as 4th Engineer on board the vessel M/V Couper under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) approved contract
[5] of employment, with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of Contract | : | 12 months |
Position | : | Fourth Engineer |
Basic Monthly Salary | : | USD 550.00 |
Hours of Work | : | 48 hours per week |
Overtime | : | USD 165.00 |
Vacation Leave With Pay | : | 3 days/month |
On
August 2, 1994, at about 6:45 A.M., Vedasto was seen by Messman Nolito
L. Tarnate (Messman Nolito) to be in deep thought, counting other
vessels passing by and talking to himself. At about 8:15 A.M., the Chief
Engineer of the vessel reported to the Master of the vessel, Mr. Kim
Jong Chul, that Vedasto did not show up for his duty. The Master of the
vessel thus ordered all personnel on stand by. The vessel then altered
its course to search for Vedasto. Some crew members were tasked to
search the vessel while others were assigned to focus their search on
the open sea to locate and rescue Vedasto. Assistance from other
vessels was also requested. The search and rescue operation lasted for
about six hours, but Vedasto was not found. On August 3, 1994, a Report
[6]
was issued by the Master of M/V Couper declaring that Vedasto was
missing. His wife, Imelda Pantollano (Imelda), was likewise informed
about the disappearance of Vedasto while onboard M/V Couper. Since then,
Vedasto was never seen again.
On May 29, 2000, Imelda filed a
complaint7 before the NLRC where she sought to recover death benefits,
damages and attorney's fees.
Ruling of the Labor ArbiterOn January 31, 2002, Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a Decision
[8]
holding that the legal heirs of Vedasto are entitled to the payment of
death benefits and attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the Labor
Arbiter's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is entered finding respondents liable for the
claimed death benefits to complainant-in-representation thus ORDERING
respondent's] principal and local manning agent, along with the latter's
corporate officers and directors, jointly and severally:
1. [T]o
Pay to the deceased complainant's legal heirs/beneficiaries Imelda
Pantollano and their four minor children, viz., Honeyvette L. Pantollano
born 10/30/81, Tierra Bryn L. Pantollano born 04/17/84. Kienne Dionnes
L, Pantollano born 08/29/89, and Sherra Veda Mae L. Pantollano born
11/21/90, death benefits under the POEA Rules and Regulations of
US$50,000.00 and US$ 28,000.00 (US$7,000.00 each) for the said 4 minor
children;
2. [T]o give and/or pay to them the proceeds of
seafarer V. Pantollano['s] coverage for Comprehensive Life, Health,
Medical and Disability Insurance with various P and I Clubs for the
Owner's Protection and Indemnity against any such claim against all
hazards and risks in operating the vessel pursuant to maritime commerce;
3. [To] pay attorney's fees of 10% of the total monetary amount awarded.
Other claims of complainant-in-representation are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED [9]
Ruling of the National Labor Relations CommissionKorphil sought recourse to the NLRC by submitting its Notice of Appeal
[10] With Memorandum of Appeal on March 6, 2002. On June 7, 2002, Korphil filed a Supplemental Appeal
[11] to their Memorandum of Appeal.
On July 31, 2002, the NLRC issued a Resolution
[13]
reversing and setting aside the January 31, 2002 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. According to the NLRC, the death of Vedasto which was clearly
shown by evidence to be a case of suicide was not compensable under the
clear provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract.
Imelda filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[13] which was opposed by
Korphil.
[14]In a Resolution
[15]
dated May 30, 2003, the NLRC reversed its July 31, 2002 Resolution and
reinstated the January 31, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Korphil filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[16] which was denied by the NLRC through its Resolution
[17] dated July 31,2003.
Ruling of the Court of AppealsAggrieved, Korphil filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari.
[18] On October 10, 2003, Imelda filed her Comment.
[19] Korphil did not file its reply and so the CA in a Resolution
[20]
dated December 4, 2003 deemed that it had waived the right to file its
reply. The CA directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
and then the case was declared submitted for
decision.
On
June 30, 2005, the CA issued its assailed Decision which granted the
petition, reversed and set aside the May 30, 2003 Resolution of the
NLRC, and dismissed the case for lack of merit. It held that under
Article 291 of the Labor Code, Imelda should have filed her complaint
within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Thus,
Imelda should have filed her complaint within three years from Vedasto's
disappearance on August 2, 1994. Having filed her complaint only on
May 29,2000, the same is already barred by prescription.
Imelda moved for reconsideration
[21] but to no avail. Hence, this appeal ascribing upon the CA the following errors:
1.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in law when it held that Art. 291
of the xxx Civil Code [applies] only in case of settlement of estates,
not in the claim for death compensation benefits under the Labor Code.
2.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in law when it applied as
precedent the case of Caltex (Phils.) Inc. vs. Cristela Villanueva, G.R.
No. L-15658, August 21, 1961.
3. Assuming arguendo that Art. 391
of the xxx Civil Code does not apply, the Honorable Court of Appeals
erred in law in refusing to apply the rule on estoppel against the
respondent company, thereby giving premium on the respondent's deception
of invoking prematurity when the petitioner timely demanded her death
compensation benefits but then raised the defense of prescription when
she reiterated her claim after waiting for the lapse of four (4) years
as earlier advised by the respondent company.[22]
The
above issues boil down to a single issue of whether the claim of Imelda
for death compensation benefits filed on May 29, 2000, or more than
five years from the time her husband Vedasto was reported missing on
August 2, 1994, is already barred by prescription following the
provisions of Article 291 of the Labor
Imelda's ArgumentsImelda
contends that her claim was not yet barred by prescription when she
filed it on May 29, 2000. She avers that when she went to the office of
Korphil to claim the death benefits due to the heirs of her husband,
Korphil advised her that it was still premature and that she has to wait
for the lapse of four years before her husband Vedasto could be
declared dead. This is in accordance with the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code.
However, when she came back after four years,
she was told that her claim has already prescribed pursuant to Article
291 of the Labor Code. Imelda asserts that Korphil is, therefore,
estopped from interposing the defense of prescription in this case as it
was Korphil itself which advised her to wait for at least four years
before filing the claim for death benefits. However, the CA ignored
this very material fact albeit conspicuously discussed as one of
Imelda's arguments.
Imelda further contends that the CA erred
when it held that Article 391 of the Civil Code applies only in cases of
settlement of estates, and not to cases of death compensation claims as
in this case.
Korphil's Arguments
Korphil,
on the other hand, argues that prescription of actions for money claims
arising from employer-employee relationship is governed by Article 291
of the Labor Code. The three-year prescriptive period referred to in
Article 291 shall commence to run from the time the cause of action
accrued.
According to Korphil, the unexplained disappearance on
August 2, 1994 of Vedasto occurred on the high seas where there is
inherent impossibility for him to leave the ship. The fact that he
could not be found dead or alive despite best A efforts of all the crew
members and the other vessels which responded to the distress call, and
the failure of Imelda to establish that Vedasto is still alive are more
than substantial proofs to establish that the latter died on August 2,
1994. Therefore, prescription should be reckoned from this date which is
considered as the time of death of Vedasto. It is also at this point
that the obligation of Korphil to pay death compensation can be demanded
as a matter of right by the heirs of Vedasto.
Korphil posits
that since Imelda filed only on May 29, 2000, or almost five years and
ten months from August 2, 1994, her claim to recover death benefits,
damages, and attorney's fees is, therefore, already barred by the
three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
In
Medline Management, Inc. v. Roslinda,
[23]
we declared that "in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the
employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment
contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the
employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it
is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his
employment contract, the employer is liable."
In this case, there
is no dispute that Vedasto went missing on August 2, 1994, during the
effectivity of his employment contract. Thus, his beneficiaries are
entitled to the death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers, Section 20 of which states:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
In
the case of work-related death of the seafarer during the term of his
contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine
Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$
50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$
7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding
four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of
payment.
xxxx
Thus, upon the death of
Vedasto, his heirs, specifically Imelda and their four children, are
entitled to US$50,000.00 as well as US$7,000.00 for each child under the
age of 21. The status of Imelda and her four children as the
legitimate beneficiaries of Vedasto was never questioned. The only issue
raised by Korphil was the prescription of their claim.
Korphil is estopped from asserting
that the reckoning point for prescription
to set in is August 2,1994.Preliminarily,
it must be stressed that Korphil is estopped from asserting that
Imelda's cause of action accrued on August 2, 1994. Korphil could not
deny the fact that it is a party to another case filed by Gliceria P.
Echavez (Gliceria), the mother of Vedasto. In this case, Gliceria
claimed death benefits due to the death of her son Vedasto. In a
Decision
[24] dated October 15,
1997, Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Ahnirante ruled that the claim was
prematurely filed and hence it must be dismissed without prejudice to
the re-filing of the same at the right time. The case was re-filed on
August 26, 1998. In a decision
[25]
dated February 22, 1999, Labor Arbiter Almirante ruled that Korphil is
liable for the payment of death benefits to Gliceria. Korphil appealed
to the NLRC. On November 19, 1999, the NLRC rendered its Decision
[26] which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision.
Korphil filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari[27] which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58933. In the said petition, Korphil advanced the following arguments:
In
as much as the missing seaman's death cannot be proven, Mr. Pantollano
cannot be presumed dead right away considering that the New Civil Code
as well as the Rules of Court provide for a specific rule before a
missing person can be properly presumed dead. We shall quote in full
the said provision as follows:
After an absence of
seven (7) years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
xxxx
Considering that Mr. Pantollano
has been absent only for less than six (6) years, his death cannot be
legally presumed. If Mr. Pantollano cannot be considered to have died
at the time of his disappearance or cannot be legally presumed dead as
of the present time by virtue of Article 390 of the Civil Code, public
respondent NLRC cannot successfully apply the provision of Section 20
(A) (1) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract because the death of
Mr. Pantollano indeed had never occurred. Even [if] a perspicacious,
thorough and exhaustive perusal is made on the pertinent provisions of
the POEA Standard Employment Contract, this Honorable Court cannot find a
provision which gives death compensation to a seafarer who had just
disappeared or was merely declared as missing.
In view of the
fact that the death of the seaman was not duly proven and the period
within which the missing seaman can be lawfully presumed dead has not
been complied with, it becomes clear that public respondent NLRC indeed
committed serious error when it affirmed the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter awarding death compensation to private respondent.
[28]The
CA dismissed the claim of Gliceria because the natural mother is not
the beneficiary contemplated by law notwithstanding the fact that she
was designated by her deceased son as the sole allottee and
beneficiary. If there is any party entitled to the death compensation
benefits, it is Vedasto's surviving spouse and children and not her
mother.
Gliceria thus filed a petition for review with this
Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 157424. In a Resolution dated
August 6, 2003, the Court denied the same for the failure of Gliceria to
file the appeal within the extended period in accordance with Section
2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and for her failure to properly verify
the petition in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to
Section 4, Rule 7, since the verification is based on affiant's personal
knowledge, information and belief, as a consequence of which the
petition was treated as an unsigned pleading which under Section 3, Rule
7, produces no legal effect.
But what is obvious is that in the
earlier claim for compensation benefits filed by Gliceria, who wanted to
arrogate unto herself the said benefits, Korphil was claiming that it
was still premature because the death of Vedasto was not yet duly proven
and the period that must elapse before a seaman can be lawfully
presumed dead has not been complied with. Consequently, Korphil is
estopped from insisting in this later case filed by Imelda that Vedasto
should be considered dead from the time he went missing on August 2,
1994 and therefore the claim was filed beyond the allowable period of
three years.
This Court is mindful of the fact that as soon as
Imelda came to know about the missing status of her husband on August 2,
1994, she went to Korphil to file her claim for the payment of death
benefits. However, the latter informed her that it was still premature
to claim the same and advised her instead to wait four more years before
her husband could be presumed dead thereby entitling his heirs to death
benefits. Korphil is therefore guilty of estoppel.
"Under the
doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved
as against the person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his
own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who
relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his
own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or
omission, be permitted to falsify it."
[29]Imelda 's cause of action accrued only
on August 2,1998 and not on August 2,
1994.According to Korphil, Article 291 of the Labor Code is applicable in this case as it provides:
ART. 291. Money Claims.
- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
xxxx
Korphil posits that the
three-year prescriptive period referred to in Article 291 shall commence
to run from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., at the time
Vedasto died on August 2, 1994. Hence, when Imelda filed her claim on
May 29,2000, the same has already prescribed.
We are not
persuaded. On August 2, 1994, it cannot as yet be presumed that Vedasto
is already dead. "The boat was not lost. This opens up a number of
possibilities, x x x [N]othing is certain. Nobody knows what has
happened to him. He could have transferred to another vessel or
watercraft. He could even have swum to safety. Or he could have died.
Or worse, he could have taken his own life. Legal implications - such
as right to compensation, succession, the legal status of the wife - are
so important that courts should not so easily be carried to the
conclusion that the man is dead. The result is that death cannot be
taken as a fact."
[30]A
person missing under the circumstances as those of Vedasto may not
legally be considered as dead until the lapse of the period fixed by law
on presumption of death, and consequently Imelda cannot yet be
considered as a widow entitled to compensation under the law.
On
August 2, 1994, when Vedasto was reported missing, Imelda cannot as yet
file her claim for death benefits as it Is still premature. The
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code therefore become relevant,
to wit:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs;
(1)
A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the
loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. (Emphasis supplied.)
With
the known facts, namely, that Vedasto was lost or missing while M/V
Couper was navigating the open sea, .there is no doubt that he could
have been in danger of death. Paragraph (3) of Article 391 of the Civil
Code will then be applicable in this case. Thus, Vedasto can only be
presumed dead after the lapse of four years from August 2, 1994 when he
was declared missing. But of course, evidence must be shown that
Vedasto has not been heard of for four years or thereafter. This is the
case here.
Vedasto is presumed legally dead only on August 2,
1998. It is only at this time that the rights of his heirs to file
their claim for death benefits accrued.
Korphil then further
argued that although Vedasto was declared dead only on August 2, 1998,
his death should be considered on the very day of the occurrence of the
event from which death is presumed. Thus, the death of Vedasto should
retroact to August 2, 1994. The three-year prescriptive period under
Article 291 of the Labor Code will therefore be reckoned on August 2,
1994.
We do not agree.
If we allow such an argument, then
no claim for death compensation benefits under this circumstance will
ever prosper. This is so because the heirs of a missing seaman have to
wait for four years as provided under Article 391 of the Civil Code
before the seaman is declared as legally dead. After four years, the
prescriptive period for filing money claims under Article 291 of the
Labor Code would, obviously, lapse. This scenario could not have been
the intention of the legislature in enacting a social legislation, such
as the Labor Code.
Imelda's claim for death compensation
benefits was filed on time.Having
already established that Imelda's cause of action accrued on August 2,
1998, it follows that her claim filed on May 29, 2000 was timely. It
was filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued
pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code. Hence, Imelda and her
children are entitled to the payment of said compensation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78759 dated May 30, 2005, is
SET ASIDE and the May 30, 2003 Resolution of the NLRC is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and
Perez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 23-48.
[2] CA
rollo,
pp. 291-300; penned by Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred
in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza
[3] Id. at 157-162.
[4] Id. at 175-176.
[5] Id. at 194.
[6] Id. at 195.
[7] Rollo, p. 73
[8] CA
rollo, pp. 42-49.
[9] Id. at 48-49.
[10] Id. at 50-77.
[11] Id. at 101-110.
[12] Id. at 111-119.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
dismissing the instant case for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 118.)
[13] Id. at 120-140.
[14] Id. at 141-156.
[15] Id. at 157-162.
[16] Id. at 163-174.
[17] Id. at 175-176.
[18] Id. at 2-41.
[19] Id. at 234-259.
[20] Id. at 260.
[21] Id. at 303-311.
[22] Rollo, p. 36.
[23] G.R. No. 168715, September 15. 2010, citing
Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr., G.R. No. 167678, June 22, 2010 and
Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita, G.R. No. 166580, February 8, 2007, 515 SCRA 157, 168.
[24]Rollo, pp. 74-77.
[25] Id. at 104-108.
[26] Id. at 109-113.
[27] Id. at 78-103.
[28] Id. at 87.
[29] Philippine Savings Bank v. Chowking Food Corporation, G.R. No. 177526, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 318, 328.
[30] Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Pepito, 125 Phil. 197,200-201 (1966).